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The research is focused on purchase of service contracting in the Otago/Southland regi
on -
from 1992 to 1998. For the purpose of this research, purchase of service contract
ing is 
defined as purchase of social services by the Community Funding Agency from
 the 
voluntary organisations in the Otago/Southland region. The aim of the research
 is to 
examine the potential of purchase of service contracting as an effective policy instru
ment. 
The research is based on a comprehensive study of the success and failure of purch
ase of 
service contracting in helping the voluntary organisations in the Otago/Southland r
egion 
and the Community Funding Agency attain ten specific objectives, namely: 
- achievement of a genuine partnership between the purchaser and the providers; 
-increase in the quantity of services; 
-improvement in the quality of programmes; 
-decrease in the cost of production; 
-responsiveness to the changes in the demands of users; 
- acceptance of accountability requirements by both parties to the contract; 
-empowerment of clients and their communities; 
-clarity of contractual terms and conditions; 
-transparency of the contracting process; and 
-fair and just distribution of resources and outputs. 
The findings of the research, whose theoretical foundation is provided by a set of eco
nomic 
and administrative doctrines, are based on the information collected from a) the resp
onses 
of fifty-seven participating voluntary organisations to the questionnaire mailed to the
m, b) 
face-to-face, open-ended interviews with twenty-eight voluntary sector managers an
d the 
three outreach workers operating in the Otago/Southland region at the time of writin
g, and 
c) informal discussion with eight people formerly associated with the Community Fu
nding 
ii 
Agency at senior management level. The data obtained through field research are verified 
with prevailing literature -local and international. 
The research suggests that the protagonists of purchase of service contracting outnumber its 
opponents. While many of the advocates observe that purchase of service contracting needs 
to be improved upon, they conceive at the same time that it is beneficial for the voluntary 
organisations in Otago/Southland region as well as the Community Funding Agency and, 
broadly speaking, has the capacity to contribute to the creation of a public sector that works 
better and costs less. Even a number of critics consider purchase of service contracting to 
be occasionally helpful for the purchaser. 
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During the 1980s, there was a significant upsurge in the reliance of governments, in the 
OECD countries in particular, on contracting out- an administrative device encouraged by 
political will - for the purchase of specific public services from a variety of providers.
1 
Indeed, with the global recession in the mid-1970s causing acute fiscal crisis, contracting 
out began to flourish over a couple of decades ago impacting, according to Barrett, on both 
support and traditional core services.' In the opinion of Ascher, several nations in Europe 
like the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Germany, Switzerland, Sweden and Denmark, 
in addition to the United States, Canada, Japan and Israel, had a long history of contracting 
out.' While used extensively in socialist economies as well,' contracting out, however, is 
conspicuous by its virtual absence in the Third World owing to limited infrastructural 
facilities, resistance from influential interest groups, and lack of requisite managerial skills.' 
Contracting out has been highly commended by academics as well as practitioners around 
the world as one of the most important management tools "of improving", in the words of 
Stockdale, "public sector performance".' The expanding use of contracting out has led to 
the adoption of such progranunes as the 'Next Steps' in Britain' and the formulation of 
1 K. Walsh (1995) Public Services and Market Mechanisms: Competition. Contracting and New Pu!Jlic 
Management p. 118. S. Domberger (1998) Contracting Organization: A Strategic Guide to Outsourcing 
r· 9. 
P. Barrett (2000) Balancing Accountability and Efficiency in a More Competitive Public Sector Environment 
Public Administration 59:6, p. 65. 
3 K. Ascher (1987) The Politics of Privatisation: Contracting out Public Services p. 18. 
4 S. Rimmer (1994) Competitive Tendering and Contracting: Theory and Research The Australian Economic 
Review 3rd Quarter, p. 80. 
5 S. Paul (1988) Privatisation: A Review of International Experience Economic and Political Weekly 23:6, 
fP· 274-275. 
Stockdale quoted inS. Domberger (1994) Public Sector Contracting: Does It Work? The Australian 
Economic Review 3rd Quarter, p. 92. 
7 Cm 524 (1988) Civil Service Management Refonn: the Next Steps, Government reply to the 8th 
Report from the Treasury and the Civil Service Committee, Session 1987-88, HC 494-1, 1988. 
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framework documents like the 'Gore Report' in the United States.' Australia has displayed 
a keen interest in contracting out, with Victoria introducing compulsory competitive 
tendering at the local level in 1994.' An increasing proportion of public services 
reorganised, to quote Kirkpatrick and Lucio, "around contracts .. .in a way ... never seen 
before''10
 has resulted in a proliferation of research on the consequences of contracting out 
in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and particularly Australia where, as 
Rimmer points out, the value of the services contracted by public sector agencies was 
estimated to exceed $A13 billion a year in the mid-1990s.
11 
New Zealand witnessed a more substantial growth than almost anywhere else in the 
application of contracting out as a part of the public sector reforms carried out by the fourth 
Labour government between 1984 and 1990,
12 and attracted international kudosn 
However, in the very same country, there are few empirical analyses or case studies on the 
effects of contracting out.
14 This is especially the case in the domain of social welfare 
where contracting out has formally been in use since the early 1990s. The relative dearth of 
raw data places limits on the conclusions in respect of the advantages and shortcomings of 
contracting out in social welfare, alternatively referred to as purchase of service contracting. 
Though there are numerous impediments involved in carrying out research on purchase of 
service contracting, such as paucity of concrete evidence on benefits and costs and 
8 A. Gore (1993) From Red Tape to Results: Creating a Government That Works Better and Costs 
Less. 
9 S. Domberger (1994) The Australian Economic Review 3rd Quarter, p. 91. 
10 I. Kirkpatrick and M. M. Lucio (1996) Introduction: The Contract State and the Future of Public 
Management Public Administration 74:1, p. 1. 
11 S. J. Rinnner (1998) Competitive Tendering and Outsourcing- Initiatives and Methods Australian 
Journal of Public Administration 57:4, p. 76. 
12 S. Dornberger and C. Hall (1996) Contracting for Public Services: A Review of Antipodean Experience 
Public Administration 74:1, p. 129. 
13 C. Campbell (2001) Juggling Inputs, Outputs and Outcomes in the Search for Policy Competence: Recent 
Experience in Australia Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration 14:2, p. 253. 
14 J. Boston (1996) The Use of Contracting in the Public Sector- Recent New Zealand Experience 
Australian Journal of Public Administration 55:3, p. 105. 
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problems in measuring performance, one should not be deterred by these obstacles. 
Besides, purchase of service contracting is a particularly interesting topic of research 
because of its difference from contracting out in several other policy sectors. Last but not 
the least, comprehensive research on purchase of service contracting may enable the 
researcher to find better ways of "fostering", in the words of Tunzelmann and Murphy, " ... 




The current research concentrates on the success and failure of purchase of service 
contracting in helping voluntary organisations (also called service agencies) and 
government attain certain specific objectives. State agencies, local authorities and private 
firms, involved in the contracting process as well, lie beyond the scope of the study. There 
are reasons behind choosing the voluntary (or third or independent) sector comprising, 
according to Salamon and Aneheier, 'organized', 'private', 'non-profit distributing', 'self-
governing', and 'voluntary' agencies." It has traditionally been the chief producer of the 
services purchased by the state to meet the requirements of clients and their communities. 
Besides, a complete understanding of the economic and social dynamics within society is 
not possible by analysing the relationship between government and market alone-" The 
focus is on Otago/Southland, because while regional variations do exist in relation to, say, 
consumer needs or responses from providers, there seems to be nothing in the prevailing 
literature to suggest that the contract system differs fundamentally across geographic areas. 
Therefore, it is likely that the findings will be relevant for the rest of New Zealand. The 
15 A. von Tunzelmann and M. Murphy (1998) Government Funding of Voluntary Services in New 
Zealand: The Contracting Issues - A Scoping Study p. 3. 
16 Salamon and Anheier cited inS. Morris (2000) Defining the Nonprofit Sector Voluntas: Internation
al 
Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations 11:1, pp. 29-30. 
17 D. Suggate (1995) An Overview of the Voluntary Sector p. !. 
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time-frame is from May 1992 when the Community Funding Agency· came into existence, 
up until its merger with the Children, Young Persons and Their Families Service in January 
1999. 
The research is organised into three parts. Consisting of seven chapters, Part I embarks on a 
general review of contracting out including purchase of service contracting in New Zealand 
and overseas, on the basis of an extensive survey of extant materials - both local and 
international. Chapter 1 elucidates the salient features of, and the economic and 
administrative doctrines influencing the shift towards, contracting out including purchase of 
service contracting. Chapter 2 deals with the implications of the contract system as a 
neoliberal strategy contributing to the enhancement of the productive efficiency, and the 
reduction of the level of expenditure, of the public sector. Chapters 3 and 4 examine in 
general terms the success and failure of purchase of service contracting in enabling 
voluntary organisations and government respectively to achieve ten specific objectives, 
identified in theoretical literature as significant goals for both of them to attain, and 
influenced by the ideas originating from a set of economic and administrative doctrines. 
Chapter 5 explores the nature and scope of contracting out within the public sector in New 
Zealand, together with the degree of variation in its applicability across policy domains. 
Chapter 6 looks at the operation of purchase of service contracting in New Zealand from 
1992 to 1998, starting with a brief review of the historical background. Chapter 7 sets out 
the research design. Comprising three chapters, Part II attempts to examine the perceptions 
of those participating in the research about the utility or otherwise of purchase of service 
contracting for the service agencies in Otago/Southland and the Community Funding 
Agency. Chapter 8 assesses the success and failure of purchase of service contracting in 
helping the voluntary organisations in the area to secure the objectives mentioned above, 
and demonstrates the extent to which six specific agency characteristics or traits (level, 
area, size, age, funding, and client group) - found, by means of field research, to have a 
5 
major impact on the attitude of the producers towards contracting out in social welfare -
affected the views of the providers on the part played by outsourcing in enabling or failing 
the Community Funding Agency to attain the goals referred to. Chapter 9 evaluates the 
efficacy and deficiency of purchase of service contracting in aiding the Community Funding 
Agency to achieve the aforementioned objectives. Part III has two chapters. The first 
summarises the findings of the research and makes some generalisations, while the second 
concludes the thesis by recommending the measures to be undertaken to enhance the 
effectiveness of purchase of service contracting. 
The research studies the role of the voluntary organisations in Otago/Southland as well as 
the Community Funding Agency in producing and providing social services. It is hoped 
that the research will lead to the generation of a more viable contracting process, the 
emergence of stronger families and safer communities, the establishment of practical ways 
to promote the well-being and foster the self-determination of Maori and other ethnic 
minorities, and the development of a robust partnership between voluntary organisations 
and the state. It is likely that the people working in various departments or ministries 
(especially the Department of Child, Youth and Family Services and the Ministry of Social 
Development), the staff associated with voluntary organisations, and a host of practising 
social workers and academics will find the research of some interest. 
In the opinion of the researcher, purchase of service contracting is set to become even more 
important as an effective policy instrument in the future, with continuous efforts to improve 
upon the provision of social services. It is obvious that the initiatives pursued in a 
particular country cannot always be transferred successfully to other nations, since cultural, 
constitutional, and demographic circumstances vary. Nevertheless, it is expected that the 
present study will be of both theoretical and practical value in helping practitioners in 
different countries draw on the experiences of New Zealand in refining their own systems. 
6 
Chapter 1 
Defining Contracting Out 
This chapter considers the key issues associated with the contract system including contracting 
out and purchase of service contracting. It begins with a discussion of contracting out - what 
it means, how it differs from privatisation and competitive tendering, what its various forms 
are, how it is pursued, and why it needs a competitive environment. It then embarks on a more 
or less similar review of purchase of service contracting -its meaning and scope, its past and 
present, and its problems and prospects in the West. Thereafter, it critically assesses the 
economic and administrative theories underpinning both contracting out and purchase of 
service contracting. In conclusion, it reflects on the benefits and costs of contracting out as 
well as purchase of service contracting, makes some observations on the future of the contract 
system, and identifies, in existing literature, two significant gaps which the cmTent study 
attempts to redress. 
Contracting out 
Sometimes referred to as outsourcing or distancing,' contracting out, in simple terms, stands 
for the purchase of specific public services (including those previously undertaken in-house) 
by the public sector from providers (alternatively called producers or suppliers) for the benefit 
of clients and may, as such, be regarded, to quote Ascher, "essentially as a form of 
procurement".' Public services range from the secondary functions of the state (cleaning, 
garbage collection, payroll services, building and construction), to its more important activities 
1 S. Pinch (1997) Worlds of Welfare: Understanding the Changing Geographies of Social Welfare 
Provision p. 50. 
2 K. Ascher (1987) The Politics of Privatisation: Contracting out Public Services p. 7. 
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(health, education, social welfare, transport) and primary responsibilities (policy advice, 
planning, regulation, law enforcement). The public sector consists of government (central, 
state, and local) and state agencies. By providers are meant non-profit voluntary organisations, 
for-profit private firms, and individual vendors. Clients (variously designated as consumers or 
customers or users) represent not only individuals but also groups and communities. The 
fundamental objective of contracting out is to mitigate the fiscal crisis-driven tensions in a 
modern state (explained in greater detail in Chapter 2), by enhancing the productive efficiency, 
and reducing the level of expenditure, of the public sector, that is, enabling government to 
provide more for less. The scope of contracting out, however, varies widely across policy 
domains. For instance, in New Zealand, contracting out has been much more extensive in 
health care, scientific research, and transport than in areas like policing, diplomacy, and prison 
management.' 
In the United States, the term 'contracting out' has often been used interchangeably with 
privatisation. Contracting out may indeed be looked upon as, in the words of Culpitt, "[a] part 
of the wider social policy frame of privatisation" .' But, under no circumstances should 
contracting out be thought of as synonymous with privatisation.
5 Contracting out indicates a 
method of purchasing services by government from private or voluntary agencies. 
Privatisation, on the other hand, involves shifting the funding of services from the state to the 
private or voluntary sector. In the case of contracting out, the accountability for the delivery of 
services ultimately remains with government, while privatisation amounts to a deliberate 
transfer of responsibility from the public to the private or voluntary realm for the replacement 
of state by market. However, Gibelman is not far from the truth when she observes that 
3 J. Boston (1996) The Use of Contracting in the Public Sector- Recent New Zealand Experience Australian 
Journal of Public Administration 55:3, p. 107. Boston (1998) Public Sector Management, Electoral Reform 
and the Future of the Contract State in New Zealand Australian Journal of Public Administration 57:4, p. 36. 
4 I. Culpitt (1992) Welfare and Citizenship: Beyond the Crisis of the Welfare State? p. 81. 
5 C. Thomas (1988) Contracting-Out: Managerial Strategy or Political Dogma? In V. Ramanadham (ed.) 
Privatisation in the UK p. 153. 
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contracting out represents a mid-point between direct provision of services and total 
• • • 6 
pnvatlsatwn. 
Contracting out needs to be distinguished from competitive tendering as well - a process 
under which, to quote Pinch, "various contractors are invited to tender for the provision of a 
contract ... usually awarded on the basis of some specified criteria such as least cost, highest 
quality or greatest flexibility".' According to Choi, contracting out and competitive tendering, 
while related, may (and do) occur independently of each other.' Competitive tendering does 
not necessarily have to entail contracting out "since", in the words of Pinch, "an internal 
departlnent within the parent organisation ... may bid for, and win, the contract".' Conversely, 
there is little competitive tendering in cases where government, engaged in contracting out 
services, builds up long-term relationships of trust and cooperation with the voluntary sector. 
Contracting out generally calls for an explicit contract written m clear and simple terms, 
entered into by at least two parties through free consent, and enforced by law. 
10 The parties 
enjoy the positive freedom to create, change, or 'turn back' from contractual obligations on 
mutual assent, refuse to enter into a contract, and appear before the court in case of non-
I .
 ll 
comp mnce. However, the parties to a contract are encouraged to develop - by means of 
consultation and dialogue - faith and commitment which constitute the basis for voluntary 
transactions. In this sense, any contract, while basically a legal concept, has a moral 
significance for the parties, too. It should be mentioned here that there was a long-standing 
tendency for numerous states to let out services to voluntary organisations or private firms 
6 M. Gibelman (1996) Contracting for Social Services: Boom or Bust for the Voluntary Sector? lou mal of 
Health and Human Services Administration 19 1, p. 28. 
7 Pinch (1997) Worlds of Welfare: Understanding the Changing Geographies of Social Welfare Provision 
r- 50. 
Y-C Choi (1999) The Dynamics of Public Service Contracting: The British Experience p. 22. 
9 Pinch (1997) Worlds of Welfare: Understanding the Changing Geographies of Social Welfare Provision 
p,- 51. 
0 P. M. Kettner and L. L. Martin (1987) Purchase of Service Contracting pp. 17-20. 
11 I. Harden (1992) The Contracting State p. 3. 
9 
without making any conventional agreement with producers, but in course of time the old 
practice made way for the modem trend towards formalising the relationship between the 
parties to a contract. 
Contracting out assumes a variety of forms - each having its distinctive traits. 'Classical' or 
'explicit' contracts are characterised by spot exchange negotiations, legal rules, formal 
documents, self-liquidating transactions, and recourse to litigation for the resolution of 
]eli 
12 
contractua sputes. 'Relational' or 'implicit' contracts are based on commitment, 
goodwill, integrity, trust, reciprocity, and continuing relationship.!) 'Long-term' contracts 
facilitate adjustments to changing market circumstances, insofar as the services to be provided 
are described in general terms, with the details left to be elaborated as events unfold." In the 
case of 'short-term' contracts, the conditions are set once and for all- not to be altered under 
. h ~ any Circumstances w atsoever. There are contracts on the basis of inputs, outputs, 
outcomes, fixed price, and incentives (apart from the usual fee)." In the United Kingdom, 
three types of contract are found to operate in social care: 'block' contracts under which 
payment is made regardless of whether the service has been utilised; 'spot and call-off' 
contracts under which the supplier is only paid if the client uses the service; and 'cost-and-
volume' contracts under which a guaranteed level of service is purchased and additional 
reimbursement made in accordance with the number of consumers.
17 
Contracting out is usually pursued through competitive tendering. Under competitive 
tendering, the purchaser exercises a degree of control over the delivery of services by deciding 
12 
C. Bennett and E. Ferlie (1996) Contracting in Theory and in Practice: Some Evidence from the NHS Public 
Administration 74:1• p. 50. 
13 G. Scott (1997) Continuity and Change in Public Management: Second Generation Issues in Roles, 
Responsibilities and Relationships. In State Services Commission Future Issues in Public Management p. 23. 
14 0. Williamson (1975) Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications p. 17. 
15 Ibid. 
16 J.D. Donahue (1989) The Privatization Decision: Public Ends, Private Means pp. 82-85, llO. 
17 M. Knapp et al (2001) Commissioning for Quality: Ten Years of Service Care Markets in England Journal of 
Social Policy 30:2, p. 296. 
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which of them require to be outsourced, on what conditions, and to whom for the procurement 
of desired outcomes. Competitive tendering involves: 
- adopting a multi-stage tendering process to select the most competitive tenderer in terms of 
quality, quantity, and cost; 
-managing hazards, in the opinion of O'Looney, by means of risk-reducing mechanisms; 
18 
- correcting deviance and setting targets for better achievement through standards and 
indicators which, according to Halachmi, have the potential to align organisational behaviour 
. h I 19 wtt agency goa s; 
- structuring rewards and sanctions to secure compliance; and 
- resorting to 'benchmarking', that is, to quote Gooden and McCreary, "identifying and 
importing best practices"
20 by making comparisons with similar progrmes embarked upon 
by others21 · d rf n m or er to measure pe ormance, assess migration options (re-tendering, 
discontinuing, bringing in-house, renewing contract)," and maximise value for money in the 
bl . 
24 
pu tc sector. 
The common stages of competitive tendering are, therefore, transparent enough. Careful 
planning and management of competitive tendering under the supervision of trained and 
experienced contract managers lowers, if not eliminates, the risks related to contracting out, 
and contributes to the attainment of its benefits." 
18 O'Looney cited in P. Barrett (2000) Balancing Accountability and Efficiency in a More Competitive Public 
Sector Environment Australian Journal of Public Administration 59:3, p. 66. 
19 A. Halachmi (2000) Value for Money, Best Value and Measuring Government Performance: An Inttoduction to 
the Symposium International Review of Administrative Sciences 66:3, p. 389. 
20 S. T. Gooden and S.M. McCreary (2001) That Old-Time Religion: Efficiency. Benchmarking and Productivity
 
Public Administration Review 61:1, p. ll8. 
21 Foot cited in T. Bovaird (2000) Best Value in the United Kingdom: Using Benchmarking and Competition to 
Achieve Value for Money International Review of Administrative Sciences 66:3, p. 416. 
22 A. Halachmi and V. L. Montgomery (2000) Best Value and Accountability: Issues and Observations 
International Review of Administrative Sciences 66:3, p. 410. 
23 The Treasury (1997) Review of Contracting in Central Government p. 26. 
24 Halachmi and Montgomery (2000) International Review of Administrative Sciences 66:3, p. 410. 
25 S. J. Rimmer (1991) Competitive Tendering, Contracting Out and Franchising: Key Concepts and Issues 
Australian Journal of Public Administration 50:3, pp. 292-302. C. Hall and S. J. Rimmer (1994) Performance 
Monitoring and Public Sector Contracting Australian Journal of Public Administration 53:4, pp. 453-461. 
II 
While the success of contracting out depends to a considerable extent on how proficiently it is 
managed, a competitive environment, in the opinion of Hartley and Huby, needs to prevail." 
Indeed, in the absence of a competitive environment, contractors might not bother to think of 
improving service performance or enhancing quality, efficiency, and cost-effectiveness, but 
rather take advantage of automatic renewals to offset previous losses and capture larger profits. 
There are a number of 'roadblocks' or impediments, such as preference for well-known 
providers, corruption, and political interference in the way of a competitive environment. 
However, in order to remove such obstacles and preserve a competitive environment, steps can 
be taken to employ strategies like encouraging greater use of open competitions, accepting 
offers from new entrants, arranging for regular re-contracting, making in-house bidders and 
external producers compete on similar terms, necessitating compliance with legal standards, 
and publishing the results of the tendering process." 
The protagonists of contracting out often claim that it results, among other things, in 
substantial improvements in the production, provision, and recommodification of outputs." 
26 K. Hartley and M. Huby (1986) Contracting-Out Policy: Theory and Evidence. In J. Kay et al. (eds.) 
Privatisation and Regulation: The UK Experience p. 286. 
27 K. Hartley (1990) Contracting-out in Britain: Achievements and Problems. In J. Richardson (ed.) Privatisation 
and Deregulation in Canada and Britain pp. 194-195. 
28 G. Manser (1972) Implications of Purchase of Service for Voluntary Agencies Social Casework 53:6, p. 336. 
L. C. Fitch (1974) Increasing the Role of the Private Sector in Providing Public Services. In W. D. Howley and 
D. D. Rogers (eds.) Improving the Quality of Urban Management p. 551. P. Terrell (1976) The Social 
Impact of Revenue Sharing pp. 86, 87. D. Fisk et al. (1978) Private Provision of Public Services: An 
Overview pp. 6, 7. A. Gurin et al. (1980) Contracting for Service as a Mechanism for the Delivery of 
Human Services: A Study of Contracting Practices in Three Human Services Agencies in Massachusetts 
p. 247. E. S. Savas (1982) Privatizing the Public Sector: How to Shrink Government pp. 89-90. K. Hartley 
(1984) Why Contract Out? In Contracting Out in the Public Sector p. 11. M. Pirie (1985) Privatization in 
Theory and Practice pp. 140-143. S. Domberger (1986) Economic Regulation through Franchise Contracts. In 
J. Kay et al. (eds.) Privatisation and Regulation: The UK Experience pp. 275-276. S. Domberger et al. 
(1986) Competitive Tendering and Efficiency: The Case of Refuse Collection Fiscal Studies 7:4, pp. 69-87. J. 
Ferris and E. Graddy (1986) Contracting Out: For What? With Whom? Public Administration Review 46:4, pp. 
332-334, 337-339. Hartley and Huby (1986) Contracting-Out Policy: Theory And Evidence. In Kay et al. 
(eds.)Privatisation and Regulation: The UK Experience p. 289. Kettner and Martin (1987) Purchase of 
Service Contracting p. 49. S. Domberger (1988) Competitive Tendering and Contracting Out: Some Lessons 
from the UK Experience p. 9. S. Domberger et al. (1988) Competition and Efficiency in Refuse Collection: A 
Reply Fiscal Studies 9:1, pp. 86-90. Hartley (1990) Contracting-out in Britain. In Richardson (ed.) 
Privatisation and Deregulation in Canada and Britain p. 187. R. M. Stein (1990) The Budgetary Effects of 
Municipal Service Contracting: A Principal-Agent Explanation American Journal of Political Science 34:2, p. 
489. J. Boston (1996) The Use of Contracting in the Public Sector- Recent New Zealand Experience Australian 
Journal of Public Administration 55:3, p. 106. Industry Commission (1996) Competitive Tendering and 
12 
An oft-used argument in favour of contracting out whose 'minor' pitfalls, according to 
Berenyi, may be overcome with competent management of the contracting process," is that 
very few functions, once externalised, have subsequently been 'contracted in', that is, in the 
words of Boston, "brought back in-house" .
30 On the other hand, the critics of contracting out 
seek to highlight the hazards they believe are associated with it," in addition to looking down 
upon public management reforms as unwelcome importations from the private sector." As 
well, a good many of them refer to New Zealand where contracting in, as the findings of 
Anderson et al. indicate, happens to be no less popular than contracting out." The benefits 
Contracting by Public Sector Agencies pp. 92, 102, 124, 150, 156. S. Domberger (1998) The Contracting 
Organisation: A Strategic Guide to Outsourcing pp. 38-51. 
29 E. Berenyi (1984) To Contract Or Not. In J. T. Marlin (ed.) Contracting Municipality Services: A Guide for 
Purchase from the Private Sector p. 8. 
30 Boston (1996) Australian Journal of Public Administration 55:3, p. 108. 
31 Ascher (1987) The Politics of Privatisation: Contracting out Public Services pp. 102-111. Donahue 
(1987) The Privatization Decision: Public Ends, Private Means pp. 38-42,49-56, 146-149, 165-169. R. M. 
Kramer and B. Grossman (1987) Contracting for Social Services: Process Management and Resource 
Dependencies Social Service Review, 61:1, pp. 36, 52. Australian Chamber of Commerce (1988) Contracting 
Out as a Form of Privatisation pp. 2, 4. R. P. McAfee and J. McMillan (1988) Incentives in Government 
Contracting p. 143. Evatr Research Centre (1990) Breach of Contract: Privatisation and Management of 
Australian Local Government pp. 48-49,50-55,60-61,70-76. A. Dunsire et al. (1991).0rganisational Status 
and Performance: Summary of Findings Public Administration 69:1, p. 21. M. Paddon (1991) The Real Cost 
of Contracting Out: Re-assessing the Australian Debate from UK Experience pp. 8, 10. S. Albin (1992) 
Bureau-Shaping and Contracting Out p. 15. J. Stewart (1993) The Limitations of Government by Contract 
Public Money and Management 13:3, pp. 11-12. J. Borland (1994) On Contracting Out: Some Labour Market 
Considerations The Australian Economic Review 3rd Quarter, pp. 87-90. J. Praeger (1994) Contracting Out 
Government Services: Lessons from the Public Sector Public Administration Review 54:2, pp. 177-183. J. 
Quiggin (1994) The Fiscal Gains from Contracting Out: Transfers or Efficiency Improvements The Australian 
Economic Review 3rd Quarter, pp. 98-101. S. J. Rimmer (1994) Competitive Tendering and Contracting: 
Theory and Research The Australian Economic Review 3rd Quarter, pp. 81-84. J. Martin (1995) Contracting 
and Accountability. In J Boston (ed.) The State under Contract pp. 40-42. J. Spoehr (1995) Privatisation and 
Contracting Out: An International Perspective. In J. Spoehr and R. Broomhill (eds.) Altered Sates: The Impact 
of Free Market Policies on Australian States pp. 52-56. N. Deakin and K. Walsh (1996) The Enabling State: 
The Role of Markets and Contracts Public Administration 74:1, pp. 35-43. S. Globerman and A. R. Vining 
(1996) A Framework for Evaluating the Government Contracting-Out Decision with an Application to Informat
ion 
Technology Public Administration Review 56:6, pp. 579-583. I. Kirkpatrick and M. M. Lucio (1996) 
Introduction: The Contract State and the Future of Public Management Public Administration 74:1, pp. 5-6. J. 
Quiggin (1996) Competitive Tendering and Contracting in the Australian Public Sector Australian Journal of 
Public Administration 55:3, pp. 50-53. R. A. W. Rhodes (1996) The New Governance: Governing without 
Govenuuent Political Studies 34:3, pp. 661-663. G. Scott (1996) The Use of Contracting in the Public Sector 
Australian Journal of Public Administration 55:3, pp. 100-104. R. Mulgan (1997) Contracting Out and 
Accountability Australian Journal of Public Administration 56:4, pp. 106-115. 
32 J. Alford (1998) A Public Management Road Less Travelled: Clients as Co-Producers of Public Services 
Australian Journal of Public Administration 57:4, pp. 129-130. 
33 G. Anderson et al. (1996) The New Public Management And Human Resource Management Policies: 
Numerical Flexibility in the New Zealand Public Sector International Journal of Employment Studies 4:1, p. 
50. 
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and costs of contracting out will be discussed in greater detail in Chapters 3 and 4 with special 
reference to the domain of social welfare. 
Purchase of service contracting 
Purchase of service contracting is not really different from contracting out: the former can be 
defined as an organised procedure by which government enters into a formal agreement with 
voluntary organisations to purchase a wide range of social services particularly for individuals, 
families, groups, or communities afflicted by a variety of problems. Under purchase of service 
contracting, every service agency is expected to deliver social services, in exchange for funds 
or other resources, in consonance with the specifications laid down by the purchaser. 
Gibelman believes that purchase of service contracting is an attractive option for the delivery 
of social services." 
In many countries in the West, there was a long tradition of certain services being left to the 
nonprofit sector, with the state providing financial support for their production and provision. 
The popular conviction in olden times was that philanthropic people and charitable groups 
could deliver better quality services at a lower cost." For example, in colonial America, it 
was common practice for neglected children and adult paupers to be entrusted by town 
officials to the care of local individuals for a fixed payment." However, direct delivery of 
most of the services was the norm on either side of the Atlantic up until the 1960s. The 1967 
amendments to the Social Security Act in the United States facilitated the emergence of 
purchase of service contracting as a new paradigm which was to become, in course of time, the 
principal mode for the provision of services and the predominant means of financing voluntary 
organisations worldwide. 
34 Gibelman (1996) Journal of Health and Human Services Administration 19:1, p. 27. 
35 Kettner and Martin (!987) Purchase of Service Contracting p. 23. 
36 Wedel cited in Kettner and Martin (1987) Purchase of Service Contracting pp. 22-23. 
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Representing not just a set of new distancing options for efficient delivery of services but, to 
quote Culpitt, "a major redrafting of some of the strongest assumptions about altruistic social 
exchange integral to an understanding of the welfare state" ,
37 and viewed as, in the words of 6 
and Kendall, " ... a basic reconfiguration of the power relationships and policies that colour the 
lives of millions of people"," purchase of service contracting is the most widespread form of 
outsourcing." Government often contracts with voluntary organisations for the provision of a 
multiplicity of high quality, cost-effective, and innovative services for clients with genuine 
needs, contributing to the development of quasi-markets where, in the opinion of Flynn et al., 
financial control ultimately remains with the funder, the preferences of customers are mediated 
by a variety of professionals and managers, and users do not pay at the point of consumption." 
That such a relationship can be established with for-profit private firms or individual vendors 
capable of developing social services, is evidenced by the presence, in a host of countries, of 
what Charlesworth et al. call "welfare pluralism" ,'
1 and Billis and Glennerster designate as 
"a mixed economy of welfare" .
42 But, generally speaking, clients are dissatisfied with the 
limitations and failures of both state and market in solving social problems and have, 
according to Kamerman, far more trust in the third sector in relation to the delivery of 
services." Savas makes an exhaustive list of the services available by contract, including such 
variegated programmes as irrigation, tax collection, licensing, electricity supply, air pollution 
abatement, street lighting, solid waste disposal, mental health, alcoholic rehabilitation, 
37 Culpitt (1992) Welfare and Citizenship: Beyond the Crisis of the Welfare State? p. 81. 
38 P. 6 and J. Kendall (1997) Introduction. In P. 6 and J. Kendall (eds.) The Contract Culture in Public 
Services p. 1. 
39 I. Thynne (2000) The State and Governance: Issues and Challenges in Perspective International Review of 
Administrative Sciences 66:2, p. 234. 
40 R. Flynn et al. (1995) Contracts and the Quasi-market in Community Health Services Journal of Social 
Policy 24:4, p. 530. 
41 J. Charlesworth et al. (1996) Tangled Webs? Managing Local Mixed Economies of Care Public 
Administration 74:1, p. 68. 
42 D. Billis and H .. Glennerster (1998) Human Services and the Voluntary Sector: Towards a Theory of 
Comparative Advantage Journal of Social Policy 27:1, p. 79. 
43 S. B. Karnerman (1983) The New Mixed Economy of Welfare: Public and Private Social Work 28:1. p. 8. 
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administration of hospitals and cemeteries, and prevention and suppression of fire
44 
- off-
loaded by the federal government in the United States to nonprofit service agencies." 
Commended" as well as assailed" on various grounds, purchase of serv1ce contracting 
continues to prevail (and even expand) due to, in the opinion of Ferris and Graddy, the 
availability of cost-effective, accessible voluntary organisations- endowed with the ability to 
produce high quality, collective-consumption services." Voluntary organisations in the 
United Kingdom employed approximately 3.5 million workers, generated a gross annual 
income in excess of £13.1 billion, and held assets to the estimated value of £39.8 billion in 
1998!' In the United States, the number of voluntary organisations increased from 309,000 in 
1967 to a million in the mid-1990s
50 
- earning revenues worth more than 10 per cent of 
44 Savas (1982) Privatizing the Public Sector: How to Shrink Government pp. 63-64. 
45 B.S. Romzek (2000) Dynamics of Public Sector Accountability in Era of Reform International Review of 
Administrative Sciences 66:1, p. 32. 
46 D. J. McCready (1986) Privatized Social Service Systems: Are There Any Justifications? Canadian Public 
Policy 12:1, pp. 253-256. K. Weddell (1986) Privatizing Social Services in the U.S.A. Social Policy and 
Administration 20:1, pp. 14-23. B. Sugarman (1987).The 'Three Worlds' of Human Services Social Policy and 
Administration 21:3, pp. 230, 232. S. Veit (1990) Purchase of Service Contracting in the Social Services in 
Canada. In Richardson (ed.) Privatization and Deregulation. in Canada and Britain pp. 202-203. D. F. Ketti 
(1993) Sharing Power: Public Governance and Private Markets pp. 160-161. S. Domberger and C. Hall 
(1996) Contracting for Public Services: A Review of Antipodean Experience Public Administration 74:1, pp. 
141, 143-144. B. A. Weisbrod (1997) The Future of the Nonprofit Sector: Its Entwining with Private Enterprise 
and Government Policy Analysis and Management pp. 549-551. 
47 M. Herman (1979) Purchase of Service Contracting: Prontise or Threat to Social Services? InK. R. Wedel et 
al. Social Services by Government Contract: A Policy Analysis pp. 31-36. R. M. Kramer (1981)Voluntary 
Agencies in the Welfare State pp. 265-267. L. F. Hurl (1984) Privatized Social Service Systems: Lessons from 
Ontario Children's Services Canadian Public Policy 10:4, pp. 396-399, 402. L. F. Hurl (1986) Privatization of 
Social Services: Time to Move the Debate Along Canadian Public Policy 12:3, pp. 508-510. M. Lipsky and S. 
R. Sntith (1990) Nonprofit Organizations, Government. and the Welfare State Political Science Quarterly 104:4, 
pp. 631, 632, 644. S. R. Sntith and M. Lipsky (1993) Non-profits for Hire: The Welfare State pp. 203-205. R. 
M. Kramer (1994) Voluntary Agencies and the Contract Culture: 'Dream or Nightmare?' Social Service Review 
68:1, p. 46. N. Ryan (1995) The Competitive Delivery of Social Services: Implications from Program 
Implementation Australian Journal of Public Administration 54:3, pp. 355-362. N. Deakin (1996) The Devils 
in the Detail: Some Reflections on Contracting for Social Care by Voluntary Organizations Social Policy and 
Administration 30:1, pp. 21-22, 24, 31-32, 34-35. J. Charlesworth et al. (1996) Tangled Webs? Managing 
Local Mixed Econonties of Care Public Administration 74:1, pp. 70-73,77-81. S. R. Sntith (1996) 
Transfornting Public Services: Contracting for Social and Health Services in the US Public Administration 74:1, 
ff 117-124. 
Ferris and Graddy (1986) Public Administration Review 46:4, pp. 338-339. 
49 Hems and Passey cited in F. Tonkiss and A. Passey (1999) Trust, Confidence and Voluntary Organisations: 
Between Values and Institutions Sociology 33:2, p. 240. 




and accounting for over 15 per cent of the employees in the service sector," including 
no less than 5 million full-time volunteers." In Canada, voluntary organisations 
conservatively contributed at least 4 per cent of the value of GDP in 1996." In Sweden, 
voluntary organisations had an annual turnover of nearly 60 billion Swedish croners in 1992." 
In France, 58 per cent of employment in social welfare was in voluntary organisations in 
1994.56 In Italy, about 200,000 salaried workers were involved in the delivery of services 
provided by voluntary organisations in 1997.
57 In Japan, the employees of around 194,000 
voluntary organisations constituted 2.5 per cent of the nation's workforce in 1990." 
Currently, that is, in the early twenty-first century, more than a million New Zealanders are 
doing some form of voluntary work for 60,000 voluntary organisations in New Zealand." 
There are certain common trends in purchase of service contracting as practised in the West -
particularly in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand. 
In the United States, manifold problems seem to be associated with purchase of service 
contracting, like over-dependence of voluntary organisations on state funding, diminution of 
their advocacy role and greater emphasis by them on managerial efficiency as opposed to 
community welfare," and such dilemmas as insufficient reimbursement, time gaps before 
51 T. Herman (1995) Got a Message, Do You? You Can Send It by Plate Wall Street Journal, February 8 p. AI. 
52 L. M. Salamon and H. Anheier (1994) The Emerging Sector: A Statistical Supplement p. 33. 
53 E. T. Boris (1999) The Nonprofit Sector in the 1990s. In C. T. Clotfelter and T. Ehlrisch (eds.) Philanthropy 
and the Nonprofit Sector in a Changing America pp. 6, 9. 
54 J. Shields and B. M. Evans (1998) Shrinking the State: Globalization and Public Administration "Reform" 
~· 90. 
5 T. Lundstrom and L. Svedberg (2003) The Voulntary Sector in a Social Democratic State Journal of Social 
Policy 32:2, p. 220. 
56 C. F. Ullman (1998) The Welfare State's Other Crisis: Explaining the New Partnership between 
Nonprofit Organizations and the State in the Private Sector p. 60. 
57 L. Fazzi (1996) Social Policies and the Non-profit Sector in Italy: A Critique of the Ideologies of Contracting 
Out Economic and Industrial Democracy 17:1, p. 77. 
58 Anonymous (1998) Nonprofit Organizations: A Changing Role for Changing Times Asahi Evening News 
August 19, p. 5. 
59 Prime Minister Helen Clark cited in Inspiring Volunteering - Registration Brochure (2002) page number 
not given. 
60 Smith and Lipsky cited in V. M. Smith (1993) Contracting for Social and Welfare Services: The Changing 
Relationship between Government and the Voluntary Sector in New Zealand p. 66. 
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renewals, award and approval delays, and profuse and expensive accountability requirements." 
While several studies do indicate that in the United States purchase of service contracting has 
reached, to quote Smith, "a level of considerable dysfunction"," one can, at the same time, 
discern tremendous enthusiasm for the principal mode of service provision as, in the words of 
Gronbjerg, "a way to enhance the quality of services while reducing their costs"" which 
suggests that "contracting with non-profit agencies", to quote Smith, "will continue to increase 
in the coming years" .
64 In Canada, the effectiveness of purchase of service contracting is 
challenged by numerous issues that Hurl brings up in one of her articles: transfer of risks and 
responsibilities by the government to voluntary organisations; decrease of costs at the expense 
of the quality of the outputs produced by service agencies; lack of equality in the access to the 
services delivered by nonprofits; and poor enforcement of contract regulations owing to non-
availability of effective monitoring systems." However, in Canada, interest in purchase of 
service contracting has been heightened in recent years by, in the words of Veit, "the joint 
focus on community care (or deinstitutionalisation) and decentralisation"." In the United 
Kingdom, the basic hazards believed to be related to purchase of service contracting are 
decline in flexibility, increase in expenditure, and reduction in consumer choice." 
Nonetheless, the current trend in the United Kingdom appears to be towards purchase of 
service contracting or, to quote Taylor and Lewis, "greater use of purchase of service from the 
61 S. Bernstein (1991) Managing Contracted Services in a Nonprofit Agency: Administrative, Ethical and 
Political Issues pp. 4-5, 152. 
62 Smith (1995) Contracting for Social and Welfare Services: The Changing Relationship between 
Government and the Voluntary Sector in New Zealand p. 68. 
63 K. Gronbjerg (1997) Transaction Costs in Social Service Contracting: Lessons from the USA. In 6 and Kendall 
(eds.) The Contract Culture in Public Services: Studies from Britain, Europe and the USA p. 99. 
64 S. R. Smith (1997) Contracting and the Changing Politics of Need in the USA. In 6 and Kendall (eds.) The 
Contract Culture in Public Services: Studies from Britain, Europe and the USA p. 79. 
65 L. F. Hurl (1984) Privatized Social Service Systems: Lessons from Ontario Children's Services Canadian 
Public Policy 10:4, pp. 396-399, 402. 
66 V eit ( 1990) Purchase of Service Contracting in the Social Services in Canada. In Richardson ( ed.) Privatisation 
and Deregulation in Canada and Britain p. 200. 
67 Smith (1995) Contracting for Social and Welfare Services: The Changing Relationship between 
Government and the Voluntary Sector in New Zealand p. 70. 
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'independent' sector"'," In Australia, an Industry Commission report in 1994 came up with a 
series of recommendations like the development of effective mechanisms for service delivery, 
the institution of selective tendering and output-based funding, and the adoption of relevant 
measures to bring about improvements in accounting standards, benchmarking techniques, and 
quality management systems - all for the enhancement of purchase of service contracting." 
Be that as it may, purchase of service contracting seems to be growing in popularity in 
Australia with, in the words of Baldock, "more systematic transfer of services to the non-
governmental sector" ,
70 The difficulties associated with purchase of service contracting in 
each of the countries referred to above were confronted by policy makers in New Zealand, too. 
But, New Zealand does not at all look unwilling to make optimum use of purchase of service 
contracting which Ullman considers to be a defining feature of the latest phase in the evolution 
of the Western welfare states. 
71 
Theoretical underpinnings of the contract system 
The contract system, including contracting out and purchase of service contracting, "cannot 
be," to quote Lane, "traced back to a single body of theory":" it has been influenced by a set 
of economic and administrative doctrines, namely, public (or rational or collective) choice 
theory, new public management (or managerialism), agency (or principal-agent) theory, and 
transaction cost analysis." They are conceived to furnish the theoretical background for the 
68 M. Taylor and J. Lewis (!997) Contracting: What does It do to Voluntary and Non-profit Organisations. In 6 
and Kendall (eds.) The Contract Culture in Public Services: Studies from Britain, Europe and the USA p. 
27. 
69 Industry Commission (1994) Charitable Organisations in Australia: An Inquiry into Community Social 
Welfare Organisations pp. 70, 180, 200,282, 294-295,305, 321. 
70 Baldock cited in M. Lyons (1994) The Privatisation of Human Services in Australia Australian Journal of 
Public Administration 53:2, p. 179. 
71 C. F. Ulhnan (1998) The Welfare State's Other Crisis: Explaining the New Partnership Between 
Nonprofit Organizations and the State in France p. 10. 
72 J. Lane (2001) From Long-Term to Short-Term Contracting Public Administration 79:1, p. 30. 
73 J. Boston (1991) The Theoretical Underpinnings of Public Sector Restructuring in New Zealand. In J. Boston 
et al (eds.) Reshaping the State: New Zealand's Bureaucratic Revolution pp. 2-10. J. Boston et al (eds.) 
Public Management: The New Zealand Model pp. 16-40. 
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new contractual relationships both within state and between government and voluntary 
organisations and/or private firms. 
Public choice theory seeks to explain how actors behave in different institutional settings as a 
consequence of diverse incentive structures. It brands all individuals as rational beings guided 
by self-interest. It displays a preference for the contract system as a means to restrain the 
power-seeking politicians, the 'empire-building' civil servants, the profit-making 
businessmen, and the monopolistic contractors. It emphasises the need for decision-making to 
be separated from service provision in order to "weed out", in the words of Gutch, "potential 
conflicts of interests between the planners and the producers"," minimise the risk of political 
or bureaucratic capture, 
75 clarify roles and enable the public sector to concentrate on policy 
development and accountability monitoring," establish a collaborative partnership reflecting 
fidelity," and introduce competition into the supply of services and thereby improve provider 
• 78 
responsiveness. 
New public management, of which there is no universally accepted definition" although a 
substantial literature has developed thereon," broadly stands for the replacement of traditional 
integrated hierarchies by structures organised on market principles and oriented towards users 
in the name of choice and efficiency, 
81 in an attempt to slow down or reverse the growth in 
74 R. Gutch (1992) Contracting Lessons from the US p. 48. 
75 Domberger (1998) The Contracting Organization: A Strategic Guide to Outsourcing p. 161. 
76 Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia (1998) What Price Competition? A Report on the 
Competitive Tendering of Welfare Service Delivery p. xiii. 
77 Kernaghan cited in Shields and Evans (1998) Shrinking the State: Globalization and Public Administration 
"Reform" p. 107. 
78 J. Lewis et at. (1996) The Purchaser/Provider Split in Social Care: Is It Working? Social Policy and 
Administration 30:1, p. 2. 
79 J. Wilson (1999) Compulsory Competitive Tendering and Local Government Financial Services: An Analysis of 
the Views of Local Government Accountants in the North West of England Public Administration 77:3, p. 546. 
80 M. Christensen and H. Yoshimi (2000) A Value-for-money Pathway: A Two-country Case Study of 
Performance Reporting International Review of Administrative Sciences 66:3, p. 434. 
81 J. Lewis (1999) Reviewing the Relationship Between the Voluntary Sector and the State in Britain in the 1990s 




state expen ture. It offers a menu of choices rather than a single option:" professional 
management of public enterprises, specification of explicit standards and quantifiable 
measures of performance, more emphasis on output controls, disaggregation of units, shift to 
greater contestability, stress on private sector management practices, and parsimony and 
discipline in resource use inter alia." Acclaimed as a new global paradigm" and believed to 
be reflecting an administrative culture, it advocates the contract system apart from 
privatisation, decentralisation, merit pay, partnerships, management by results, and customer 
. • 86 
onentatwn; determined, clear-sighted leadership;" and separation of politics and 
administration." According to Geri, it symbolises an unexpected wave of state-centred 
administrative reforms that swept around the world in the 1990s." 
Agency theory looks at social and political life as the embodiment of the contract system- a 
series of agreements between the principal and the agent, examples of which, in the opinion of 
Moe, are legion: lawyer-client, doctor-patient, broker-investor, politician-citizen, and the 
commonest of all, employee-employer." The agent - endowed with the expertise or 
specialised knowledge needed to perform a task - works for, and reports to, the principal 
who, in exchange, agrees to reward the former in a mutually acceptable way. Since the 
principal as well as the agent is a self-interested utility maximiser, the activities of both of 
them might be influenced by distrust and deceit. Hence, an optimal form of outsourcing has to 
82 Dunsire and Hood cited in C. Hood (1991) A Public Management for All Seasons? Public Administration 
69:1, p. 3. 
83 N. Manning (2001) The Legacy of the New Public Management in Developing Countries International Review 
of Administrative Sciences 67:2, p. 298. 
84 Hood (1991) Public Administration 69:1, pp. 4-5. 
85 Rhodes cited in B. Bowornwathana (2000) Governance Reform in Thailand: Questionable Assumptions. 
Uncertain Outcomes Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration p. 396. 
86 J. I. Gow and C. Dufour (2000) Is the New Public Management a Paradigm? Does It Matter? International 
Review of Administrative Sciences 66:4, p. 579. 
87 C. Pollitt (1990) Managerialism and the Public Services p. 1. 
88 R. Kelly (1999) An Inclusive Democratic Polity, Representative Bureaucracies, and the New Public 
Management Public Administration Review 58:3, p. 205. 
89 L. R. Geri (2001) New Public Management and the Reform oflnternational Organizations International 
Review of Administrative Sciences 67:3, p. 445. 
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be devised which can align the interests of the agent with those of the principal, motivate the 
supplier to work towards the goals laid down by the funder, and reduce the tensions existing 
between the two due to the hazards dealt with by Boston at length - adverse selection, 
information asymmetry, organisational slack, opportunism, and coordination problems.
91 A 
serious limitation of the principal-agent framework is the focus on the behaviour of the agent 
rather than the principal. However, Pratt and Zechauser consider the principal to be the 
affected party unable to monitor the agent's action and information perfectly and costlessly." 
Transaction cost analysis evaluates and compares the transaction and compliance costs 
involved in planning, designing, negotiating, administering, monitoring, and enforcing task 
completion under alternative governance structures." It prefers the contract system only in 
cases where the latter helps to achieve productive efficiency and cost-effectiveness. For 
instance, it stands for distancing when a big market for competitive tendering prevails, the 
problems in measuring the quality and quantity of services are not insurmountable, and 
behavioural or political uncertainties do not loom large." It suggests that direct delivery is 
likely to be more efficient under precisely the opposite conditions." It does stigmatise 
individuals as, to quote Williamson, "prone to self-interest-seeking with guile"," but 
recognises simultaneously the importance of authority relations and takes seriously a range of 
structural and sociological variables often ignored by economists." 
91 J. Boston (1994) Purchasing Policy Advice: The Limits to Contracting Out Governance 7:1, pp. 11-26. 
92 J. W. Pratt and R. J. Zechauser (1985) Principals and Agents: An Overview. In J. W. Pratt and R. J. Zechauser 
(eds.) Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business pp. 2-3. 
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94 Boston (1994) Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration 7:1, p. 12. 
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It is clear from the foregoing discussion that each of the above-mentioned theories has 
produced novel ideas facilitating the development of the contract system including contracting 
out and purchase of service contracting. For example, public choice theory has inspired the 
drive to foster a spirit of a genuine partnership and enhance clarity and transparency. New 
public management has highlighted the necessity for the separation of policy formulation from 
service delivery. Agency theory, often considered as a theoretical framework for all kinds of 
outsourcing, has brought to light the value of, and the need for, mutual accountabilty -
essential for the alignment of the interests of the agent with those of the principal. Transaction 
cost analysis has drawn attention to the significance of cost-effectiveness as a factor in making 
a choice between the institutional arrangements for the provision of outputs. As such, they 
have all contributed to the increasing reliance of funders/purchasers on distancing for the 
production and delivery of services. 
At the same time, there exist a few critical gaps in each of the four theories with regard to the 
contract system. Public choice theory, agency theory, and transaction cost analysis rest on a 
series of implausible behavioural assumptions. Indeed, nothing could be more preposterous 
than the idea that human beings are forever, in the words of Boston et al., "opportunistic, 
guileful, self-serving, lazy, and quick to exploit others."'" If they were, then providers would 
always manage to find ways of misleading purchasers and deceiving consumers. In a country 
(such as New Zealand) with a preference for cooperation among producers while applying for 
funding, the potential suppliers might have been involved in cutthtoat competition with each 
other in a bid to win contracts. In the interest of higher quality and greater choice, public 
choice theory, new public management, and transaction cost analysis support contestability 
which is antithetical to the ideas of collaboration and networking. Agency theory wrongly 
assumes that the parties to a contract enjoy similar rights and privileges; cannot be relied on to 
explain all that one wants to know about contracting out, not being, to quote Scott, "a 
98 Boston et al. (eds.) Public Management: The New Zealand Model p. 30. 
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complete theory of governance";" and does not deal with the social policy objectives that 
government wishes to secure by means of purchase of service contracting.
100 
Conclusion 
The adoption and growing use of the contract system has been attributed to a set of pragmatic 
as well as ideological reasons."' Introduced by the OECD countries as a measure to counter 
fiscal stresses in their macroeconomies, 
102 contracting out has been rationalised in terms of its 
capacity to enable the state to face what Zanetti calls the challenge of producing high quality, 
cost-effective services."' Purchase of service contracting has been justified as a way of 
implementing the ideal of social justice. Contracting out has been appreciated on the ground 
that it helps policy makers do everything, in the words of Gore, "smarter, better, faster and 
cheaper" .104 Purchase of service contracting has been appreciated for its ability to combine 
market discipline with longer-term, cooperative relationships."' 
However, there is no dearth of critics assailing the views expressed in favour of the contract 
system to elevate it to the status of a panacea. If the 'core activities' or 'defining functions' of 
government (defence, justice, external affairs) are outsourced, contracting out, it is argued, 
may lead to what Rhodes refers to as the 'hollowing out' of the state.
106 Purchase of service 
99 G. Scott (1996) The New Institutional Economics and Reshaping the State in New Zealand. In G. Davis et al. 
(eds.) The New Contractualism? p. 162. 
100 A. von Tunzelmann and M. Murphy (1998) Government Funding of Voluntary Services in New Zealand: 
The Contracting Issues - A Scoping Study p. 6. 
101 V. Gooden (1998) Contracting and Negotiation: Effective Practices of Successful Human Service Contract 
Managers Public Administration Review 58:6, p. 499. 
102 C. Aulich and M. Reynolds (1993) Competitive Tendering and Contracting Out: Guest Editors' Introduction 
Australian Journal of Public Administration 52:4, p. 400. 
103 C. Zanetti (1998) Managing Change: Focus on Improving Service Quality and Information Management 
Australian Journal of Public Administration 57:4, p. 3. 
104 A. Gore (1993) From Red Tape to Results: Creating a Government That Works Better and Costs Less 
Pr· 66. 
05 Domberger (1998) The Contracting Organisation: A Strategic Guide to Outsourcing pp. 50-51. 
106 R. A.. W. Rhodes (1994) The Hollowing Out of the State Political Quarterly 65:2, p. 138. Rhodes (1996) 
Political Studies 44:4, p. 661. 
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contracting is criticised on the ground that it subjects both state agencies and private firms to 
unfair competition with voluntary organisations which, according to Weisbrod, receive 
subsidies. 107 While contracting out lays stress on a 'policy/operations split', "the separation 
between strategy or policy "n the one hand, and operations on the other", to quote Haggett, "is 
not always easy to maintain" .
108 The Ministry of Social Policy in New Zealand is quick to 
point out that with nonprofits adopting business practices under purchase of service 
contracting, distinctions between community and private sectors have become blurred.
109 
Contracting out as well as purchase of service contracting is often thought of as a politically 
driven strategy for service provision, with little concern for values of public service like 
accountability, equity, access, coordination, and social justice.
110 
Nonetheless, the contract system, looks unlikely to disappear:
1u not only has there been little 
demand for its abandonment, m but an accelerated trend towards private delivery of public 
infrastructure appears to be probable. m Contracting out has replaced the W eberian-inspired 
model of hierarchy and centralised command with a new type of arrangement characterised by 
decentralisation of the production and provision of services, and 'reinvented' government by 
converting the former providers into 'enabling authorities' or mere purchasers who, in the 
opinion of Osborne and Gaebler, must steer rather than row.u' The availability of more 
information concerning the use and impact of purchase of service contracting has resulted in 
intensive debates on how the process can be best managed in the interests of society. It has to 
107 Weisbrod (1997) Policy Analysis and Management 16:4, p. 543. 
108 P. Haggett (1996) New Modes of Control in the Public Service Public Administration 74:1, p. 27. 
109 Ministry of Social Policy (2001) Communities and Government - Potential for Partnership Whakatopu 
Whakaaro, p. 32. 
110 D. Adams and M. Hess (2000) Alternatives to Competitive Tendering and Privatisation: A Case Study from the 
Australian Health Industry Australian Journal of Public Administration 59:1, pp. 56-57. 
!II B. Sullivan (1996) Mapping Contract. In G. Davis et a[ (eds.) The New Contractualism? p. 12. 
112 J. Richardson (1993) Reinventing Contracts: Transatlantic Perspectives on the Future of Contracting p. 
3. 
113 J. Chahners and G. Davis (2001) Rediscovering Implementation: Public Sector Contracting and Human 
Services Australian Journal of Public Administration 60:2, pp. 75, 84. 
ll
4 D. Osborne and T. Gaebler (1992) Re-inventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit Is 
Transfonning the Public Sector pp. 30-37. 
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be borne in mind that neither contracting out nor purchase of service contracting is seen any 
more as merely a management tool or administrative device: taken together, they are now 
considered to be " a mechanism", in the words of Muetzelfeldt, "for re-organising social and 
political life", 
115 and regarded as "a metaphor", to quote Walsh, "for the character of change 
in the management of the public services as a whole".
116 
However, almost all studies cited in the dissertation concentrate on the performance of the 
contract system as an useful technique to introduce, say, accountability, clarity, and 
transparency into organisational dealings, and seldom deal with its bigger role in redefining 
governance structures. Secondly, most of these studies on the contract system are not based on 
any objective empirical research, but focus on normative and/or theoretical discussion and 
reflect an ideological and/or partisan interest. While appreciative of the value of these studies, 
the researcher seeks to redress the two significant gaps in the literature by, first, examining in 
the next chapter the bigger role of the contract system as a neoliberal strategy to facilitate the 
enhancement of the productive efficiency, and the reduction of the level of expenditure, of the 
public sector with special reference to New Zealand and, second, undertaking, against the 
background of the Otago/Southland region, an objective empirical research on the potential of 
purchase of service contracting as an effective policy instrument - preceded by an extensive 
theoretical analysis thereof. Such an effort, it is believed, will be instrumental in improving 
the broader knowledge of government, the third sector, and the relationship between the two, 
and contributing to scholarship in the fields of public policy, management, and administration 
- apart from adding to the insignificant number of case studies on the effects of the contract 
system, especially purchase of service contracting, in New Zealand. 
115 M. Muetzelfeldt quoted in G. Davis and T. Wood (1998) Is There a Future for Contracting in the Australian 
Public Sector? Australian Journal of Public Administration 57:4, p. 95. 
116 Walsh (1995) Public Services and Market Mechanisms: Competition, Contracting and the New Public 
Management p. 110. 
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Chapter2 
Contracting Out as Part of the Neoliberal Agenda for Public Sector Restructuring 
This chapter deals with the issue of public sector reform and the role of the contract system 
therein. It begins with a discussion of the factors contributing to the emergence of the 
demand for public sector restructuring in the Western world. It then focuses on the impact 
of state fiscal crisis and globalisation on the public sector. Thereafter, it examines the 
neoliberal prescription for the transformation of the public sector. Next, it examines, first, 
the implications of contracting out including purchase of service contracting as an effective 
policy instrument, second, the redesigning of the contractual relationship between state and 
voluntary organisations, and third, the re-engineering of the public sector in New Zealand, 
with outsourcing playing a major part in the process. In conclusion, it states the purpose of 
the research which is to evaluate the potential of purchase of service contracting in the 
'reinvention' of the public sector in New Zealand. 
Call for a transformed public sector in the Western world 
Public sector restructuring has become the focal point of academic discussion on 
administrative reform all over the Western world in recent years. Since the end of the post-
war economic boom, the redesigning of the public sector has emerged as a hotly contested 
topic. The ascendance of neoliberal political agendas has directed the debate towards, to 
quote from a report of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), "a re-examination of public sector management and performance".' The key 
issue has been the enhancement of the productive efficiency, and the reduction of the level 
1 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (1995) Governance in Transition
: 
Public Management Reforms in OECD p. 19. 
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of expenditure, of the public sector through the employment of market principles. The 
transformation occurring within the public sector - calling for the state to 'steer' rather 
than 'row', or in other words, withdraw from direct production and delivery of services and 
concentrate on policy making- has greatly influenced governance structures. 
Change is, indeed, the order of the day for the public sector in the advanced industrialised 
democracies. Politicians, media commentators, and academics have been demanding the 
restructuring of the public sector, so that it fits into the new realities of a transforming 
society.' This raises the question of the proper role of management and administration in 
the redesigned public sector. 
There has been a decided shift within public policy and administration towards the notion 
of the failure of the public sector. Up until the mid-1970s, the attention was upon why 
'free' markets often produced negative effects on society and economy. Now, in the early 
twenty-first century, the focus is more on the perceived deficiencies of government 
intervention. However, some believe that the contemporary economic, social, and political 
problems are primarily the result of acute failures found in the market itself.' 
The reasons behind this perceptible alteration in orientation are state fiscal crisis and 
globalisation - the two forces that, according to Shields and Evans, have shaped the 
current climate of public sector change.' The factors stimulating public sector re-
engineering are intimately connected with larger forces of transformation within both 
domestic and global political economy. To understand the dynamics and direction of 
2 J. Shields and B. M. Evans (1998) Shrinking the State: Globalization and Public Administration 
"Reform" p. 11. 
3 W. Hutton (1996) The State We're In. J. Myles (1996) When Markets Fail: Social Welfare in Canada and 
the United States. In G. Esping-Anderson (ed.) Welfare States in Transition: National Adaptations in 
Global Economies pp.ll6-140, 
4 Shields and Evans (1998) Shrinking the State: Globalization and Public Administration "Reform" p. 
18. 
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public sector change, its connections with broader political and economic shifts within and 
without society need to be identified. 
State fiscal crisis, globalisation and the public sector 
There are numerous studies to show that the fiscal crisis of the state caused by climbing 
debt loads and escalating budget deficits restricts the growth of the public sector.' 
Neoliberals insist that the public sector, with limited ability to expand its paying customer 
base, has got to be drastically retrenched, and the resulting 'freed' finances should be 
directed towards debt retirement and tax cuts.' Also, in their opinion, the public sector is 
required to 'slash' social spending in tandem with the policy of debt elimination.' 
Most of the capitalist economies in the West have tended to support the fiscal cutback 
approach - some, such as Sweden and Denmark, of course less than others, like New 
Zealand and Australia. There appears to be a clear preference among neoliberals for fiscal 
prudence over 'unproductive expenditure'. It is not for the lack of economic expansion 
that the modern welfare state has gone into fiscal crisis: since the oil shock in the mid-
1970s, "real gross national product in the OECD ... countries", in the words of Esping-
Anderson, " ... increased by a respectable 45 percent". 
8 The burden of fiscal deficits seems 
to be responsible for the adoption of the hardline policy. The payment of interests on debts 
has continued to increase relative to the revenues collected, resulting in policy agendas, 
whether in social or economic spheres, being driven by the new fiscal 'necessities' and 
'realities'. In short, fiscal constraints constitute one of the major factors behind the 
5 J. O'Connor (1973) The Fiscal Crisis of the State. Buchanan and Wagner (1977) Democracy in 
Deficit: The Political Economy of Lord Keynes. L. Pantich [ed.) (1977) The Canadian State: Political 
Economy and Political Power. 
6 R. Harris (1993) Trade, Money and Wealth in the Canadian Economy. 
7 R. Harris et al. (1994) Paying Our Way: The Welfare State in Hard Times. D. Waterfall (1995) 
Dismantling Leviathan: Cutting Government Down to Size. 
8 Esping-Anderson (1996) After the Golden Age? Welfare in a Global Economy. In G. Esping-Anderson (ed.) 
Welfare States in Transition: National Adaptations in Global Economies p. 2. 
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rethinking of policy makers concerning the reduction of the level of expenditure of the 
public sector. 
Globalisation, which involves the capacity to produce across national economies at an 
astounding speed, has been defined as a process underpinning, to quote Held et al, "a 
transformation in the organisation of human affairs by weaving networks of complex webs 
and relations between communities, states, international institutions, non-governmental 
organizations and multinational corporations that make up the global order" 
9 A product of 
technological innovation, it has led to the removal of borders between a domestic economy 
and the rest of the world. It is a powerful force that has succeeded in exerting tremendous 
pressure on the economy and society of nation-states. It has, indeed, managed to create a 
situation where the public sector must think of redefining its roles and activities in order to 
survive in the world market economy." For the neoliberals, it has offered a powerful 
justification for the retrenchment of the welfare state
11 and the integration of the same with 
international economy.
12 
The necessity for an efficient and cost-effective public sector in the race for nations to 
favourably place themselves in global competitiveness has been highlighted in several 
studies undertaken by neoliberal scholars, think tanks, and institutions.
13 For instance, it 
has been argued that if economy and society are to be properly adjusted to suit the 
imperatives of the global market, the 'renewal' of the public sector is, in the words of 
Ingstrup, "important, even crucial" .
14 It has been upheld by the OECD that the public 
9 D. Held et al. (1999) Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture p. 27. 
10 G. Teeple (1995) Globalization and the Decline of Social Reform p. 68. 
11 R. Mishra (1996) The Welfare of Nations. In R. Boyer and D. Drache (eds.) States Against Markets: The 
Limits of Globalisation pp. 316-317. 
12 R. G. Lipsay (1996) Economic Growth, Technological Change, and Canadian Economic Policy pp. 
78-79. 
13 OECD (1990) Survey of Public Management Developments: 1990. N.J. Adler (1994) Globalization, 
Government and Competitiveness. 0. Ingstrup (1995) Public Service Renewal: From Means to Ends. 
14 0. lngstrup (1995) Public Service Renewal: From Means to Ends p. 3. 
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sector needs to display a much better performance for the attainment of competitive 
advantage in a changing global environment.
15 At the same time, however, it has been 
pointed out that enhanced global positioning will mean little if, despite all the reforms of 
the public sector, government fails to sustain the social and economic health of society, 
protect national interests, and promote democratic governance - in short, play, to cite 
from a report of the World Bank, "a more catalytic, facilitating role".
16 
Neoliberal prescription for the transformation of the public sector 
As a result of persistent demand over the last couple of decades to reform the public sector, 
Keynesianism, which entrusts the state with the responsibility of intervening in the 
management of the economy, has been brought under intense scrutiny. According to 
Purchase and Hirshhom, the institutional legitimacy as well as the political sovereignty of 
the public sector has been challenged.
17 At any rate, the role of the public sector as the 
provider of social services that are responsive, accessible, and reliable has been 
questioned18 by the public who do not trust government officials very much.
1
' In Canada, 
the United Kingdom and Australia, the public sector has been criticised by the political left, 
too, for not being able to deliver what was expected of it." It has been possible for 
neoliberal ideologues to capture popular frustration with the failure of the public sector to 
adjust to the forces of socioeconomic change and the inability of the bureaucracy to find 
policy and administrative solutions to the varied and increasingly difficult problems 
confronting society. The dominant thinking has been to enhance the productive efficiency, 
and reduce level of expenditure, of the public sector by allowing the dynamic of the 
15 OECD (1990) Survey of Public Management Developments: 1990 p. l. 
16 World Bank (1997) The State in a Changing World: World Development Report 1997 p. iii. 
17 B. Purchase and R. Hirshhorn (1994) Searching for Good Governance p. l. 
18 F. L. Seidle (1995) Rethinking the Delivery of Public Services to Citizens pp. 2, 10. 
19 S. Peters (1995) Exploring Canadian Values: Foundations for Well-Being Ch. 6. 
20 A. Whale (1993) Voluntary Welfare Provision in a Landscape of Change p. 21. 
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marketplace to assert itself, to quote Whale, "[in] all arenas of production, consumption 
and welfare"." 
The era of unprecedented economic prosperity and income expansion among the working 
population during the long post-war boom contributed to the emergence of the Keynesian 
welfare state which, with its network of social safety supports, was conceived to be ideal 
for, in the words of Esping-Anderson, "the eradication of class differences, ... and nation-
building" .22 People had faith in the ability of government to promote economic prosperity, 
secure a more just and tolerant society, and advance political participation and democratic 
practices." But, the system went into crisis during the period of slow economic growth, 
acute unemployment, and increased income polarisation in the mid-1970s following the 
world recession. It has been suggested that a rise in the demand for welfare due to high 
levels of economic and financial insecurity created problems for the state under "enormous 
pressures", to quote Osberg et al., "to cut costs and increase productivity"," in spite of 
being overburdened with enlarged social expenditure and a reduced tax base." The 
inability of government to resolve the problems by means of Keynesian macro-economic 
stabilisation techniques brought critics - assailing the incompetence of the public sector 
- to the fore. At this point, Keynesianism, as a system for the political control of the 
economy, entered into decline." 
21 Ibid, p. 25. 
22 G. Esping-Anderson (1996) After the Golden Age? Welfare in a Global Economy. In G. Esping-Anderson 
(ed.) Welfare States in Transition: National Adaptations in Global Economies p. 2. 
23 S. McBride and J. Shields (1993) Dismantling a Nation: Canada and the New World Order p. 644. 
24 L. Osberg et al. (1995) Vanishing Jobs: Canada's Changing Workplaces p. 129. 
25 M. Crozier et al. (1975) The Crisis of Democracy: Report on the Governability of Democracies to 
the Trilateral Commission. J. M. Buchanan and R. E. Wagner (1977) Democracy in Deficit: The Political 
Economy of Lord Keynes. 
26 R. Skidelsky (1979) The Decline of Keyensian Politics. In C. Crouch (ed.) State and Economy in 
Contemporary Capitalism p. 55. 
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In such an environment where the Fordist public sector, predicated, in the opinion of 
Murray, upon mass production of standardised services available to all
27 was encountered 
simultaneously by declining fiscal capacities of the state and growing public demands for 
quality outputs, neoliberalism, according to Shields and Evans, became ascendant." 
"Starting", in the words of George, "from a tiny embryo at the University of Chicago with 
the philosopher-economist Friedrich von Hayek"" and pushed by think tanks (Institute of 
Economic Affairs in the United Kingdom, Political Economy Research Center in the 
United States), conservative governments (Thatcher's Britain, Reagan's America), and 
global institutions (International Monetary Fund, World Bank), neoliberalism offered an 
intellectually forceful critique of Keynesian structures and arrangements, and came up with 
unflinching support for a 'Schumpeterian workfare state' based, in the opinion of Jessop, 
on the promotion of a transition towards a new economic regime." Neoliberalism 
succeeded in providing an alternative model introducing the public sector to the discipline 
of the market, championed by New Right as the perfect mechanism to utilise and allocate 
resources and, according to Johnson, maximise social welfare." To improve the 
productive efficiency of the public sector, neoliberalism recommended the adoption of 
some concrete measures such as, to quote Cox, "deregulation, privatisation, and 
restriction of [state] intervention in economic processes"." Also, neoliberalism considered 
it essential to make drastic cuts in social spending in order to lower the level of expenditure 
of the public sector." 
27 R. Murray (1991) The State After Henry Marxism Today 35.5. pp. 22-27. 
28 Shields and Evans (1998) Shrinking the State: Globalization and Public Administration "Reform" p. 
54. 
29 S. George (1999) A Short History of Neoliberalism http://globalpolicy.org/globaliz/econ!histneol.html, 
~age number not given. 
0 B. Jessop (1994) Post-Fordism and the State. In A. Amin (ed.) Post-Fordism: A Reader pp. 266-267. 
31 N. Johnson (1990) Problems for the Mixed Economy of Welfare. In A. Evers and H. Winterberger (eds.) 
Shifts in the Welfare Mix p. 155. 
32 R. W. Cox (1995) Critical Political Economy. In B. Hettne (ed.) International Political Economy: 
Understanding Global Disoder p. 39. 
33 T. Courrchene (1994) Social Canada in the Millennium- Reform Imperatives and Restructuring 
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Neoliberalism suggested that in order to restructure the public sector, the provision of 
public services should be privatised, wherever practicable, in consonance with, in the 
words of Self, "market concepts of competition and efficiency" .
34 It advocated 
decentralisation of the production and delivery of public services as a precondition for the 
creation of a 'smarter' public sector or what Osborne and Gaebler referred to as 
'entrepreneurial govenment' ." To make the public sector work better and cost less, it 
prescribed the use of contracting out which was meant to enhance the quantity, quality, 
cost-effectiveness, and flexibility of the public services developed and delivered; ensure the 
accountability of the purchaser and the producer to each other and the responsibility of both 
of them to consumers who were more anxious than ever before about value for money; 
empower clients and their communities; and encourage, to quote 6, "more transparent and 
effective redistribution of services" .
36 It redefined citizenship away from the concept of 
universal entitlement to social rights and towards the idea of the citizen as, in the opinion 
of Hughes, the 'rational' customer of the public services rendered within the public sector." 
The role of neoliberalism was therefore to reorient the organisational framework and the 
management ideology of the public sector in order to facilitate its redesigning towards a 
specific set of objectives. Neoliberalism was in favour of the re-engineering of the public 
sector through the replacement of the Weberian model of rigid hierarchical structures and 
centralised command - concerned mainly with inputs and processes - by a novel 
arrangement constructed on a 'network of contracts', with its focus on Leibenstein's 'x-
efficiency', that is, production of maximum output at minimum cost." The preference of 
neoliberalism was for a productive and streamlined government: it sought to redefine the 
34 P. Self (1993) Government by the Market: The Politics of Public Choice p. xi. 
35 D. Osborne and T. Gaebler (1992) Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit Is 
Transforming the Public Sector p. xix. 
36 P. 6 (1997) The New Politics of Welfare Contracting. In 6 and Kendall (eds.) The Contract Culture in 
Public Services: Studies from Britain. Europe and the USA p. 184. 
37 0. E. Hughes (1994) Public Management and Administration: An Introduction p. 102. 
38 H. Leibenstein (1966) Allocative Efficiency vs. "X-Efficiency••• American Economic Review 56:3, pp. 
392-415. 
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public sector via the replacement of the bureaucratic administrative state which, according 
to Hughes, was too expansive in scale and scope from the rationalist economic 
• 39 
perspective. 
The theoretical foundation for the neoliberal reconceptualisation of the role of the public 
sector could be found in a set of economic and administrative doctrines, 
40 all of which 
supported contracting out including purchase of service contracting as an appropriate 
institutional framework required for, in the words of Walsh, "[t]he creation of an effective, 
market -based system of management"." Public choice theory maintained that it was 
necessary to separate policy and operational responsibilities and the roles of the purchaser 
and providers, and try alternative forms of programme provision including contracting out 
because, as Doern pointed out, civil servants were motivated only by the desire to protect 
and promote their own selfish interests, and bureaucracies enjoyed a monopoly status in the 
production and delivery of public services." New public management suggested that 
private sector practices like privatisation and contracting out needed to be transferred to 
government operations, as the governance structures associated with the centralised, rule-
bound, process-oriented, inflexible administrative state could no longer respond to the 
challenges presented by increasing fiscal debts and deficits, decreasing popular confidence 
in the expertise of policy makers, eroding standard of public services, and the impact of 
globalisation upon state sovereignty." By asserting in no uncertain terms that contracting 
out might be used as a way of improving productivity, enhancing the quality of public 
services and strengthening accountability, agency theory, in the opinion of Hughes, gave 
39 Hughes (1994) Public Management and Administration: An Introduction p. 115. 
40 J. Boston (1991) The Theoretical Underpinnings of Public Sector Restructuring in New Zealand. In J. 
Boston et al. (eds.) Reshaping the State: New Zealand's Bureaucratic Revolution pp. 2-10. J. Boston et 
al (eds.) (1996) Public Management: The New Zealand Model pp. 16-40. 
41 K. Walsh (1995) Public Services and Market Mechanisms: Competition, Contracting and the New 
Public Management p. 54. 
42 G. B. Doern (1994) The Road to Better Public Services: Progress and Constraints in Five Canadian 
Federal Agencies pp. 23-24. 
43 P. Aucoin (1995) The New Public Management: Canada in Comparative Perspective p. 2. 
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impetus to those arguing for outsourcing." Transaction cost analysis upheld that 
contracting out could be a cost-effective strategy for the provision of public services in the 
absence of asset specificity or small numbers bargaining." 
Contracting out as a neoliberal policy instrument for the reinvention the public 
sector 
The neoliberal protagonists of contracting out regarded outsourcing as one of the most 
effective measures to ensure the redesigning of the public sector - on the grounds 
suggested by them below. It involved the creation of a core-periphery model, based on a 
genuine partnership between the strategists at the core and the deliverers at the periphery 
with regard to planning and decision-making and emphasising, to quote Walsh, "the 
importance of solidarity, reciprocity and trust rather than the formal rights and duties 
embodied in the written terms of a contract" .
46 It called for the separation of the purchaser 
(responsible for policy making) from the producer (entrusted with the task of operational 
management) which added to the quantity, improved the standard, reduced the costs, and 
increased the flexibility, of the programmes to be produced; lowered the risk of bureacratic 
capture; and, in the words of Domberger, "led to improved client responsiveness"." It 
necessitated the development of service specifications in clear terms that contributed, inter 
alia, to the achievement of transparency, the enhancement of mutual accountability and, 
according to Hoggett, the appraisal of organisational behaviour." It encouraged 
contestability which resulted in a downward pressure on prices; the selection of the 
appropriate contractor from among a host of tenderers; the production and delivery of a 
44 Hughes (1994) Public Management and Administration: An Introduction p. 14. 
45 J. Boston (1994) Purchasing Policy Advice: The Limits to Contracting Out Governance: An International 
Journal of Policy and Administration 7:1, p. 12. 
46 Walsh (1995) Public Services and Market Mechanisms: Competition, Contracting and the New 
Public Management p. 42. 
47 S. Domberger (1998) The Contracting Organization: A Strategic Guide to Outsourcing p. 161. 
48 P. Haggett (1996) New Modes of Control in the Public Service Public Administration 74:1, p. 21. 
36 
wide range of high quality, innovative services that provided a competitive edge in the 
market; greater consumer choice; and improvement of outcomes for clients and their 
communities." It empowered customers to exercise their consumer rights explicitly stated 
in service entitlements, with standards and processes of redress clearly laid down." It 
facilitated better use, and more equitable allocation, of resources in a bid to enhance the 
relationship between government and citizens which, of course, was not, to quote Walsh, 
"one of [market] exchange but ... mutual commitment"." 
The neoliberal advocates of contracting out claimed that it had the potential to produce cost 
savings through, in the words of Davis and Wood, "better management and work practices, 
innovative solutions, and more productive use of capital and equipment"" - without 
diminishing the quantity of services, sacrificing the quality of outputs, reducing wages or 
bonuses, or retrenching employees (while there was, indeed, a possibility of, to quote 
Rimmer, "permanent or temporary transfer of employees from the public sector to external 
contractors"''). In their opinion, the savings from contracting out could be used not only to 
develop and deliver a larger bulk of superior services but also lower the levels of taxation 
which might lead to decreased business costs, and hence, in the words of Rimmer, 
"increased economic activity"" and consequently generation of higher real income." 
According to them, the savings provided by contracting out usually continued, to quote 
Rimmer, "to be realised over time relative to the cost prior to [outsourcing]"." 
49 S. Domberger (1998) The Contracting Organization: A Strategic Guide to Outsourcing pp. 38-48, 
163-164. 
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5 Ibid. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid, p. 78. 
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The neoliberals asserted that contracting out which replaced, in the words Davis, 
"traditional bureaucratic hierarchy and command with networks of providers loosely 
clustered around government funding agencies"," improved rather than diminished the 
ability of the public sector by reducing its size, establishing contractual relationships 
between the purchaser and producers, and making providers compete with each other." In 
their opinion, it enjoyed spectacular success as a means to demolish the conventional 
structures, the traditional processes and the antiquated values of the public sector, and find 
out, to quote Pal, "the best way to organize the administrative machinery of government" .
59 
According to them, it was, in the words of Walsh, "more or less universally applicable",
60 
having been used for miscellaneous services, across diverse sectors, and by governments of 
different hues. 61 
The neoliberals ardently believed that contracting out was crucial to the process of 
'reinventing government' - subjecting the public sector, in the opinion of Self, to the 
discipline of the market." According to them, it was able to catch the imagination of 
decision-makers and offer them a body of innovative ideas and practices constituting, in the 
opinion of Pierre, a simple and quick method of transforming the public sector." 
However, they observed that it could be the most attractive option where the market was 
competitive and had the capacity to arrange for the provision of services; where public 
agencies did not possess 'in-house' capabilities; where producers were endowed with the 
expertise to deliver outputs; and where functions happened to be, to quote Ryan, "new, 
57 G. Davis (1996) Implications, Consequences and Futures. In G. Davis et al (eds.) The New 
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discrete or non-core activities"." Besides, according to them, the assessment of the scope 
for its use was to be made, in the words of Rimmer, "on a case-by-case basis"." 
Neoliberal redesigning of the government-third sector relationship 
The neoliberal restructuring of the public sector has witnessed a transformation m the 
relationship between state and voluntary organisations. In the postwar era, the state never 
considered voluntary organisations to be its equal, undermined the ability of service 
agencies as a catalyst for social change and, in the opinion of Pal, regarded government as 
the only institution capable of regulating economy and society in a manner that addressed 
pressing social problems." But, the state is presently willing to forge partnerships with 
voluntary organisations which, according to Salamon, are in a better position than 
government to personalise the delivery of services." However, those on the political left 
look upon voluntary organisations with suspicion, often accuse nonprofits of providing a 
'protective layer' for capitalism by accepting business philanthropy which, in their opinion, 
results in the legitimation of corporate power, and tend to criticise the blind faith of the 
state, to quote Gidron et al., "[in] the capacities of ineffectual voluntary action as a barrier 
to the establishment of a truly effective system of public care available to all as a matter of 
. ht" 6S ng . 
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Voluntary organisations have long been playing a significant role in the welfare state 
structure all over the Western world. They have been supplementing the social services 
rendered by government. They have been assisting the state in building a network of both 
uni versa! and targeted programmes. Thought of as embodying the qualities of the market 
as well as the state, they have, by and large, been heavily subsidised by government which 
is currently intent on developing partnerships, through contactual agreements, with the 
third sector whose dominance, according to the neoliberals, was disrupted by, in the words 
of Gidron et al., "the rise of the powerful welfare state"." 
In a reformed public administrative structure, the question of the place of voluntary 
organisations as providers of social services is of central importance to governance itself. 
Voluntary organisations deliver a variety of social services; develop high quality 
programmes; lower the cost of production through prudent mobilisation of resources; 
provide outputs tailored to the changing demands of clients; empower consumers by 
protecting and promoting their rights and interests; display a high level of accountability to 
the purchaser; and serve the customers who require the greatest care. Thus, government 
seeks to make strategic partnerships with voluntary organisations with a view to purchasing 
social services from them. Further, no longer claimed to be the principal vehicle for socio-
economic progress, the state preserves its core functions and endeavours to contract with 
voluntary organisations for the provision of social services either never or previously 
offered by it. Neoliberal policy makers expect voluntary organisations not only to act in 
accordance with the specifications laid down by the purchaser following mutual 
consultations, but also become competitive and entrepreneurial adopting, to quote Browne, 
"new managerial standards and strategies"" for the production and delivery of more and 
68 Ibid, p. 12. 
70 P. L. Browne (1996) Love in a Cold World? The Voluntary Sector in the Age of Cuts p. 41. 
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better social services at less cost, and integrate, in the words of Salamon, "into the private, 
kt ,71 mar e economy . 
The emergence of partnership with voluntary organisations has been a key innovation in 
the movement to relocate production activities outside government." In essence, the 
concept and practice of partnership entails an agreement between the purchaser and the 
producer for the provision of social services. Partnership does not involve an order-and-
obey relationship but free consent, mutual collaboration, two-way consultation, power-
sharing, joint responsibility, acceptance of shared contributions, and recognition of mutual 
needs and problems - the critical elements that clearly differentiate it from the 
domineerng characteristics of service delivery associated with the traditional administrative 
state. While the strategic decision-making power is retained by government in conformity 
with the principle of the separation of planning from provision, partnership calls for a 
'sharing of work' which does help service agencies to influence policy formulation. 
Neoliberalism considers partnership to be particularly attractive because, to quote Seidle, 
"activities carried out by public servants ... are transferred to organizations that may do the 
work for less cost"." 
Purchase of service contracting has its theoretical origin in agency theory which asserts that 
the state (principal) enters into a contract with voluntary organisations (agents) on mutually 
acceptable terms for the delivery of outputs, and is as much influenced by public choice 
theory that posits the incapacity of government to render services in an efficient way and its 
vulnerability to provider capture and bureaucratic empire building in the absence of market 
discipline. It is the regulatory mechanism to arrange for the provision of services through a 
constellation of potential, competitive service agencies. By offering a sense of linear 
71 Salamon (1995) Partners in Public Service: Government-Nonprofit Relations in a Modem Welfare 
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simplicity and a clear division of responsibility, purchase of service contracting, in the 
opinion of the neoliberals, is able to prove its superiority over the hierarchical 
governmental machinery in which such lines are blurred, and ensure, in the words of 
Deakin and Walsh, "greater transparency and accountability in the way that public services 
[should be] run"." It is believed to bring the state and the third sector close to each other 
without effacing the distinctions between them, and promote a sense of partnership 
characterised by, to quote Wright and Rodal, "empowerment, flexibility, collaboration, 
consultation, proactivity, efficiency and a service orientation" .
75 
The redesigning of the relationship between state and voluntary organisations through 
purchase of service contracting is claimed to be capable of enabling the public sector to 
secure two basic policy objectives. First, it is believed to be able to contribute to the 
reduction of the size of the public sector through the devolution of service responsibility to 
local citizens - providing them, in the words of Kramer, "with the opportunity to 
influence public policy" .
76 Secondly, it is claimed to be capable of facilitating the 
enhancement of the productive efficiency of the public sector by means of the production 
and delivery of manifold high quality, cost-effective, and flexible social services purchased 
from service agencies formed, to quote Whale, "of individuals acting in a collective 
manner, according to a set of values based on altruism and non-profit, for the well-being of 
themselves or others" .77 In addition, it is believed to be able to ensure the establishment of 
'collaborative' partnerships between the parties to the contract, mutual accountability of the 
purchaser to producers and vice versa, empowerment of clients and their communities, 
clarity of contractual conditions, transparency of the contracting process and, in the words 
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of Maykind, "equitable distribution of resources and outputs across the public sector"." 
Hence, it is claimed by the neoliberals to be capable of helping the public sector not only to 
meet the challenges posed by fiscal crisis and globalisation but satisfy the popular demand 
for the ongoing provision of a wide range of welfare programmes, protect the rights and 
interests of the weaker sections of society, and strengthen nonprofits, so that they can be, to 
quote Smith, "a valuable source of citizen participation, community building, social capital, 
and pluralism" .79 
The praxis of public sector restructuring in close accord with neoliberal objectives has been 
discussed in general terms. We now turn to an overview of the neoliberal re-engineering of 
the public sector in New Zealand with special reference to the role of the contract system 
therein. 
New Zealand's welfare state before the public sector reform 
In New Zealand, the great depression of the 1930s brought a social democratic government 
to power which initiated relief schemes for jobless tenants and farmers, and then proceeded 
to develop what a number of people believe to be the first welfare state in the world, with 
the Social Security Act of 1938 creating an all-embracing system of welfare under a single 
piece of legislation." Initially, however, the paramount aim of the government was to 
arrange for security through the preservation of full employment and support for the poor 
and the unemployed. However, as the economy developed after the Second World War, 
the welfare state expanded. A system was instituted where, in the words of James, 
"everybody had a right in the appropriate circumstances to the protection, benefits and 
78 M. Maykind, Manager, Volunteer Centre, 12 August, 1999 (personal communication). 
79 S. R. Smith (2003) Governments and Nonprofits in the Modern Age Society 40:4, p. 44. 
80 A. Davidson (1989) Two Models of Welfare: The Origin and Development of the Welfare State in 
Sweden and New Zealand p.l. 
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services that the state provided". 
81 The welfare state vowed to be responsive to popular 
requirements and interests and promised the extension of welfare as one of the privileges of 
citizenship. The pledge was fulfilled by the government, with unprecedented prosperity 
during the 1950s and 1960s permitting social services to be conferred on one and all. The 
welfare state institutionalised the universal programmes and ensured that everyone enjoyed 
the right to full participation. As a consequence of the long post-war economic boom from 
the mid-1940s to the early 1970s witnessing the pursuit of Keynesian economic policies, it 
was possible to set the 'social minima' at a high level. 
However, by the mid-1970s, with the welfare state in New Zealand coming to be perceived 
by the State Services Commission as a 'dead weight' on society contributing little towards 
wealth creation" and the Business Roundtable consistently arguing for massive reductions 
in social spending, 
83 the idea that the public sector needed to be redesigned in order to 
work better and cost less became popular among many within the ruling political party, the 
Treasury, and the business community who, according to James, were highly influenced by 
neoliberal intellectual thought." The emergence of a variety of seemingly intractable 
problems such as soaring inflation, rising unemployment and falling living standards, 
declining incomes and eroding tax base, escalating debts and deficits, recurring foreign 
exchange crisis, and spiralling interest rates - consequent upon the entrance of Great 
Britain into the European Common Market in 1973, the OPEC oil crisis in the same year, 
and the collapse of the commodity price boom in the early 1970s- prompted the adoption 
of a set of concrete measures to facilitate the restructuring of the public sector. Secondly, 
shifts in the nature of global competition and organisation of production called for the 
enhancement of the productive efficiency of the public sector and the improvement of the 
81 C. James (1992) New Territory - The Transformation of New Zealand p. 20. 
82 State Services Commission (1994) New Zealand's Refonned State Sector p. 2. 
83 B. Roper (1993) A Level Playing Field? Business Political Activism and State Policy Formulation. In B. 
Roper and C. Rudd (eds.) State and Economy in New Zealand p. 163. 
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international competitiveness of local firms and their products. Thirdly, resource 
constraints as a result of increased government spending in the 'era of golden weather' 
which, in fact, had hindered economic development, made it essential for policy makers to 
reflect on 'fiscal restraint' or reduction of the level of expenditure of the public sector. 
Pressures on the welfare state in New Zealand originated from social change, too." The 
fiscal crisis was accompanied by alterations in the socioeconomic and demographic 
structure. The number of the able-bodied unemployed began to rise as a consequence of 
low economic growth in the 1970s. With increasing geographic mobility, gaps started 
appearing in the ability of families to look after their ageing members. The pre-eminence 
of nuclear households came to be challenged by, as pointed out in a report of the 
Department of Statistics, "higher levels of marital dissolution and separation ... de facto 
relationships and one parent families"." These trends increased the demand for benefits 
- adding to the gap between the state's capacity to supply and the nation's expressed 
demand for welfare. 
The welfare state in New Zealand was, therefore, unable to deliver as anticipated, and 
hence both the political left and right began to lose confidence in the ability of the 
government to manage social and economic affairs. Although it was acknowledged by 
those on the political left that a decrease in the degree of inequality had taken place, 
disillusionment arose from the failure of the welfare state to bring about any fundamental 
change in the socioeconomic structure through the redistribution of power and wealth." It 
was held by the right that the welfare state had become too centralised, too bureaucratic, 
and too authoritarian." Overall, there was, to quote Whale, "agreement from both sides of 
85 Whale (1993) Voluntary Welfare Provision in a Landscape of Change p. 21. 
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the political spectrum that the welfare state had become unresponsive to people's needs and 
... undertaken responsibilities beyond its capacity"." 
From the neoliberal perspective, the basic reason behind the comparative decline in New 
Zealand's per capita GDP in the 1950s and 1960s and the general deterioration in economic 
performance from 1974 to 1985 was the adoption of Keynesian macroeconomic policies. 
On the other hand, the Keynesians conceived that the relative decrease in per capita GDP 
during the post-war era could be attributed to the structural characteristics of the New 
Zealand economy and a relatively high population growth rate." Besides, in the words of 
Roper, "New Zealand's economic performance from 1974 to 1985, while disastrous in 
historical terms, was less serious when viewed comparatively because all of the major 
OECD economies experienced lower growth rates during the 1970s and early 1980s"." 
However, while the neoliberals and the Keynesians differed from each other regarding the 
interpretation of the economic crisis in post-war New Zealand, they were in broad 
agreement that the country's economy was adversely affected by a number of external 
shocks in the 1970s and 1980s. 
As regards the redesigning of the welfare state in New Zealand, the pluralists, the Marxists 
and the neo-Weberians had their own reservations. The pluralists felt that policy-making in 
New Zealand was not markedly pluralist or democratic, as a tiny elite of cabinet ministers, 
Treasury officials, and industrialists made the decisions." The Marxists argued that the 
realisation of the policy agenda of the dominant capitalist class in New Zealand required a 
wide range of attacks on the historic gains which, to quote Roper, "the labour movement 
89 Whale (1993) Voluntary Welfare Provision in a Landscape of Change p. 22. 
90 J. Gould (1985) The Muldoon Years p. 65. 
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had achieved through generations of struggle during the twentieth century" .
93 The neo-
Weberians believed that in New Zealand, the state, far from acting in a visibly autonomous 
manner, "consistently implemented", in the words of Roper, "the policies promoted by 
business associations"." However, New Right ideologues in the Treasury, the Business 
Roundtable, the Reserve Bank, and the parliamentary wings of the National and Labour 
parties conceived that the monetarist macroeconomic strategy implemented from 1984 
onwards "succeeded", to quote Roper, "in permanently reversing New Zealand's economic 
decline" .95 
Public sector restructuring in New Zealand 
International and local economic and social realities generated substantial agreement, and 
thus pressure, in New Zealand to restructure the public sector. In the words of Goldfinch 
and Roper, "[a] transitional period in which some limited attempts at market liberalisation 
were combined with a broadly . .. interventionist approach to managing the economy 
followed from the late 1970s to 1984".
96 On the recommendation of the policy makers 
inspired by the neoliberal ideology as opposed to the Keynesian approach and keen to 
emulate the strategies pioneered by the conservative right which held the balance of power 
in most of the Western capitalist countries throughout the 1980s, the fourth Labour 
government, elected in July 1984, undertook a series of management reforms with the aid 
and advice of the Treasury under the leadership of Roger Douglas, who was thought of as 
having, to quote an anonymous columnist of National Business Review, "vision and a 
d. kl . th "
97 
rea mess to tac e restructurmg e economy . 
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid, p. 166. 
95 B. Roper (1997) New Zealand's Postwar Economic History. In C. Rudd and B. Roper (eds.) The Political 
Economy of New Zealand p. 20. 
96 S. Goldfinch and B. Roper (1993) Treasury's Role in State Policy Formulation During the Post-war Era. In 
Roper and Rudd (eds.) State and Economy in New Zealand p. 50. 
97 National Business Review (1984) Financial Consensus: Govt Must Go July 2, p. 11. 
47 
The purpose of the reforms was not only to add to the productive efficiency, and cut down 
the level of expenditure, of the public sector and thereby make the state able to encounter 
the challenge posed by fiscal crisis and globalisation in New Zealand, but also take care of 
the diverse needs of the weaker sections of society. The reforms, meant to redesign the 
public sector, involved re-engineering internal processes, clarifying responsibilities and 
outcomes, and operating within a more precisely defined set of objectives. The key 
administrative principles underpinning the reforms were applied with a high degree of 
consistency across the entire public sector." 
Representing a paradigmatic shift or a fundamental recasting of the instruments of 
governance, the reforms carried out in New Zealand were remarkable in several respects 
and, in the words of Boston and Holland, "substantial and far-reaching" .
99 In the first 
place, they were well coordinated and mutually reinforcing. Secondly, they were 
comprehensive in scope - radically reconfiguring almost every aspect of public 
management. Thirdly, they were instrumental in bringing about major changes in the style 
of governance and the culture of the public service. Fourthly, they were accomplished in 
an exceptionally short space of time. Fifthly, they were not undertaken in isolation but 
formed part of a broader neoliberal strategy or the 'grand design', the chief aim of which 
was to make the government work better and cost less and thereby enhance the country's 
economic performance after nearly three decades of relative decline. Sixthly, they were 
fashioned in consonance with a reasonably coherent theoretical framework based on a set 
of economic and administrative doctrines (public choice theory, new public management, 
agency theory, and transaction cost analysis), the impact of which was evident in a variety 
of ways: the perception of individuals as actors capable of making rational economic 
choices; the advocacy of managerial principles and practices; the conception of the 
98 J. Boston et al. (eds.) (1996) Public Management: The New Zealand Model p. 350. 
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government as a complex senes of contractual relationships; and the emphasis on 
productive efficiency and cost-effectiveness. 
The reforms embarked upon in New Zealand drew high commendations from international 
agencies and leading academics.
100 As well, they figured prominently in the debates over 
administrative restructuring in numerous countries - Australia, the United Kingdom, the 
United States, and Canada, to name but a few.
101 Introduced in 1984 out of the passion of 
the political actors in New Zealand for an efficient and cost-effective public sector, and 
continued under various centre-right administrations during the 1990s, they called, among 
other things, for: 
-the gradual withdrwal of the state from certain spheres of activity; 
- the marketisation of the government via commercialisation, corporatisation, and 
privatisation; 
-growing use of private sector practices in redesigning public services; 
-the decoupling of policy and operational responsibilities and the related separation of the 
roles of the purchaser and the provider; 
- the establishment of a comprehensive system for strategic planning, output -based 
budgeting, performance appraisal, and accrual accounting; 
- strong encouragement for greater competition among producers to reduce production 
costs and maximise consumer choice; and 
- extensive use of contracting out including purchase of service contracting for the 
development of genuine partnerships between the purchaser and the provider, the delivery 
of a multiplicity of high quality, cost-effective, and flexible services, the promotion of 
mutual accountability, the empowerment of clients and their communities, the clarity of the 
contractual terms and conditions, the transparency of the contracting process, and the 
encouragement of fairness and justice in relation to the allocation of resources and services. 
100 Boston et al. (eds.) (1996) Public Management: The New Zealand Model p. 2. 
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The neoliberal reforms meant to restructure the public sector in New Zealand went, to 
quote Osborne and Gaebler, "farthest along the entrepreneurial path"-"' Since the early 
1990s, there was an enhancement in the economic performance of the public sector on the 
whole - with growth rates in the 4-5 per cent range, falling unemployment, and declining 
d
. 103 
government expen 1ture. Through better management of cash and fixed assets, greater 
control of state spending, and more informed choices about outputs made by ministers as a 
result of vast improvement in the quantity and quality of information available to them, the 
public sector succeeded in producing more for less. Also, the providers, both in-house and 
external, came to develop a much sharper focus and a clearer organisational mission, and 
enabled the public sector to tackle the hazards of fiscal crisis and globalisation. The public 
sector and the producers looked equally enterprising, and prudent to a similar extent in the 
use of resources. 
While the neoliberal restructurings of the public sector in New Zealand are almost 
complete, the state, however, remains relatively large, and the scope of its activities 
continues to be very broad. Despite scaling down of the public sector, central government 
expenditure as a proportion of GDP in the late 1990s was around 35 per cent, that is, quite 
similar to the level just before the reforms commenced.
104 The public sector is definitely 
smaller now than a decade earlier, but only in terms of the number of government 
employees and the value of public assets. Secondly, there are some fundamental problems 
with regard to the management of the public sector - none of which can be permanently 
solved through technical measures, being essentially political in nature. For example, the 
'New Zealand model' has never been able to create an enduring consensus on the proper 
boundary between the public and private sectors in relation to funding or service provision, 
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or establish a transparent dividing line between political and managerial responsibility, or 
prompt any novel solutions to the tension between the desire for choice and diversity and 
the expectation of common standards, consistency, and equitable access. Nor could the 
'experiment' to re-engineer the public sector ever succeed in completely resolving the 
dilemma of how to achieve coherence and horizontal coordination in the context of 
institutional fragmentation, or overcome the hurdles generated by the existence of complex 
principal-agent relations, or hold influential and resourceful contractors to account. 
Thirdly, it seems that the ongoing process of globalisation will continue to threaten the 
organisation and management of the public sector. Fourthly, the public sector in general 
and the contract system in particular are likely come under new strains from, in the words 
of 6, "internationalisation, changing technologies, breaking down of barriers between 
services, demand movements and shifts in the centre of political gravity".
105 
Conclusion 
The above discussion highlights the twin pressures of fiscal crisis and globalisation on the 
welfare state, leading to the adoption of a neoliberal agenda - supposedly ensuring the 
enhancement of the productive efficiency, and the reduction of the size of the public sector 
and transforming the nature of the modern state. The researcher focuses on a smaller part 
of the bigger neoliberal agenda, and seeks to find out if purchase of service contracting, as 
an effective policy instrument, has really facilitated 'the development of genuine 
partnerships between the purchaser and the producer, the delivery of a multiplicity of high 
quality, cost-effective and flexible services, the promotion of mutual accountability, the 
empowerment of clients and their communities, the clarity of the contractual terms and 
conditions, the transparency of the contracting process, and the encouragement of fairness 
and justice with regard to the allocation of resources and services' (see p. 49) in New 
105 P. 6 (1997) The New Politics of Welfare Contracting. In P. 6 and J. Kendall (eds.) The Contract Culture in 
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Zealand - helping the state thereby work better and cost less. It is anticipated that 




Purchase of Service Contracting and Voluntary Organisations: A Study in Benefits 
and Costs 
This chapter assesses the success and failure of purchase of service contracting in enabling 
voluntary organisations to attain certain specific objectives. It begins with a discussion of 
the factors contributing to the emergence and consolidation of purchase of service 
contracting in the Western world, and thereafter identifies a set of objectives that the 
strategy supposedly helps voluntary organisations to achieve. It then goes on to examine 
the positive and negative views on the purported ability of purchase of service contracting 
to enable service agencies to attain these objectives. In conclusion, it comments on the 
need for an objective empirical research on the prospects and problems of purchase of 
service contracting in helping the third sector achieve its objectives. 
Historical context 
In the Western world, the traditional welfare paradigm was based on, to quote Fulcher et 
al., "a paternalistic philosophy of state care" .
1 The primary responsibility for the funding 
and provision of social services was to be undertaken by the state, with the church left to 
define popular attitudes towards 'caring for the stranger'. The dominant belief was that 
private welfare systems were supplementary and subordinate to the efforts of government to 
tackle societal problems. It was these notions that influenced the bureaucratic structures 
and institutional frameworks for preserving and maintaining the welfare state. 
1 L. Fulcher et al. (1988) Contracting for Social Services: A Review of the Literature and Policy 
Implications for the Department of Social Welfare p. 3. 
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In the 1950s and 1960s, the generally buoyant economies in the Western world witnessed 
government assuming a wider role concerning social welfare. With the state prospering on 
the dividends of economic growth which had made social altruism painless, 
2 there was a 
massive increase in the expenditure of public funds to deliver a variety of social services
3 
Also, changes in the demographic profile, the socioeconomic structure, the philosophies of 
private individualism, and the systems of intellectual analysis contributed to the greater part 
played by government as the service provider and the gradual obliteration of a host of 
natural support networks.' 
Subsequent to the oil shock in 1973, most of the nations in the Western world had to 
readjust themselves to major reductions in financial capacity.' The economic stress, in the 
words of Aucoin, " ... led to the paramountcy of the policy responses aiming at budgetary 
restraint and ... downsizing the public services of government".' Expectations about the 
emergence of a productive and cost-effective public sector began to rise. 
There was widespread adoption of purchase of service contracting in an attempt to produce 
more with less. However, critics denounced purchase of service contracting as an attack on 
the welfare state, and suspected that it might have arisen out of political rather than 
economic considerations.' While purchase of service contracting is quite a common 
feature almost all over the Western world today in the early twenty-first century, there 
seems to be no end to the debate on its advantages and shortcomings. 
2 Klein cited in Fulcher et al. (1988) Contracting for Social Services: A Review of the Literature and 
Policy Implications for the Department of Social Welfare p. 4. 
3 Fulcher et al. (1988) Contracting for Social Services: A Review of the Literature and Policy 
Implications for the Department of Social Welfare p. 4. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
6 P. Aucoin (1990) Administrative Reform in Public Management: Paradigms, Principles, Paradoxes and 
Pendulums Governance: An International Review of Policy and Administration 3:2, p. 115. 
7 Fulcher et al. (1988) Contracting for Social Services: A Review of the Literature and Policy 
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The champions of purchase of service contracting argue that if prudently handled, the 
'device' may offer, to quote Weddell, "a bigger hope for a strengthened partnership 
between the private and public sectors, resulting in increased availability as well as 
refinement in the provision and delivery of high quality services".' On the other hand, 
purchase of service contracting is believed to have in-built defects which cannot be 
eliminated or even minimised with the help of the so-called 'effective contracting'. The 
views of the protagonists of purchase of service contracting who look at it as a means to 
redraft the structure of civil society in the Western world, and the opinions held by the 
opponents urging that the welfare state should be preserved under its original auspices -
both deserve to be examined in detail. 
Efforts are now made to discuss the success and failure of purchase of service contracting in 
helping voluntary organisations attain the following objectives: 
- achieving a genuine partnership between the purchaser and providers; 
-increasing the quantity of services; 
-improving the quality of programmes; 
-reducing the cost of production; 
-responding to the changes in the demands of users; 
- ensuring mutual accountability of the parties to the contract; 
-empowering clients and their communities; 
-promoting clarity of contractual terms and conditions; 
-facilitating transparency of the contracting process; and 
- encouraging fair and just distribution of resources and outputs. 
These objectives are not without a theoretical basis. First, these objectives have been 
identified in theoretical literature as major goals for voluntary organisations as well as 
8 K. Weddell (1986) Privatizing Social Services in the USA Social Policy and Administration 20:1, p. 26. 
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government to attain.' Secondly, a set of economic and administrative doctrines, namely, 
public choice theory (inspiring the drive to foster a spirit of a genuine partnership, improve 
clarity and transparency, and promote popular interest by means of community 
empowerment and equitable distribution of resources and outputs), new public management 
(highlighting the need for programme effectiveness and flexibility), agency theory (bringing 
to light the value of, and the need for, mutual accountability), and transaction cost analysis 
(drawing attention to the significance of productive efficiency and cost-effectiveness) 
provide the theoretical foundation of these objectives.
10 
Achieving genuine partnership 
Purchase of service contracting calls for consultation and negotiation between government 
and voluntary organisations in all decisions regarding needs identification and evaluation, 
programme planning, service provision, performance appraisal, and policy development. It 
contributes to the evolution of a long-term and welfare-maximising, rather than a strict 
principal-agent, alliance characterised by interdependence and complementarity on which 
the relationship between the purchaser and suppliers, according to Nowland-Foreman, 
should rest. 11 It ensures the generation of 'procedural fairness' emanating from bilateral 
communication, impartiality, refutability, explanation, knowledgeability, and courtesy, 
12 
9 Fulcher et al (1988) Contracting for Social Services - A Review of the Literature and Policy 
Implications for the Department of Social Welfare pp. 18-43. Department of Social Welfare (DSW) 
(1990) Contracting for Social Services - Principles and Guidelines pp. 6-7. !. Culpitt (1992) Welfare 
and Citizenship -Beyond the Crisis of the Welfare State? pp. 97-132. J. Leigh (1994) Contracting for 
Social Services - A Process Evaluation of the Community Funding Agency's Contracting Procedures 
pp. 37-47. G. Nowland-Foreman (1997) Can Voluntary Organisations Survive the Bear Hug of 
Government Funding Under a Contracting Regime? - A View from Aotearoa!New Zealand pp. 27-
36. A. von Tunzelmann and M. Murphy (1998) Government Funding of Voluntary Services in New 
Zealand: The Contracting Issues - A Scoping Study pp. 18-24. 
10 J. Boston (1991) The Theoretical Underpinnings of Public Sector Restructuring in New Zealand. In J. 
Boston et al (eds.) Reshaping the State: New Zealand's Bureaucratic Revolution pp. 2-10. J. Boston et 
al (eds.) Public Management: The New Zealand Model pp. 16-40. 
11 G. Now land-Foreman (1995) Neither Mendicants Nor Deal-Makers: Contracting, Government Funding and 
Voluntary Organisations Signpost February, p. 5. 
12 Ernst and Young (1996) Thinking about NZCFA 's Contracting Approach: Draft p. 15. 
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and a true partnership based on mutual trust and respect, cooperation and commitment to 
common goals, risk sharing, free information flows, flexible management of the contracting 
process, and maintenance of credibility and reputation." It wants the complementary roles 
and the respective strengths of the funder and the producer to be recognised; the 
independence, priorities and constraints of the partners to be acknowledged; the objectives, 
values and expectations of the parties to be aligned; decision-making to be more reciprocal; 
differences of opinion to be identified with pinpoint accuracy and discussed in an 
environment free from tension; and disagreements to be resolved through dialogue and 
deliberation. 
On the other hand, a host of voluntary organisations - particularly those which are local 
and not strong enough in terms of resources or connections- do not have any involvement 
in the decision-making process dominated by government With little interest and scanty 
knowledge in the activities, purposes, operational impediments, and diverse requirements of 
voluntary organisations, and no great respect for their experience in, and commitment to, 
community development, government does not prefer to consult, or discuss, or even 
negotiate with them on pre-decided contractual issues, such as the basis for needs 
assessment, or the rationale behind the changes in resource allocation. The level of 
information shared by government with voluntary organisations concerning, for example, 
the outcomes of its meetings with them, or the factors influencing the decisions taken by 
policy makers, is seldom sufficient - breeding frustration and misunderstanding and 
causing good ideas to get lost Voluntary organisations, indeed, find it extremely difficult 
to work (much less bargain) with government in the absence of open and bilateral 
communication, a common platform, a spirit of genuine partnership, and a close working 
13 Tunzelmann and Murphy (1998) Government Funding of Voluntary Services in New Zealand: The 
Contracting Issues - A Scoping Study p. 22. 
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relationship characterised by 'good faith' which has had the potential to import, in the 
words of Bremen, "a higher standard of conduct into contractual transactions".
14 
Secondly, the independence of voluntary organisations is undermined due to the imposition 
of manifold policy restrictions by government regarding staffing requirements and, to quote 
Culpitt, "client eligibility and service delivery".
15 Voluntary organisations accept the 
interpretation of community needs by government, and the specification of part-funded 
services and compliance costs including, in the words of Higgins, "several non-negotiable 
criteria ... relating to needs assessment, cultural appropriateness and good employer 
standards for paid staff'.
16 In order to cope with what Nowland-Foreman calls the 'bear 
hug' of state funding/' voluntary organisations seek to remodel themselves in the image of 
government along either bureaucratic or market principles - "destroying", to quote 
Maykind, "their own strength and ability to bring about social change and becoming more 
like competitive and output- rather than outcome-driven corporate entities".
18 Under 
mounting pressure from government for the improvement of performance, voluntary 
organisations keep on trying to look 'business-like' - focusing on accountability 
structures, efficiency gains, and management development programmes instead of the 
traditional attributes of voluntary endeavour such as consultation, consensus, cooperation, 
and collective action
19 and values like humanity, impartiality, democratic inclusiveness, 
and cultural awareness,
20 moving towards the replacement of direct service volunteers with 
14 J. Bremen (1999) The Tender Trap- Tendering for Public Sector Work Australian Journal of Public 
Administration 58:3, p. llO. 
15 Culpitt (1992) Welfare and Citizenship: Beyond the Crisis of the Welfare State? p. liS. 
16 J. Higgins (1997) Transparency and Trade-offs in Policy Discourse: A Case Study of Social Service 
Contracting Social Policy Journal of New Zealand 9:2, p. 6. 
17 Now land-Foreman (1997) Can Voluntary Organisations Survive the Bear Hug of Government Funding 
under a Contracting Regime?- A View from Aotearoa!New Zealand Third Sector Review 3:1, p. 5. 
18 M. Maykind, Manager, Volunteer Centre, 12 August, 1999 (personal communication). 
19 Ibid. 
20 B. Gregory (2000) Getting Better but Feeling Worse?- Public Sector Reform in New Zealand Public 
Sector 23:2, p. 16. 
58 
professional staff members,
21 and weakening the human element in the process." Ever 
subjected to excessive regulation, voluntary organisations are compelled, in the opinion of 
Now land-Foreman, to turn their attention to the demands of the funder," "forced", in the 
words of Easton, "into dependency on the state"," reduced to 'de facto agents'
25 or 'sub-
contractors'" of government, and entrusted, according to Gronbjerg, with the task of 
carrying out its mandates." Government continues to exercise almost absolute control over 
voluntary organisations by remaining, to quote Whale, "the chief source of finance"," 
maintaining the ultimate responsibility for the oversight of services, and retaining the 
decision-making authority with regard to the planning and delivery of outputs - far from 
becoming what Wolch considers to be a 'shadow state' .
29 Large voluntary organisations 
alone can assert with confidence that they will not enter into a contract with government but 
keep out if not consulted as equal partners," or if the agreement is not consistent with the 
goals and values upheld by them,
31 or if the outputs sought to be purchased are peripheral 
to their real reason for being." 
Increasing quantity 
Purchase of service contracting initiates a systematic approach to the comparative 
evaluation of the priorities of government and the needs of clients and their communities to 
21 G. Nowland-Foreman (1998) Purchase-of-Service Contracting. Voluntary Organizations, and Civil Society: 
Dissecting the Goose That Lays the Golden Eggs? American Behavioral Scientist 42:1, p. 110. 
22 K. Smyth (1995) Are Voluntary Organisations Losing Their Heart? Dialogue No.3 (March), p. 2. 
23 G. Nowland-Foreman (1997) Excellence Starts on the Outside Dialogue No. 96 (October), p. 11. 
24 B. Easton (1999) The Whimpering of the State: Policy After MMP p. 111. 
25 D. Robinson (1991) Partnership and Contracts- Are They Compatible? Dialogue No. 65 (July), p.3. 
26 Newland-Foreman (1995) Neither Mendicants Nor Deal Makers: Contracting, Government Funding 
and Voluntary Organisations p. 4. 
27 K. Gronbjerg (1983) Private Welfare: Its Future in the Welfare State American Behavioural Scientist 
26:6, p. 778. 
28 A. Whale (1993) Voluntary Welfare Provision in a lAndscape of Change p. 34. 
29 J. Walch (1990) The Shadow State: Government and Voluntary Sector in Transition p. 16. 
30 J. Lewis (1993) Developing the Mixed Economy of Care: Emerging News for Voluntary Organisations 
Journal of Social Policy 22:2, p.180. 
31 Tunzelmann and Murphy (1998) Government Funding of Voluntary Services in New Zealand: The 
Contracting Issues - A Scoping Study 'p. 39. 
32 Nowland-Foreman cited in Tunzelmann and Murphy (1998) Government Funding of Voluntary Services 
in New Zealand: The Contracting Issues - A Scoping Study p. 39. 
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be taken care of by voluntary organisations. As well, it facilitates the enhancement of the 
capacity of voluntary organisations to deliver, in the words of Geiger and Walch, "[a] mix 
of voluntary services in a region ... in response to ... client service demands" .
33 
Secondly, purchase of service contracting creates a situation where voluntary organisations 
are inspired to render services for the vulnerable with a missionary zeal and without any 
profit motive whatsoever. Voluntary organisations do not, in general, have the intention to 
deceive their donors or clients, and are therefore trusted more than for-profits. While 
commercial or industrial operations may be carried out by voluntary organisations as a 
subsidiary activity, profits are not distributed among shareholders" but, to quote Gidron et 
al., "plowed back into the primary mission of the agency" .
35 
Thirdly, purchase of service contracting recognises the importance of recruiting and 
retaining the right staff - committed and competent in enhancing the service 
performance of voluntary organisations. Also, it encourages voluntary organisations to 
arrange for training and work appraisal on a regular basis to improve the ability of their 
staff (including volunteers) who, as a report of the Audit Office in New Zealand indicates, 
are the key resource in delivering services of a high standard." 
At the same time, there is usually a gap between the funding from government and the 
actual costs incurred by voluntary organisations in providing services." As a result, 
33 Geiger and Walch cited in Whale (1993) Voluntary Welfare Provision in a Landscape of Change p. 
67. 
34 S. Payne (1993) Non-profit Organisations in Economic Statistics: Issues of Definition and Measurement. In 
G. R. Hawke and D. Robinson (eds.) Performance Without Profit: The Voluntary Welfare Sector in New 
Zealand p. 76. 
35 B. Gidron et al. (eds.) (1992) Government and the Third Sector: Emerging Relationships in Welfare 
States p. 3. 
36 Audit Office (1999) Towards Service Excellence: The Responsiveness of Government Agencies to 
Their Clients - Report of the Controller and Auditor General p. 74. 
37 Leigh (1994) Contracting for Social Services: A Process Evaluation of the Community Funding 
Agency's Contracting Procedures p. 43. 
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voluntary organisations try to make up the deficit and even save by employing cheaper but 
less qualified staff, laying off workers or paying them far below market rates, tapping 
funding from different sources (other departments of government, corporate sponsors, 
philanthropic trusts, local authorities, generous individuals, and fee-paying service users), 
applying for tax exemption, and developing, if possible, commercial ventures to generate, 
in the words of Frumkin and Tim, "a stream of earned income".'" Anticipating 100 per 
cent accountability for less than 50 per cent funding makes government look unreasonable, 
constrains the innovativeness of voluntary organisations, and lowers trust." With 
government entering into a contract for a whole service while contributing only a 
percentage, refusing post hoc adjustments to reimbursement levels and thereby leaving 
contractors to carry most of the risk, claiming back money under the 'claw-back' clause, 
insisting that accountability requirements be met notwithstanding the high compliance 
costs, and blaming suppliers for underperformance without accepting the responsibility for 
inadequate funding, voluntary organisations become more than irritated and resent getting 
less and doing more, albeit to no avail. Most of the contracts with government as a party 
"end up", to quote Gutch, "being subsidised by voluntary organisations to the tune of 15-20 
per cent".40 Government does not feel it necessary to bother about the growing pressure on 
voluntary organisations as a consequence of reductions in direct provision. In the 
circumstances, the relationship between government and voluntary organisations can be 
portrayed in terms of a zero-sum game in which, in the words of Gidron et al., "one 
actor's gains are another's loss".'' 
38 P. Frumkin and M. T. Tim (2001) Strategic Positioning and the Financing of Nonprofit Organisations: Is 
Efficiency Rewarded in the Contributions Marketplace? Public Administration Review 61:3. p. 266. 
39 R. Dyson (1998) The Role of Volunteers and Voluntary Organisations in Our Economy. In M. O'Brien 
(ed.) Social Responsibility: Whose Agenda? p. 66. 
40 R. Gutch (1992) Contracting Lessons from the US p. 74. 
41 Gidron et al. (eds.) (1992) Government and the Third Sector: Emerging Relationships in Welfare 
States p. 5. 
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Secondly, the length of the contract (generally one year) reduces the ability of voluntary 
organisations to plan ahead in an effective manner for the development of new and/or 
additional services on a long-term basis, for service agencies have no idea whether funding 
from government is going to continue. Voluntary organisations get trapped in an endless 
circle of applying for funding, form-filling, and setting up or closing down projects at the 
expense of their limited resources because of what Gutch calls the annual paper blizzard." 
Even in the event of renewal, voluntary organisations cannot make any alterations in their 
services to cope with the forthcoming changes in the level or priorities of funding, because 
the time between the expiry of the previous, and the commencement of the subsequent, 
agreement is by no means adequate and, in the opinion of Norman, there are hardly any 
savings to be carried over to the ensuing year." 
Thirdly, uncertainty or interruption of funding from government due to legislative and/or 
bureaucratic delays, or decline in financial support following policy shifts, leads to 
recurrent cashflow problems for voluntary organisations - subjecting them to a high risk 
of stress and tension. In many cases, voluntary organisations receive funding (which rarely 
succeeds in keeping pace with inflation) in instalments, with consequential reduction in the 
accrued interest. Voluntary organisations strive to live up to their contractual obligations by 
exploring alternative sources of funding - seldom available on an ongoing basis and 
necessitating the fulfilment of diverse accountability requirements. As resources become 
scarce, competition for funding and charitable giving increases: not only voluntary 
organisations but quasi-public agencies begin to look for trust funds. Funding cannot be 
expected from communities with meagre financial capabilities and almost no concern for 
the needs of voluntary organisations. More often than not, voluntary organisations find the 
boundaries between the funding 'buckets' of the different departments of government far 
42 Gutch (1992) Contracting Lessons from the US p. 84. 
43 R. Nonnan (1995) New Zealand's Re-invented Government: Experiences of Public Sector Managers Public 
Sector 18:2, p. 23. 
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from flexible. A number of funders refuse, on principle, to even consider funding voluntary 
organisations supported by the state. In view of an overall lack of accessible funding, most 
of the undercapitalised voluntary organisations are forced to retrench staff and minimise 
spending on wages and allowances, training, research and professional development, 
programme evaluation, and management support strongly required, according to Now land-
Foreman, by middle-sized service agencies.
44 
Fourthly, many voluntary organisations depend wholly on voluntary labour. Absolute 
reliance on volunteers may have an adverse effect upon the quantity of the services able to 
be delivered for a set amount of money." While most of these individuals are well-
meaning, sincere, and efficient, a few of them do display a deficiency of motivation and 
professionalism. 
Improving quality 
Purchase of service contracting helps voluntary organisations to determine how well they 
are doing their job." To be precise, it offers voluntary organisations a chance to assess 
their own performance against agreed standards. Thus, it contributes to the improvement of 
the professional competence of voluntary organisations in planning and producing quality 
services and generating positive outcomes for clients and their communities. 
However, it is not possible for numerous voluntary organisations to measure the quality of 
services against contract specifications owing to dearth of, to quote Johnson et al., 
"appropriate and ... acceptable performance indicators"," and non-existence of an 
44 G. Newland-Foreman (1996) Government Funding Can Be a Management Hazard Dialogue No. 90 
(August), p. 18. 
45 Waitangi Tribunal Report (1998) Te Whanau 0 Waipareira Report p. 101. 
46 Williams cited in Leigh (1994) Contracting for Social Services A Process Evaluation of the 
Community Funding Agency's Contracting Procedures p. 39. 
47 N. Johnson et al. (1988) Regulating for Quality in the Voluntary Sector Journal of Social Policy 27:3, p. 
320. 
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economic 'market' to determine the value of outputs." Intangible social outcomes, unlike 
outputs, take relatively long periods to materialise, can be only partly realised in most cases, 
and hardly lend themselves to be compared. Further, they are, in the words of Gill, "often 
poorly defined"," not accurately measurable since, to quote of Scott, "nobody has yet 
designed a comprehensive outcome-based measurement system that actually works",
50 and 
not really easy to be linked with outputs.
51 But, it has to be borne in mind that funding 
based only on outputs risks skewing performance towards meeting superficial 
characteristics often unrelated to the impacts clients desire." Besides, as a consequence of 
over-dependence on outputs, voluntary organisations get sucked into a huge emphasis on 
counting which tends, in the words of Smyth, "to put numbers on everything"," cannot 
furnish any evidence of the results of their efforts," and find it hard to see where the 
activities undertaken by them "fit", to quote Tunzelmann and Murphy, "in the larger 
scheme of things"." While capable of contributing to public participation in service 
delivery," customer satisfaction surveys provide just minor insights into the extent to which 
outputs and outcomes have been secured." 
"G. Duncan (1997) The Management of Risk and Quality in the Social Services Social Policy Journal of 
New Zealand 9:2, p. 70. 
49 D. Gill (2000) New Zealand Experience with Public Management Reform: Why the Grass is Always 
Greener on the Other Side of the Fence Public Sector 23:2, p. 9. 
50 G. Scott (2000) How to Broaden the Base of Contractualism Public Sector 23:2, p. 6. 
51 A. Neale and B. Anderson (2000) Performance Reporting for Accountability Purposes- Lessons, Issues, 
Future Public Sector 23:2, p. 21. 
52 Newland-Foreman (1995) Neither Mendicants Nor Deal Makers: Contracting, Government Funding 
and Voluntary Organisations p. 44. 
53 Smyth (1995) Dialogue No. 83 (March), p. 2. 
54 Newland-Foreman (1995) Neither Mendicants Nor Deal Makers: Contracting, Government Funding 
and Voluntary Organisations p. 44. 
55 Tunzelmann and Murphy (1998) Government Funding of Voluntary Services in New Zealand: The 
Contracting Issues - A Scoping Study p. 37. 
56 N. Ryan (2001) Reconstructing Citizens as Consumers: Implications for New Modes of Government 
Australian Journal of Public Administration 60:3, p. 105. 
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Reducing cost 
Purchase of service contracting has tremendous ideological appeal. It succeeds in ensuring 
continuous and increasing flow of volunteer support which, together with supply of funds 
from alternative sources, makes it possible for voluntary organisations to lower the cost of 
services and enhance their capacity, in the words of Salamon, "to leverage public dollars"." 
On the other hand, voluntary organisations nowadays receive an indifferent response when 
they seek to attract volunteer support, and more important, funding from government is 
seldom sufficient to meet the requirements of service agencies. In a majority of cases, 
government refuses to approve of additional funding for voluntary organisations, or assist 
them in recovering their start-up, negotiation, and overhead costs. Further, voluntary 
organisations do not always succeed in tapping alternative sources of funding, including 
other departments of government. Faced with increased transaction and compliance costs 
on account of the need for more specification, supervision, and reporting and, to quote Ryan 
and Brown, "the dilemma of applying scarce resources to monitor and evaluate outcomes"," 
underresourced voluntary organisations are often forced to divert the funding granted by 
government from core programme objectives, postpone plans to purchase or upgrade the 
equipment capable of producing more for less, incur debts and, in the opinion of Weddell, 
inflate prices and compromise the quality of outputs. 
60 
Responding to changes 
Purchase of service contracting entrusts voluntary organisations with the liberty to 
experiment with their programmes in order to best achieve the desired outcomes. Freedom 
of action makes it easier for voluntary organisations to redress the grievances, and cater to 
58 Salamon cited in Culpitt (1992) Welfare and Citizenship: Beyond the Crisis of the Welfare State? p. 
115. 
59 Ryan and Brown (1998) Australian Journal of Public Administration 57:3, p. 50. 
60 Weddell cited in Culpitt (1992) Welfare and Citizenship: Beyond the Crisis of the Welfare State? p. 
117. 
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the changing priorities, of their clients via development of outputs in specific directions, 
diversification of delivery approaches, betterment of staff, introduction of quality systems in 
the provision of services, and organisation of production, in the words of W olch, "in 
geographic locales hard hit by the ravages of deindustrialisation and entrenched poverty" .
61 
Besides, voluntary organisations manage to render a variety of services to choose from 
which are, according to Kramer, individualised and specialised" and, in the opinion of 
Culpitt, flexible and responsive." 
Secondly, purchase of service contracting encourages voluntary organisations to employ 
volunteers and train them for maximisation of results. Volunteers, in general, exhibit a high 
level of sincerity and drive, and provide assistance of superior quality in producing and 
delivering a greater quantity of better outputs. Expending time, enthusiasm and 
commitment in the hope of making a difference, and providing a cost-effective source of 
labour with no expectation for any return on the investment, volunteers keep on helping 
voluntary organisations establish, according to Salamon, innovative branch agencies in 
areas where new social needs are identified before government is able to develop and 
deliver alternate or adjunct services." 
At the same time, the compliant attitude developed as a result of acting in conformity with 
the contract specifications imposed by government makes voluntary organisations passive 
- unwilling to take risks and initiatives and disinterested in producing particularistic and 
specialised services for clients left, consequently, with reduced choice. Further, the 
reluctance of the funder to arrange for additional reimbursement, even in the event of a rise 
in costs, incapacitates voluntary organisations to tailor their outputs to specific requirements 
61 Walch (1990) The Shadow State: Government and Voluntary Sector in Transition p. 220. 
62 Kramer cited in Fulcher et al (1988) Contracting for Social Services: A Review of the Literature and 
Policy Implications for the Department of Social Welfare p. 24. 
63 Culpitt(l992) Welfare and Citizenship: Beyond the Crisis of the Welfare State? p.l22. 
64 Salamon cited in Culpitt (1992) Welfare and Citizenship: Beyond the Crisis of the Welfare State? p. 
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and/or changing circumstances. With their priorities distorted, goals displaced, values 
sacrificed, and capacity to take care of community needs diminished, voluntary 
organisations are forsaken by volunteers who feel strangled by bureaucratic formalities and, 
to quote Capie, "simply walk away"." 
Ensuring accountability 
Purchase of service contracting enables voluntary organisations have a say over the amount 
of inputs going into service provision, and the content and style of outputs. As well, policy 
makers are accountable to the public for the impact of programmes: the ethos and 
motivation of voluntary organisations, in the words of Tunzelmann and Murphy, "is 
inherently outcome-driven"." 
However, for all practical purposes, no government considers itself responsible to voluntary 
organisations. On the contrary, it holds voluntary organisations accountable for the duties 
that they must execute in spite of severe financial constraints. Moreover, it forces voluntary 
organisations, already suspended in a web of multiple responsibilities (to their executive 
conunittees, boards, trustees, beneficiaries, staff, contributors, and other funding sources), 
to meet a wide range of unreasonable, excessive, and frequently changing accountability 
requirements. It hardly cares for the time spent and the costs borne by voluntary 
organisations in preparing, to quote Nowland-Foreman, "different reports ... at different 
times for different bodies" .
67 It does not provide underfunded voluntary organisations with 
the resources required for the measurement of their performance against service 
specifications. It shifts the focus onto the individual performance of voluntary 
organisations when, in the words of Nowland-Foreman, "the real problem is poor social 
65 A. Capie (1999) Alternative Service Delivery: Some Experiences from the Non-Government Organisation 
Sector Public Sector 22:1, p. 12. 
66 Tunze1mann and Murphy (1998) Government Funding of Voluntary Services in New Zealand: The 
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67 G. Nowland-Foreman (1997) Accountability Is More Than What You Spend on Your Boxer Shorts 
Dialogue No. 93 (March), p. 16. 
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policy"."' At the same time, it seldom sends any feedback to voluntary organisations in the 
absence of the facts needed to make judgements on the standards reached. Thus, it brings 
voluntary organisations, already plagued by numerous inconveniences (growing workload, 
decreasing funding, dissipating resources), under intense pressure creating, to quote Perry et 
al., "a deteriorating climate of power imbalance, insecurity and suspicion between provider 
and funder":" few, indeed, would agree with Walker that contracting systematises 
accountability." 
Empowering communities 
Purchase of service contracting adds to the credibility and reputation of the voluntary sector 
by empowering it to act as the harbinger for progressive social change. Voluntary 
organisations form networks "held together", in the words of Earles and Moon, "by mutual 
interest, complementary strengths and interdependencies"." They share information, ideas, 
and resources among themselves - emphasising the value of communication, cooperation, 
and collective action. They have the ability to build voluntary resources" and develop, to 
quote Nowland-Foreman, "the confidence, hope and sense of purpose of countless 
volunteers"." They identify the needs of clients and their communities, articulate the 
necessity for new services, and act, in the opinion of Kramer, as a watchdog or gadfly to 
exert pressure on the state for the establishment, enhancement, and extension of 
personalised programmes." They monitor the statutory provisions concerning welfare, and 
campaign for amendments whenever necessary. They serve the vulnerable through 
"G. Nowland-Foreman (1996) What We Measure Counts Dialogue No. 92 (December), p. 16. 
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preventive, advocacy, and developmental work. They make users consciOus of their 
consumer rights and capable of lodging 'complaints and grievances' to secure redress. 
They furnish information on the opportunities for participation with a view to restoring the 
self-help ethic, and inspire staff, customers, and local groups to work in unison for a better 
tomorrow. Voluntary organisations protect the special interests of minority communities, 
and render certain particular services reflecting a public responsibility that government is 
unable or unwilling to assume." They plead for the involvement of clients in decision 
making and, according to Malcolm, alert the state to policy impacts." Thus, they succeed 
in lending a collective voice to the disadvantaged sections of society" who require to be 
heard and make known their rights," mobilising community initiatives which, in the 
opinion of Witten-Hannah, strengthen both individuals and associations," and contributing 
to the generation of social capital" with the assistance of volunteers,'
1 emergence of 
stronger communities, 82 promotion of citizen participation, 
83 and effective democratic 
governance." Metaphorically speaking, they are the goose that lay the golden eggs." 
Now land-Foreman does not consider voluntary organisations to be mendicants begging for 
government aid or dealmakers vying for a contract, but regards them as an essential part of 
75 Ibid. 
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the fabric of civil society" - with the potential to have more impact in competitive times 
as moral leaders, standard setters, and spreaders of good ideas. 
87 
Secondly, purchase of service contracting stimulates involvement of local voluntary 
organisations in the planning and provision of services at the local level. These voluntary 
organisations receive valuable inputs from local people endowed with local knowledge and 
expenence. The consequences are twofold: first, locality-based voluntary organisations 
acquire the competence to take care of local needs, and second, local clients feel a sense of 
participation in the development of the policies pertaining to the delivery of outputs and 
enjoy what Fulcher et al. call a partial experience of citizenship." 
Thirdly, purchase of service contracting makes many small and new voluntary organisations 
reassess their role in service provision, combine resources, and form alliances among 
themselves." Besides, it encourages strategic partnerships between small and new 
voluntary organisations and large and well-established service agencies - resulting in 
improved services to clients." 
On the other hand, all voluntary organisations are not in possessiOn of the expertise, 
resources, and influence which could have made them highly effective." It is only on rare 
occasions that they succeed in building their own capabilities by means of networking 
and/or information sharing. Despite all the preventive, advocacy, and developmental work, 
they often fail to empower, or even protect the interests of clients and forge a closer 
86 Nowland- Foreman (1995) Neither Mendicants Nor Deal Makers: Contracting, Government Funding 
and Voluntary Organisations p. 3. 
87 G. Nowland-Foreman (1998) Doing More with Less Dialogue No. 99 (June), p. 15. 
88 Fulcher et al. (1988) Contracting for Social Services: A Review of the Literature and Policy 
Implications for the Department of Social Welfare p. 28. 
89 Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia (1998) What Price Competition?. A Report on the 
Competitive Tendering of Welfare Service Delivery p. 37. 
90 Ibid. 
91 D. Robinson (1999) Partnerships- Practice and Theory. In D. Robinson (ed.) Partnership - From 
Practice to Theory p. 3. 
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relationship with, or secure continuous support from, consumers. Just a few of them 
manage to play an important role in influencing needs evaluation, resource allocation, and 
service delivery, or pressurising government to recognise and appreciate the significance of 
community groups, consult with all relevant stakeholders, and arrange for the devolution of 
decision-making to the lowest possible level. Under such circumstances, social capital that 
enables participants, in the words of Putnam, "to act together more effectively to pursue 
shared objectives"," declines- "affecting", to quote Renouf, "the web of 'belonging' and 
'commitment to others' which underpins neighbourhood and community life" .
93 
Secondly, outsourcing keeps on shifting policy-making towards a more technical process, 
emphasising commercialisation and bureaucratisation" and championing the replacement 
of community involvement by professional management." In fact, voluntary organisations 
are, in the words of Now land-Foreman, "contracted to provide certain outputs and cannot 
afford to be a training ground for the greater community good" .
96 
Thirdly, the tightly defined but partly funded contracts leave voluntary organisations with 
little scope and no resource at their disposal to function as campaigners for positive changes 
in public policy in the interest of citizens. In the circumstances, the services supposed to be 
rendered by voluntary organisations in consonance with their civic virtues get scaled down 
or dumped. Further, if the objectives of voluntary organisations threaten, or do not serve 
the interests of, government, their funds may be curtailed, switched, and even withdrawn. 
The apprehension that the funder which holds the 'purse strings' can take any of these 
drastic steps whenever it so desires, forces voluntary organisations to 'adjust' the 
92 R. Putnam (1995) Tuning In, Tuning Out: The Strange Disappearance of Social Capital in America PS: 
Political Science and Politics 27:4, pp. 664-665. 
93 J. Renouf (1995) Changing Relationships Between the State and the Voluntary Sector- The Changing 
Face of Partnership Social Work Review 7:4, p. II. 
94 N. Ryan (1995) The Competitive Delivery of Social Services: Implications from Program Implementation 
Australian Journal of Public Administration 54:3, p. 361. 
95 Newland-Foreman (1998) American Belwvioral Scientist 42:1, p. 110. 
96 Ibid. 
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organisational mission and diminishes their involvement with, to quote Richter and Ozawa, 
"legislative advocacy in social action"." Due to their reliance on state funding in the 
virtual absence of other revenue sources, voluntary organisations always tend to be cautious 
and quiet rather than frank or critical: they cannot afford to bite the hand that feeds them. 
Fourthly, the demand for greater sophistication in budgeting and financial administration is 
burdensome for small and new voluntary organisations (characterised in most cases by 
weak governance structure and unstable leadership)- forcing them, according to Kramer, 
to become more formalistic." There may be a decline in the ability of these voluntary 
organisations to replace assets (computers, vehicles, buildings) and/or retain cash reserves 
- consequent upon the diversion of excessive resources from the goals of direct service 
provision to the development of 'management infrastructure' and performance of 
'organisational maintenance tasks'. The time spent on, and the expenditure involved in, 
producing the 'evidence of effectiveness' can make it hard for these voluntary organisations 
to apply for funding, negotiate with the purchaser, win contracts, and respond to the 
changing and increasing accountability requirements of government. These voluntary 
organisations are more dependent on a single source of support and thus, in the words of 
Gutch, "have less negotiating clout"," run short of the means (staff, equipment and money) 
needed to implement expensive and complex monitoring procedures, lack the training 
required to meet, as a report of the Rivers Buchan Associates points out, the quality 
standards, 100 and fail to get their bids accepted, for, to quote May kind, "they rarely 
command any political influence".
101 All this might be seen as part of the larger dilemma 
of 'provider capture' for these voluntary organisations which are either squeezed out by big 
and established nonprofits - delivering economies of scale and enjoying, in the opinion of 
97 B. Richter and M. Ozawa (1983) Purchase of Service Contracts and Functioning of Private Agencies 
Administration in Social Work 7:1, p. 29. 
98 R. M. Kramer (1983) Contracting for Human Services: An Organisational Perspective. In R. M. Kramer 
and H. Specht (eds.) Readings in Community Organisation Practice p. 425. 
99 R. Gutch (1993) Contracting Out: Reading the Small Print Dialogue No. 74 (May). p. 6. 
100 Rivers Buchan Associates (1993) Health Contracting and the Voluntary Sector p. 26. 
101 M. Maykind Manager, Volunteer Centre. 22 August, 1999 (personal communication). 
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Hoyes and Means, an advantage over new entrants
102 
- or amalgamate and consolidate 
· I al" d m mto arge centr 1se structures. Over time, these voluntary organisations become 
bureaucratic, lose qualities such as informality, accessibility, volunteering, and charitable 
giving, and cease to have, in the words of Gutch, "[a] base in the local community [and] 
links with hard-to-reach groups".
104 
Promoting clarity 
Purchase of service contracting contributes to specification of contractual terms and 
conditions in simple, unambiguous language. Clarity helps voluntary organisations to 
understand what government expects of them and, according to Leigh, increases their 
accountability for the use of public money.
105 
At the same time, government does not always provide explicit statements covering the 
objectives of the agreement, the responsibilities of the parties, and the price to be paid for 
"fi d a spec1 JC outputs an outcomes. Also, government fails to define the complex outcomes 
in the contract in most cases: only quantifiable outputs are specified with some degree of 
accuracy. 
Facilitating transparency 
Purchase of service contracting makes it possible for voluntary organisations to operate in 
an open environment. A report of the Department of Social Welfare in New Zealand 
102 L. Hayes and R. Means (1993) Quasi-Markets and the Reform of Community Care. In J. LeGrand and W. 
Bartlett (eds.) Quasi-Markets and Social Policy p. 115. 
103 Ryan (1995) Australian Journal of Public Administration 54:3, p. 358. 
104 GutJ;h (1992) Contracting Lessons from the US p. 57. 
105 Leigh (1994) Contracting for Social Services: A Process Evaluation of the Community Funding 
Agency's Contracting Procedures p. 39. 
10 Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia (1998) What Price Competition?. A Report on the 
Competitive Tendering of Welfare Service Delivery p. xvii. 
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suggests that government is supposed to make relevant contractual information absolutely 
explicit for all interested parties."' 
However, it cannot be stated with certainty that voluntary organisations function in a 
perfectly transparent setup. Government refuses communication with service agencies on 
issues like the factors influencing choice of suppliers and allocation of resources. As a 
consequence, clients often fail to understand whom to blame - policy makers or service 
providers- in case of a contract failure. There are growing demands from both consumers 
and taxpayers for dissemination of more information on contract decisions."' But the 
funder seldom takes them into account. 
Encouraging justice 
Purchase of service contracting stimulates voluntary organisations to arrange for, to quote 6, 
"more transparent and effective redistribution of services focused on relief and care away 
from middle class recipients towards the poorest, by building systems of targeting into 
contract specifications".'" It facilitates easier access to specialised services developed by 
voluntary organisations for individuals who, in the words of Culpitt, "perceive themselves 
to be alienated from the mainstream of community life".no It prefers services to be 
delivered by those voluntary organisations which are, to quote Culpitt, "personal, 
idiosyncratic, locally based or culturally relevant" .n' 
Secondly, purchase of service contracting enables voluntary organisations to tackle demand 
heterogeneity which states and markets are not able to take care of. Setting aside the 'one 
size fits all' approach in recognition of the diversity and pluralism of the community sector, 
107 DSW (1990) Contracting for Social Services: Princtples and Guidelines p. 7. 
108 Gill (1999) Public Sector 22:1, p. 9. 
109 P. 6 (1997) The New Politics of Welfare Contracting. In 6 and Kendall (eds.) The Contract Culture in 
Public Services: Studies from Britain, Europe and the USA p. 184. 
110 Culpitt (1992) Welfare and Citizenship: Beyond the Crisis of the Welfare State? pp. 125-126. 
nt Ibid, p. 125. 
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it calls upon voluntary organisations to provide for a multiplicity of appropriate services for 
the fulfilment of the pluralistic preferences of heterogenous populations including women, 
cultural and ethnic minorities, weaker sections of society, hard-to-reach communities in far-
flung rural areas, and controversial groups "whom government", in the words of Kramer, 
"is obligated to serve but where fear or stigma inhibits utilization"."' It finds voluntary 
organisations ideal for the task, for they represent, to quote O'Connell, "alternatives, 
options, experimentation, supplementation, and leadership"
113 and do not, in the opinion of 
Nowland-Foreman, easily fit into the straight-jacket of homogeneity."' 
Nevertheless, government, in the words of Robinson, "increasingly provides funding ... on 
the basis of specified, and restricted, client groups which relate to departmental 
responsibilities" .
115 Thus, voluntary organisations are often forced to ignore the locality-
specific needs of particular communities. The discrepancy between the level of 
requirements and that of voluntary action leads to unevenness of service delivery and, 
according to Johnson, raises doubts about the capacity (but not the concern) of the third 
h. 
. 116 
sector to ac teve eqmty. 
Conclusion 
The current status of research makes it exceedingly problematic to argue conclusively for or 
against the impact of purchase of service contracting on voluntary organisations, though 
contracting out in the domain of social welfare per se has, to quote Sharkansky, "warm 
112 Kramer (1983) Contracting for Human Services: An Organisational Perspective. In Kramer and Specht 
(eds.) Readings in Community Organisation Practice p. 423. 
113 B. O'Connell (1996) A Major Transfer of Government Responsibility to Voluntary Organizations? 
Proceed with Caution Public Administration Review 56:3, p. 223. 
114 Newland-Foreman (1997) Third Sector Review 3:1, p. 26. 
115 D. Robinson (1993) NZCOSS Briefing Paper for the Incanting Government Signpost (December), p. 1. 
116 N. Johnson (1999) Mixed Economies of Welfare: A Comparative Perspective p. 197. 
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supporters and intense opponents".
117 As reliable standards of data collection have not been 
available, "specific agency information", in the words of Culpitt, "cannot be combined to 
furnish overall perspectives".
118 In the opinion of Judge and Smith, intuition rather than 
deliberation has guided the action of decision-makers.
119 To quote Kramer, "we have 
virtually no information on what difference it makes to the recipients if the service is 
directly provided or contracted". 120 According to Considine, the speed of change has made 
it difficult for research to keep pace. 
121 
In addition, the researcher conceives that a good deal of the literature on the impact of 
purchase of service contracting on voluntary organisations focuses on normative and/or 
theoretical discussion, and reflects an ideological and/or partisan interest. The benefits and 
costs of purchase of service contracting for voluntary organisations require to be tested not 
only empirically but objectively, irrespective of the obstacles on the way. Besides, 
intensive research on the prospects and problems of purchase of service contracting is 
necessary in order to evaluate its acclaimed ability as an effective policy instrument to 
attain the above-mentioned objectives and thereby create a strengthened partnership 
between the state and voluntary organisations, enable service agencies to regain their 
confidence, and make families stronger and communities safer. 
117 I. Sharkansky (1980) Policy Making and Service Delivery on the Margins of Government: The Case of 
Contractors Public Administration Review 40:2, p. 1!8. 
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Purchase of Service Contracting and Government: A Stndy in Benefits and Costs 
This chapter evaluates the success and failure of purchase of service contracting in helping 
government to achieve the objectives discussed in Chapter 3. It analyses the positive and 
negative perspectives on the purported capacity of purchase of service contracting to enable 
government to attain the objectives. In conclusion, it emphasises the need for objective 
empirical research on the prospects and problems of purchase of service contracting in helping 
government achieve the objectives. 
Context of the debate 
The advocates of purchase of service contracting believe that contracting out in social welfare 
enables not only voluntary organisations but also government to achieve the objectives 
discussed in the previous chapter - thereby assisting it in creating, in the words of Glazer, 
"more harmonious relations, better-working social institutions, broadly accepted as the decent 
and right way to order society".' According to Culpitt, in a pluralist society, purchase of 
service contracting gives government the opportunity to help indigenous and ethnic groups 
preserve their distinct differences and acquire an independent but integrated economic base.
2 
Besides, Culpitt implies that purchase of service contracting makes it possible for government 
to employ service agencies to take care of the demand for compensatory services.' 
The critics are, however, sceptical of the utility of purchase of service contracting in enabling 
government to redress the imbalances and inequities that prevail in a typical welfare 
1 N. Glazer (1988) The Limits of Social Policy p. 155. 
'I. Culpitt (1992) Welfare and Citizenship: Beyond the Crisis of the Welfare State? p. 99. 
'Ibid, p. 100. 
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democracy. Purchase of service contracting poses serious problems for government, in the 
opinion of De Hoog, to hold producers responsible to the requirements of citizens, legislators, 
and managers and coordinate a multitude of discrete activities undertaken by contractors.' 
Also, the creation and implementation of coherent public policy may become a formidable task 
for government with the extensive use of outside providers under purchase of service 
contracting.' 
There is, indeed, no dearth of arguments both for and against purchase of service contracting 
as a policy instrument at the disposal of government. It would be worthwhile now to discuss 
the success and failure of purchase of service contracting in helping government attain the 
objectives dealt with in Chapter 3. 
Achieving genuine partnership 
Purchase of service contracting encourages government to foster a spirit of genuine partnership 
with voluntary organisations through sharing information, taking decisions on the basis of 
mutual consultation, and working in close cooperation with the third sector. It enables 
government to utilise the expertise and experience of service agencies in identifying and 
assessing community needs, developing policies, planning and providing services, and 
interacting with users - stimulating a move towards what Edwards refers to as a 
'participatory governance framework'.' As well, it helps government to comprehend the role 
of trust and the significance of the relationships "that occur", to quote Tunzelmann and 
Murphy, "around the contract".' 
'R. H. De Hoog (1985) Human Services Contracting- Environmental, Behavioral and Organizational 
Conditions Administration and Society 16:4, p. 431. 
'Ibid 
'M. Edwards (2001) Participatory Governance into the Future: Roles of the Government and Community Sectors 
Australian Journal of Public Administration 60:3, p. 80. 
7 A. von Tunzelmann and M. Mnrphy (1998) Government Funding of Voluntary Services in New Zealand: 
The Contracting Issues - A Scoping Study p. 8. 
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On the other hand, questions are raised as to whether there can be a real partnership between 
government and voluntary organisations in an environment where the former locates and 
prioritises the requirements of clients and their communities, determines the services to be 
purchased, and takes the funding decisions. Government rarely permits voluntary 
organisations freedom or mutuality in the negotiation of agreements, and almost always 
refuses to share information with them. Shorn of their autonomy, voluntary organisations just 
keep on acting in conformity with the specifications laid down by government "in order to 
secure", in the words of Culpitt, · "contract finance" 
8 As a result, however, it is the 
government that misses the opportunity of taking advantage of the expertise and experience of 
voluntary organisations as suppliers of outputs and outcomes. 
Increasing quantity 
Purchase of service contracting enables government to focus on, and evaluate, the extent of the 
specific requirements - existing, new and potential - of all clients, and measure the 
adequacy of the means required to satisfy the demands of customers before funding is 
delivered. Further, it helps government to recruit through skilful letting of tenders, and 
maintain by means of stable funding, competent producers rendering community-based 
services at, to quote Tunzelmann and Murphy, "an acceptable price and agreed volume".' 
Secondly, purchase of service contracting encourages government to provide sufficient 
resources needed for the training and professional development of all its employees involved 
in the contracting process. The New Zealand State Services Commission points out that 
efficient negotiation and management of contracts for social services depends largely on the 
skills and experience of the staff employed by government.
10 
'Culpitt (1992) Welfare and Citizenship: Beyond the Crisis of the Welfare State? p. 118. 
'Tunzelmann and Murphy (1998) Government Funding of Voluntary Services in New Zealand: The 
Contracting Issues - A Scoping Study p. 8. 
10 State Services Commission cited in J. Leigh (1994) Contracting for Social Services: A Process Evaluation 
of the Community Funding Agency's Contracting Procedures p. 35. 
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At the same time, it is argued that no government has ever succeeded in identifying and 
assessing client needs with precision. On many occasions, government has failed to recruit the 
best possible provider - selecting voluntary organisations less than ideal for the task. The 
contracting process used by government has never made any significant contribution to the 
development of a wide range of services willingly rendered by service agencies committed to, 
in the words of Robinson, "the value of caring for others" .
11 Besides, government has often 
been found running short of the resources required to train its own staff in contract 
management skills. 
Improving quality 
Purchase of service contracting contributes to the provision of a variety of quality services by 
making government realise the importance of evaluating the performance of voluntary 
organisations on a regular basis. Further, it enables government to have a clearer 
understanding of quality requirements through, as a report of the Parliament of the 
Commonwealth of Australia (henceforth called the 'Australian report') suggests, improved 
specification of responsibilities." It thus plays a major role in the enhancement of the prestige 
and visibility of government as the funder of quality outputs and outcomes, and consequent 
achievement of greater public support. 
However, forcing well-established, influential, and profit-motivated voluntary organisations to 
produce quality services and procure positive social outcomes is beyond the capacity of 
government. Besides, contract-based production and provision do not resolve the difficulty of 
specifying and assessing effectiveness:
13 government finds it problematic to define, more so 
measure, the quality of the services delivered by service agencies due to lack of performance 
"D. Robinson (1993) Values in the Voluntary Welfare Sector. In G. R. Hawke and D. Robinson (eds.) 
Performance Without Profit: The Voluntary Welfare Sector in New Zealand p. 106. 
"Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia (1998) What Price Competition? A Report on the 
Competitive Tendering of Welfare Service Delivery p. xiii. 
"L. McGuire (1996) Service Delivery Contracts: Quality for Customers, Clients and Citizens. In G. Davis et at 
(eds.) The New Contractualism? p. 104. 
so 
. d" l4 m 1cators; quantify outcomes because of their intangibility" and, in many cases, 
immeasurableness within a brief time span; and evaluate the efficacy of current delivery 
systems, much less compare them with alternative strategies.
16 The discontinuities arising 
from contracts changing hands can also affect the quality of services, with substantial 
corporate memory and experience lost forever.
17 
Reducing cost 
Purchase of service contracting reduces monitoring cost by developing strategic partnerships 
between government and voluntary organisations. Government makes efficiency gains by 
contracting with voluntary organisations which produce a multiplicity of outputs at a lower 
cost through efficient mobilisation of resources, deliver more with less by means of greater 
flexibility in the use of personnel and equipment, and "enjoy", to quote Rose, "considerable 
economies resulting from specialisation and scale" .
18 In economic terms, the supply of 
services by voluntary organisations and the demand of government intersect at a price 
"below", in the words of Kramer, "the real cost for both parties" .
19 
On the other hand, government finds it difficult to assess the legitimate expenses of contracted 
services and compare them with those involved in in-house provision." Ample evidence does 
not exist to support the claim that voluntary organisations are necessarily more economical 
"C. Hall and S. J. Rimmer (1994) Performance Monitoring and Public Sector Contracting Australian Journal of 
Public Administration 53:4, pp. 459-460. R. Flynn et al (1995) Contracts and the Quasi-market in Conununity 
Health Services Journal of Social Policy 24:4, pp. 538-542. N. Johnson et al. (1998) Regulating for Quality 
in the Voluntary Sector Journal of Social Policy 27:3, pp. 310-312. 
"K. Walsh (1995) Public Service and Market Mechanisms: Competition, Contracting and the New Public 
Management p. 48. Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia (1998) What Price Competition? A Report 
on the Competitive Tendering of Welfare Service Delivery p. 26. 
'"P. Panet and M. Trebilcock (1998) Contracting Out Social Services Canadian Public Administration 41:1, p. 
29. 
P J. Chalmers and G. Davis (2001) Rediscovering Implementation: Public Sector Contracting and Human 
Services Australian Journal of Public Administration 60:2, p. 80. 
" D. Rose (1993) The Economic Role of the Voluntary Sector. In Hawke and Robinson (eds.) Peiformance 
without Profit: The Voluntary Welfare Sector in New Zealand p. 17. 
1
' R. M. Kramer (1983) Contracting for Human Services: An Organisational Perspective. In R. M. Kramer and H. 
Specht (eds.) Readings in Community Organisation Practice p. 423. 
"'L. Taylor (2000) Unanticipated Consequences of Contracting Out Public Sector 23:4, p. 19. 
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h h . "a] 21 t an t e1r statutory eqmv ents. In fact, larger service agencies can be dearer than local 
authority units of a similar scale.
22 However, bigger producers still make fiscal gains, or, to 
quote Walsh, "raise income"" by charging clients," providing fewer benefits," evading 
taxation," lowering wages," reducing working conditions," and abandoning community 
service obligations." The procedures for approving of providers and monitoring performance 
have been found to be expensive for the purchaser as well as the supplier." Shortage of funds 
may force the purchaser to use the cheapest, but not necessarily the best, of tenderers
31 
Accumulated by sacrificing quality and retrenching or transferring employees, the savings 
stand the risk of shrinking (and even evaporating) over time as a consequence of contract 
failure caused by, in the words of Rimmer, "bankruptcy of the service provider [or] dispute 
between the parties" .32 Considerable financial burden is likely to be borne at the end of an 
agreement (payment of redundancy, sale of surplus equipment) or the beginning of a new 
contract (hiring consultants to develop specifications, re-tendering at a much higher price ).
33 
"Judge and Smith cited in Leigh (1994). Contracting for Social Services: A Process Evaluation of the 
Community Funding Agency's Contracting Procedures p. 38. 
"M. Knapp and S. Missiacoulis (1982) Inter-sectoral Cost Comparisons: Day Care for the Elderly Journal of 
Social Policy 11:3, p. 335. 
"Walsh (1995) Public Service and Market Mechanisms: Competition, Contracting and the New Public 
Management p. 229. 
24 Ibid. 
"Robinson cited inN. Ryan (1995) The Competitive Delivery of Social Services: Implications from Program 
Implementation Australian Journal of Public Administration 54:3, p. 360. 
"J. Quiggin (1994) The Fiscal Gains from Contracting Out: Transfers or Efficiency Improvements The 
Australian Economic Review 3rd Quarter, p. 97. 
"Milne and McGee cited in J. Quiggin (1996) Competitive Tendering and Contracting in the Australian Public 
Sector Australian Journal of Public Administration 55:3, p. 51. 
"Ganley and Grahl cited in Quiggin (1996) Australian Journal of Public Administration 55:3, p. 51. 
"Quiggin (1996)Australian Journal of Public Administration 55:3, p. 53. 
"'V. M. Smith (1995) Contracting for Social and Welfare Services: The Changing Relationship Between 
Government and the Voluntary Sector in New Zealand p. 63. 
"Johnson et al (1998) Journal of Social Policy 27:3, p. 312. 
"S. J. Rimmer (1994) Competitive Tendering and Contracting: Theory and Research The Australian Economic 
Review 3rd Quarter p. 82. 
33 J. Boston cited in Walsh (1995) Public Services and Market Mechanisms: Competition, Contracting and 
the New Public Management p. 238. D. Adams and M. Hess (2000) Alternatives to Competitive Tendering 
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Training staff in contract management skills involves substantial cost.
34 Travers expects the 
introduction of market-like arrangements to increase expenditure in the long run, with a 
growth in the demand of clients for a wider range of flexible outputs. 
35 Wedel argues that the 
contract system lends itself to be exploited by free-riders by allowing private employees to 
receive the benefits of public service without having to pay for it." 
Responding to changes 
Purchase of service contracting makes it possible for government to benefit from flexibility. 
Government can contract with a variety of providers to serve a diversity of clients," initiate, 
cut back or terminate social services, 
38 determine, and if necessary alter programme directions, 
influence the pattern of service provision and, according to Rehfuss, maximise local options 
with greater attention given to new problems or changed situations." By contracting out 
services, government may bypass rigid administrative and budgetary rules and regulations, 
such as a freeze on personal hiring or salary standards." 
At the same time, voluntary organisations are subjected to external bureaucratic controls: they 
act strictly in accordance with the contractual specifications imposed by government. 
Voluntary organisations rarely over-perform, believing that if they do, government may lower, 
to quote Gill, "future funding levels (or purchase prices)" 
41 In the circumstances, flexible 
"Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia (1998) What Price Competition? A Report on the 
Competitive Tendering of Welfare Service Delivery p. 32. 
"P. Travers (1995) Quasi-Markets for Social Services Australian Journal of Public Administration 54:3, p. 
352. 
"Wedel cited in L. Fulcher et al (1988) Contracting for Social Services: A Review of the Literature and 
Policy Implications for the Department of Social Welfare p. 31. 
"K. McMillan (1998) Contracting for Social Responsibility: Purchase of Service Contracting and the 
Delivery of Ethnic Social Services in New Zealand (page number not given). 
3s Kramer cited in Leigh (1994) Contracting for Social Services: A Process Evaluation of the Community 
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services cannot be expected to be produced by voluntary organisations, and government loses 
the opportunity to establish its image as an institution looking for innovative solutions in 
social policy. 
Ensuring accountability 
Purchase of service contracting places government in a favourable position vis-a-vis suppliers 
of services. Government specifies its expectations in clear terms, monitors the performance of 
producers, evaluates the relevance of programmes to community needs and social outcomes, 
holds contractors answerable for the delivery of services, and uses sanctions (like threatening 
non-renewal of the contract) to discipline providers and rewards (such as promising additional 
funding) which motivate them to do better. Government manages to exercise effective control 
over suppliers, prices, and other items of expenditure (without appearing to make direct cuts or 
Jay off employees), while distancing itself from the conflicts of interests likely to occur when 
state is the major producer of services. Standing for obligations that arise within a relationship 
of responsibility'' and regarded as a cornerstone of public governance and management," 
accountability helps government develop a greater understanding of the voluntary sector by 
making available more information about the types of outputs and the costs thereof and thus 
assists the funder, in the opinion of Burn, in enhancing the standard and the range of the 
services to be purchased and improving the responsiveness to the concerns of consumers." 
However, securing adequate accountability from voluntary organisations concerning the use of 
funds and the quality of services is, in reality, far from simple for government. The sheer 
volume of the voluntary organisations contracted, the multitude of the outputs purchased, and 
the large number of the small dollar value contracts to be monitored render it exceedingly 
"R. Mulgan (2000) Comparing Accountability in the Public and Private Sectors Australian Journal of Public 
Administration 59:1, p. 87. 
"P. Aucoin and R. Heintzman (2000) The Dialectics of Accountability for Performance in Public Management 
Reform International Review of Administrative Sciences 66:1, p. 45. 
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problematic for government to guarantee that providers are reaching targets for efficiency and 
effectiveness." Government often finds it impossible to specify the requirements in advance 
and assume that voluntary organisations can schedule their programmes and ensure an 
unbroken flow of information necessary for planned evaluations." Processing applications, 
drafting contracts, negotiating with unknown suppliers, in addition to inspection, accreditation, 
and institution of other regulatory mechanisms result, according to Gutch, in an increase in 
bureaucratic formalities and financial procedures" -involving substantial staff time" and 
massive transaction costs that far exceed the efficiency savings achieved by government." 
Government does not have the ability to determine the viability of voluntary organisations, as 
most of its staff fail to understand the goals, priorities, and methods of providers and, to cite 
from the 'Australian report', "lack the expertise required to develop and implement 
meaningful performance standards and quality assurance mechanisms" .
50 The extension of the 
lines of communication, the complexity of services, and the operation of commercial criteria 
for the provision of information make it difficult for government to keep voluntary 
organisations under control. 51 Government seldom succeeds in comparing between voluntary 
organisations in terms of their efficacy" or conducting before-and-after investigations," since 
it becomes extraordinarily dependent upon the distorted and/or insufficient information 
furnished by self-interested suppliers in the absence of, as Gutch observes, a system-wide 
planning to determine how well providers are addressing community needs." 
"Taylor (2000) Public Sector 23:4, p. 20. 
"Culpitt (1992) Welfare and Citizenship: Beyond the Crisis of the Welfare State? p. 152. 
"R. Gutch (1992) Contracting Lessons from the US p. 45. 
'" V. Nicholls (1997) Contracting and the Voluntary Sector: A Critique of the Impact of Markets on Mind 
Organisations Critical Social Policy 17:2. p. 112. 
"Ferris and Graddy cited in Gutch (1992) Contracting Lessons rom the US p. 16. Walsh (1995) Public 
Services and Market Mechanisms: Competition, Contracting and the New Public Management p. 49. 
"Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia (1998) What Price Competition? A Report on the 
Competitive Tendering of Welfare Service Delivery p. 61. 
"Walsh (1995) Public Services and Market Mechanisms: Competition. Contracting and the New Public 
Management p. 217. 
"Parliament of the Conunonwealth of Australia (1998) What Price Competition? A Report on the 
Competitive Tendering of Welfare Service Delivery p. xvi. 
" S. Domberger (1998) Contracting Organizations: A Strategic Guide to Outsourcing p. 44. 
"Gutch cited in Leigh (1994) Contracting for Social Services: A Process Evaluation of the Community 
Funding Agency's Contracting Procedures p. 42. 
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Secondly, in cases where the small numbers condition prevails, some voluntary organisations, 
in the opinion of Culpitt, may obtain a monopoly over particular services" and start taking 
unfair advantage of the situation- dictating terms and conditions, resorting to 'cost-padding' 
(or charging higher prices than promised earlier) and, according to Fulcher et al., refusing to 
fulfil their service obligations to government." Under such circumstances, an adversarial, 
low-trust, and high-risk relationship has every chance to develop between government and 
opportunistic voluntary organisations, adding to the growing scepticism, in the words of 
James, "about the trustworthiness of the third sector"." Government can even be 'captured' 
by these unprincipled voluntary organisations, if it does not own a skilled cadre of technicians 
and managers. 58 
Thirdly, no government strives to hold the large, affluent, and influential service agencies 
accountable for their activities: these voluntary organisations show no lack of interest in 
competing with each other though, in the opinion of Robinson, social services can be provided 
by means of cooperation and collaboration alone." Further, many of these voluntary 
organisations have more interest in accumulating profits than bothering about the requirements 
of their clients, most of whom, in any case, "are hard put", to quote Hurl, "to understand 
differences in the efficacy of various counselling styles or levels of care";
60 fail, if 
intellectually disabled, to strike a good deal or exercise sanctions;
61 rarely have the opportunity 
to use the power of 'exit' or 'voice' ;
62 are not sure who is responsible -government or the 
~ Culpitt (1992) Welfare and Citizenship: Beyond the Cn'sis of the Welfare State? p. 111. 
"Fulcher et al. (1988) Contracting for Social Services: A Review of the Literature and Policy
 
Implications for the Department of Social Welfare p. 32. 
"E. James (1997) Wither the Third Sector? Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow Voluntas: Internationa
l Journal 
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58 R. C. Moe (1987) Exploring the Limits of Privatization Public Administration Review 48:2, p. 458.
 
"D. Robinson (1999) Fixing Fragmentation: A View from the Commnnity Public Sector 22:2, p. 13
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provider- for the delivery of outputs and outcomes" and preservation of service standards;
64 
refuse to complain out of gratitude or fear; 
65 and refrain from seeking redress owing to, in the 
words of Tang, "high cost, lack of information or support or simply the difficulty of pursuing 
judicial action" .66 With no special concern about the constraints, priorities, and accountability 
demands of government, these voluntary organisations manage to create direct relationships or 
independent political ties with policy makers and, to quote Smith, "effectively outflank their 
administrative overseers"." Manifold stratagems (forming associations, allying with citizen 
groups, influecing legislators) are employed by these voluntary organisations to secure more 
funding for their services." These voluntary organisations succeed in influencing government 
to alter, in the words of Now land-Foreman, "eligibility requirements and service structures to 
better suit their organisational philosophy" .
69 
Fourthly, it is problematic for government to monitor outcomes (degree of personal freedom, 
level of psychological satisfaction), for they are invisible, complicated, vaguely defined, not 
easy to measure, time consuming, and unpredictable. Projects with clearly specified inputs 
(equipment, administration costs) and outputs (amount of money spent, number of clients 
served) that can be developed within controllable conditions, assessed against some objective 
standards, gauged in numerical terms, and predicted upon with a degree of certainty, are 
"Tunzelmann and Murphy (1998) Government Funding of Voluntary Services in New Zealand: The 
Contracting Issues - A Scoping Study p. 19. 
"Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia (1998) What Price Competition? A Report on the 
Competitive Tendering of Welfare Sel1lice Delivery p. xiii. 
"B. Hardy and G. Wistow (1998) Securing Quality Through Contracts? The Development of Quasi-markets for 
Social Care in Britain Australian Journal of Public Administration 57:2, p. 33. 
"A Tang (1997) The Changing Role of Government Community Services: Issues of Access and Equity to 
Administrative Review Australian Journal of Public Administration 56:2, p. 100. 
"V. M. Smith (1995) Contracting for Social and Welfare Services: The Changing Relationship between 
Government and the Voluntary Sector in New Zealand p. 36. 
'"S. R. Smith (1996) Transforming Public Services: Contracting for Social and Health Services in the US Public 
Administration 74:1, pp. 119, 122. 
'"G. Nowland-Foreman (1996) How Others Cope with Contracting Dialogue (March), p. 14. 
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preferred- displaying on the part of government "a strong emphasis", to quote Leigh, "on 
fiscal accountability ... as opposed to programme effectiveness"." 
Fifthly, performance evaluation mechanisms which are still at an embryonic stage" may need 
a lot of time and money to develop,
72 call for regular review with changes in circumstances, 
and furnish incomplete or inaccurate information to government about quality if poorly 
constructed." The sophisticated monitoring systems belonging to individual service providers 
are not beneficial to government, insofar as they fail to provide consistent measures of 
performance across the sector. 
Empowering communities 
Purchase of service contracting enables government to respect the vital role of voluntary 
organisations in the development process and their key values which, in the opinion of 
Robinson, are independence or freedom of association, altruism or concern for others, and 
collective or community action" - in addition to trust, cooperation and interdependence, 
stewardship, hope, and passion." It stimulates government to encourage voluntary 
organisations in their efforts to network, share information, and build relationship among 
themselves; find out, and deliberate on, the requirements of users; produce new services for 
consumers; and establish a close and personal relationship with customers. It inspires 
government to appreciate the part played by voluntary organisations in supporting regular 
consultation with, and active participation of, clients in needs assessment, programme 
planning, service provision, and performance evaluation at the local level. It induces 
'"Leigh (1994) Contracting for Social Services: A Process Evaluation of the Community Funding 
Agency's Contracting Procedures p. 92. 
" Poertner and Rapp cited in Leigh (1994) Contracting for Social Services: A Process Evaluation of the 
Community Funding Agency's Contracting Procedures p. 92. 
"Johnson et al (1998) Journal of Social Policy 27:3, pp. 323-324. 
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government to back up voluntary organisations m their endeavours to undertake 
developmental work and achieve wholehearted community support in the process. It thus 
assists government in developing, with the aid of voluntary organisations, social capital" 
which, in tum, contributes to the growth of vibrant and prosperous economies and strong 
moral communities" and, in the words of Robinson, "helps build ... civil society" .
78 
On the other hand, purchase of service contracting creates a detriment for government by 
reinforcing division or fragmentation among voluntary organisations." The contracting 
arrangement lessens the prospect for a more planned, integrated, controlled, coordinated, 
consistent, and coherent system of programme delivery. Most of the voluntary organisations 
are least concerned with the utility of networking that could have enabled them to secure 
referrals, tap funding sources, win community support, and obtain political leverage. Several 
voluntary organisations operate in a specific area without displaying mutual trust and respect; 
collaborating with each other; deliberating in a spirit of genuine partnership to explore key 
issues of concern; permitting information and/or facilities to be shared; assisting small, new 
and (where appropriate) tribal agencies or rural community groups with financial aid or 
technical advice on basic administration and management; caring for the best possible pattern 
of service provision; or bothering about preventive, advocacy, or developmental work. While 
vying for contracts, these voluntary organisations, to quote Hudson, "ingratiate themselves to 
departmental officials and enhance the image of their service by denigrating others"," apart 
"Putnam cited in G. Nowland-Foreman (1998) Purchase-of-Service Contracting, Voluntary Organizations, and 
Civil Society: Dissecting the Goose That Lays the Golden Eggs? American Behavioural Scientist 42:1, p. 121. 
Cox cited in M. Woods (1996) Shrinking Government - The Effects on Volunteers, Voluntary 
Organisations and Clients p. 5. Jacobs cited inN. Duncan (1998) The Origins and Implications of Social 
Capital. In M. O'Brien (ed.) Social Responsibility: Whose Agenda? p. 55. Coleman cited in P. Shannon and 
C. Perry (1999) Sustainable Policy: An Activist Perspective p. 14. 
"Fukuyama cited in Duncan (1998) The Origins and Implications of Social Capital. In O'Brien (ed.) Social 
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from compromising quality, concealing information, exaggerating performance, and shifting 
from a client focus towards a managerial structure. 5
1 A more competitive atmosphere among 
voluntary organisations develops as a result -leading to less cooperation, greater secrecy, and 
distrust." 
Promoting clarity 
Purchase of service contracting spares no effort to achieve clarity which is expected to place 
the relationship between government and voluntary organisations on a secure basis. While 
designing a contract, government specifies therein the terms and conditions of the agreement 
in clear language and in sufficient detail to facilitate, according to Now land-Foreman, better 
mutual understanding of respective obligations." 
At the same time, specification of complex social services in unambiguous language and in 
detail is a difficult task for government. As a consequence, contracts tend to be written in very 
general terms. More often than not, the funder cannot help relying on the producer for what 
has been, or should be, done. If the contractor refuses to be communicative, information may 
become, in the words of Deakin and Walsh, "a key battleground in service management"." 
Facilitating transparency 
Purchase of service contracting advocates publication of relevant information on issues like 
the process of agency selection, the 'formula' for funding outcomes, and the rationale behind 
allocating resources - in order to enable government to operate in an open environment. 
Also, it encourages clients to scrutinise the contractual procedures and the decisions taken by 
"'Ryan (1995)Australian Journal of Public Administration 54:3, p. 359. 
"'G. Nowland-Foreman (1997) Can Voluntary Organisations Survive the Bear Hug of Government Funding under 
a Contracting Regime?- A View from Aotearoa/New Zealand Third Sector Review 3:1, p. 15. Nowland-
Foreman (1998) American Behavioural Scientist 42:1, p. 119. 
"'Nowland-Foreman (1997) Third Sector Review 3:1, p. 30. 
"'N. Deakin and K. Walsh (1996) The Enabling State: The Role of Markets and Contracts Public Administration 
74:1, p. 37. 
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government within the bounds of commercial confidentiality. Put another way, it allows 
transparency which has the potential of coming up with a clear justification for the measures 
adopted, eliminating the hazard of provider capture, ensuring the accountability of government 
as well as suppliers in the delivery of public services and, in the opinion of Walsh, making 
responsibilities explicit." 
However, what appears from the gaps and overlaps in the provision of services 1s that 
government cannot afford to permit the contracting process to be transparent. For reasons of 
its own (for example, to prevent funding decisions from becoming established as precedents 
for other providers) government, at times, introduces confidentiality clauses into contracts -
forbidding suppliers to divulge facts pertaining to the agreement to any third party and 
quarantining thereby, to quote De Maria, "official information from public scrutiny"." Quite 
a lot of suppliers get very secretive about their working methods and alternative sources of 
income, and send only guarded feedback to government lest future funding arrangements 
should be j eopardised. 
Encouraging justice 
Purchase of service contracting encourages government to display equal concern for, and mete 
out fair treatment to, all providers; match outputs with client needs; arrange for equitable 
distribution of funding across areas; and reshuffle resources among communities with a 
disproportionate demand for services. Government is believed to be non-parochial and 
endowed with the ability to set up comprehensive and integrated systems of social care." 
Taylor-Gooby's research demonstrates that while people conceive they are always served 
"Walsh (1995) Public Service and Market Mechanisms: Competition, Contracting and the New Public 
Management p. 112. 
"W. De Maria (2001) Commercial-in-Confidence: An Obituary to Secrecy? Australian Journal of Public 
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"'Culpitt (1992) Welfare and Citizenship: Beyond the Crisis of the Welfare State? p. 114. 
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better by the private sector, government may provide more effective outputs under certain 
conditions." 
Secondly, purchase of service contracting shows how government, in a pluralist society 
characterised by ethnic, racial, and geographical variations, may preserve culture by giving, in 
the words of Mulgan, "equal attention to all groups"." It persuades government to channel 
resources for the delivery of culturally appropriate social services responsive to the 
requirements of different communities, enable minority groups to define their own risks and 
participate in the process of contract formation, and (where appropriate) help tribal agencies to 
develop and manage their expertise and infrastructure, in addition to purchasing outputs from 
them. It thus gives policy makers in government a chance to prove their commi trnent to 
biculturalism and/or multiculturalism and operates, to quote Gronbjerg, "as a mechanism for 
group mobility" .
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Nevertheless, government often finds it problematic to induce voluntary organisations to be 
fair and just with regard to delivery of services. Kramer identifies four characteristic 
vulnerabilities of voluntary organisations, namely, institutionalisation or bureaucratisation 
resulting in rigidity, inertia and resistance to change; goal deflection signifying displacement 
of stated objectives, policies and priorities; minority rule implying dominance of a few self-
selected board members; and ineffectuality combining inefficiency, insularity, low 
accountability, a casual, muddling and bumbling style of operation, and other administrative 
deficiencies." These debilities of voluntary organisations aggravate when coupled with the 
in-built tendency of service agencies to concentrate their efforts on the middle-class consumer 
'"P. Taylor-Gooby (1986) Privatisation, Power and the Welfare State Sociology 20:2, pp. 235-243. 
"R. Mulgan (1993) A Pluralist Analysis of the New Zealand State. In B. Roper and C. Rudd (eds.) State and 
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groups- easier, cheaper, and quicker to treat -leading to severe cases (for instance, difficult 
and/or poor clients with genuine needs) being neglected and, according to Jansson, shifted to 
the state sector." This kind of a situation where voluntary organisations refuse to provide 
services 'at the edge' and do not hesitate to discriminate in anticipation of greater chances for 
success results, in the opinion of Klein, in a two-tiered system of social welfare" characterised 
by, in the words of Now land-Foreman, "the 'creaming' of relatively better equipped people ... 
and a short term focus"" under which equity stands every chance to suffer." 
Secondly, voluntary organisations seldom, to quote Sosin,"expand to compensate for ... 
reductions in many public services"," as most of them face internal and external constraints 
that severely limit the extent to which they can respond to social problems." Simultaneously, 
with increasing decentralisation of service provision and rapid multiplication of voluntary 
organisations, the hazard of duplication and overlapping intensifies - leading, much to the 
chagrin of government, to a colossal wastage of time and, according to Kramer, limited 
voluntary resources." In New Zealand, while economies of scale result in the loss of some 
services to rural communities, certain families keep on receiving outputs from multifarious 
voluntary organisations because a single point of client contact does not exist." 
Thirdly, voluntary organisations have sometimes been charged with intruding into the 
personal, religious, or moral preferences of users during the delivery of services and accused 
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of dominating particular service areas.")() Culpitt implies that voluntary organisations are less 
likely than government to have their procedures subjected to rigorous public scrutiny.
101 
Conclusion 
Just as in the case of voluntary organisations, there is simply, as yet, not enough research to 
argue clearly in favour of or against the impact of purchase of service contracting on 
government. The researcher believes that there is a need for not only empirical but objective 
analysis of the consequences of purchase of service contracting for government. Besides, in-
depth appraisal of the benefits and costs of purchase of service contracting for government is 
essential in order to assist the state in achieving some of its basic social welfare objectives 
(provision of more and better outputs, strengthening of voluntary organisations, empowerment 
of community groups, fair distribution of resources) and developing a genuine partnership with 
service agencies. It is necessary to be bear in mind that purchase of service contracting has 
been used as an effective policy instrument to substitute for government spending in the 
United States and Britain, help overcome the exclusion of the poor in France, promote 
pluralism in Sweden and, as Salamon and Anheier point out, contribute to the emergence of a 
civil society in former communist countries."' 
'
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Chapter 5 
Contracting Out in the Public Sector in New Zealand 
This chapter explores the nature and extent of contracting out within the public sector in 
New Zealand. It begins with a discussion of the factors contributing to the emergence and 
consolidation of contracting out in New Zealand. It then examines how contracting out is 
used by the central government, state agencies, and local authorities in New Zealand. 
Thereafter, it describes how and why the extent of contracting out varies across diverse 
policy sectors in New Zealand. In conclusion, it comments on the future of contracting out 
in New Zealand. 
Emergence of contracting out in the New Zealand public sector 
New Zealand initiated contracting out in the late 1970s at regional and local levels - in 
transport, cleaning, post office, land survey, community and social work, government print, 
electricity division, tourism and publicity department, weights and measures, industrial 
inspection, and housing inter alia.' On the recommendation of the policy makers keen to 
emulate the strategies pioneered by the conservative right holding the balan;;e of power in 
most of the Western capitalist countries throughout the 1980s, contracting out, 
characterised by 'policy/operations' and 'funder!provider' splits and believed to be capable 
of achieving productive efficiency and cost-effectiveness in the delivery of public services, 
was then used primarily as a means to secure higher productivity and reduce state 
expenditure. The public sector reforms, influenced by neoliberalism as opposed to 
Keynesianism and introduced in and after 1984 as the basic analytical framework for policy 
1 Public Service Association Research Discussion Paper No. 14 (1980) Contracting Out in New Zealand 
pp. 11-12. 
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formulation, specifically encouraged the growing use of contracting out and, according to 
Duncan and Bollard, corporatisation and privatisation
2 in conformity with the market-
liberal or residualist model' to facilitate what is arguably the most radical government 
restructuring in the Western world.' With contracting out ushered in on a large scale at the 
insistence of the reformers inspired by ideas "derived", to quote Schick, "from the vast 
literature on management ... [and] frontier areas of economics",' private suppliers (non-
profit voluntary organisations, for profit private firms, and individual vendors) began to 
deliver a wide variety of public services, many of which like policy advice, planning, and 
law enforcement had been, in the opinion of Boston, the exclusive domain of in-house 
producers.' 
The trend towards contracting out was given a significant boost by the Public Finance Act 
1989.7 It initiated an output-based appropriation system, under which the services 
purchased from external providers came to be categorised as non-departmental outputs or 
deliverables - grouped into classes for convenience. It necessitated clear and precise 
specification of outputs in the Estimates, Departmental Forecast Reports, and Purchase 
· Agreements, and rigorous evaluation of the same at regular intervals in terms of, as a 
Treasury document points out, quantity, quality, and cost." To ensure that the specified 
outputs were produced and provided, it called for, in the words of Schick, "ex post 
2 I. Duncan and A. Bollard (1992) Corporatization and Privatization: Lessons from New Zealand pp. 10, 
34, 38. 
3 J. Boston (1992) Redesigning the Welfare State in New Zealand: From Social Democracy to Market 
Liberalism? Public Sector 15:1, p. 5. 
4 S. Domberger (1998) Contracting Organisation: A Strategic Guide to Outsourcing p. 27. 
5 A. Schick (1996) The Spirit of Reform· Managing the New Zealand State Sector in a Time of 
Change p. 15. 
6 J. Boston (1995) Inherently Governmental Functions and Limits to Contracting Out. In The State Under 
Contract p. 83. 
7 S. Domberger and C. Hall (1996) Contracting for Public Services: A Review of Antipodean Experience 
Public Administration 74:1, p. 141. 
8 The Treasury (1995) Purchase Agreement Guidelines with Best Practices for Output Peiformance 
Measures pp. 30-32. 
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reporting of results".' In other words, it sought to make the task of assessing the utility of 
outputs much easier for policy makers while reminding them of their accountability in 
relation to the expenditure of public money, create transparency to minimise the hazards 
associated with injudicious spending of Crown revenue, and bring about, to quote Cheyne 
I " ff'. . h f "
10 
et a ., cost-e tctency ... m t e use o resources . It emphasised the need for 
information on the link between outcomes (that is, the effects of the activities of the 
government on the community ) and outputs, but the former, hard to quantify, influenced by 
factors beyond the control of a given department, and considered a matter of ministerial 
responsibility and political judgement were not required, according to an Audit Office 
report, to be measured and reported. 
11 Apart from the Public Finance Act 1989, 
Government Management, the Treasury brief submitted to the Labour government 
following its 1987 election victory, had a decisive impact on outsourcing- identifying the 
tendency of public servants to behave in a self-interested and opportunistic manner in 
buying outputs on behalf of the elected ministers whom they were supposed to serve as 
agents. 
Despite a phenomenal rise in the incidence of contracting out since the late 1980s, the 
central government never played a key role in imposing a policy of outsourcing per se .
12 
For instance, it avoided making contracting out mandatory or obligatory. Rather, it looked 
at contracting out as a principle - consistent with the overall restructuring of the public 
sector. However, it did encourage the use of contracting out in different policy domains as 
a means to purchase diverse outputs. For example, it took active interest in extending the 
application of contracting out to areas of considerable importance such as health, education, 
scientific research, social welfare, and transport - in addition to bringing within the 
9 Schick (1996) The Spirit of Refonn: Managing the New Zealand State Sector in a Time of Change 
ft· 73. 
0 C. Cheyne et al. (1997) Social Policy in Aotearoa!New Zealand: A Critical Introduction p. 128. 
11 Audit Office (1999) Report of the Controller and Auditor General: Third Report for !999 pp. 45-
46. 
12 Domberger and Hall (1996) Public Administration 74:1, p. 140. 
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purview of distancing a host of secondary or peripheral functions of the state like those 
suggested by Boston: cleaning, garbage collection, payroll services, and building and 
construction-" 
Involvement of the central government, state agencies, and local authorities in 
contracting out 
The contemporary public sector in New Zealand can be categorised under three headings: 
central government, state agencies, and local authorities- all of which are involved in the 
business of contracting out as purchasers of services from a multiplicity of private 
suppliers. They tend to avoid formal tendering if the project embarked upon happens to be 
of an urgent nature or too small to justify additional expenses; if producers have specialised 
knowledge of, or firsthand experience in, the requirements of the parties hiring them; or if 
the work is a natural extension of the job already undertaken. The policy makers associated 
with the social welfare sector discourage contestability, believing that it may produce an 
adverse effect on the communication, cooperation, and networking among external 
providers, and/or undermine their invaluable qualities (informality, accessibility, cost-
effectiveness), apart from leading to loss of volunteer contribution. Critics, however, argue 
that insufficient competition is likely to result in a lack of quality, choice, or price 
improvements;" reduction in efficiency, accountability, and innovative capacity;
15 and 
increased unresponsiveness of a single dominant contractor.
16 
Most of the ministers purchase a good deal of services - in certain cases through separate 
purchasing agencies such as the Community Funding Agency (merged with the Children, 
Young Persons and Their Families Service in January 1999) and the Health Funding 
13 Boston (1995) The State Under Contract p. 83. 
14Wistow et al. cited in P. Cambridge and H. Brown (1997) Making tbe Market Work for People with 
Learning Disabilities Critical Social Policy 17:2, p. 30. 
15 S. Domberger (1998) Contracting Organization: A Strategic Guide to Outsourcing pp. 38-47. 
16 V. Nicholls (1997) Contracting and tbe Voluntary Sector Critical Social Policy 17:2, p. 103. 
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Authority (now defunct) - from private suppliers by means of the funds appropriated by 
Parliament. The ministers of almost all departments purchase advisory services from 
external providers like private firms, universities, and think tanks: during the 1992-93 
financial year, about$ 48.5 million was spent for the purpose,
17 and the Ministry of Health 
recruited no fewer than 377 consultants at a cost of $11.3 million.
18 Several ministers 
employ, in the words of Kelsey, "private sector analysts ... on short term contracts"
19 who 
can assist them in negotiating agreements for the purchase of services
20 and assessing 
subsequent performance.
21 The ministers are often unfamiliar with the implications of the 
services purchased for the outcomes they seek." However, in 1994, the Audit Office noted 
that departments seldom conducted any systematic evaluation of the performance displayed 
by the consultants in rendering policy advice on the services sought to be purchased by the 
ministers." Of the different types of services purchased by the ministers from private 
suppliers in the mid-1990s, a few maybe cited: 
- the Minister of Health purchased services related to physical, intellectual and psychic 
disabilities, maternity, elderly and residential care, and medical, surgical and disability 
support from voluntary organisations such as IHC and Plunket, private hospitals, 
laboratories, and professionals like GPs, midwives, nurses, physiotherapists, and 
h . 
'4 p armactsts;-
- the Minister of Education purchased services associated with curriculum support, school 
transport, early childhood, secondary, tertiary and special education, maintenance of 
17 R. Morris (1994) The Pricing of Policy Advice: The Proposed Cabinet Benchmark p. 5. 
18 J. Clifton (1993) Department Hires 377 Consultants The Dominion June 22, p. 2. 
19 J. Kelsey (1995) The New Zealand Experiiment: A World Model for Structural Adjustment? p. 147. 
20 A. Schick (1996) The Spirit of Reform: Managing the New Zealand State Sector in a Time of 
Change p. 43. 
21 A. West (1994) Public Service is Independent of Public Servants Public Sector 17:2, p. 26. 
22 R. Chapman (1995) Improving Policy Advice Processes: Strategic Outcome Definition, Policy Evaluation 
and a Competitive Policy Market Public Sector 18:2, p. 16. 
23 Audit Office (1994) Report of the Controller and Auditor General: Third Report for 1994 pp. 18, 
26, 31. 
24 S. Arnold (1992) Contracting in the Health Sector Public Sector 15:4, p. 3. L. Hawkins (1995) Purchasing 
Health Services Public Sector 18:1, p. 7. G. Nabkies (1995) Health Sector Contracting- A Progress 
Report from a Provider Perspective Public Sector 18:1, pp. 15-16. G. Wilson (1995) Health Purchasing: A 
Regional Health Authority Perspective Public Sector 18:1, p. 12. 
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property, and management of student loans from commercial enterprises such as Eduserve, 
Careers Service, and Transit Group Limited, voluntary organisations, colleges of education, 
universities, and individual experts (educational psychologists, speech language therapists, 
advisers on deaf children);" 
- the Minister of Research, Science and Technology purchased services related to the 
promotion and coordination of science and technology from voluntary organisations, 
universities, polytechnics, research associations, researchers, and consultants;" 
- the Minister of Transport purchased services associated with public transport operations 
(aviation, land, maritime), road construction, highway maintenance, and bridge renewal 
from a number of private companies (Fulton Hogan, Workscorp, Bitumix); 
27 and 
- the Minister of Social Welfare purchased a variety of services related to the care of the 
physically and intellectually handicapped, child and youth rehabilitation, women's refuge 
and sexual abuse, and rape crisis support from voluntary organisations and community 
trusts, consultancies, and individual experts." 
In addition, the ministers of many other departments purchased non-departmental outputs 
like corporate, administrative, legal, computing, and accounting services from professional 
bodies and individual experts." The central government purchased approximately $10.4 
25 D. Gilling (1995) Contracting and Accountability in the Education Sector Public Sector 18:3, pp. 2, 4. S. 
Hitchiner (1995) Contracting for Services in the Pre-tertiary Education Sector Public Sector 18:3, p. 16. G. 
Marshall (1995) The Delivery of Education in High Schools: Observations from a Practitioner Public Sector 
18:3, pp. 7-8. R. Wilson (1995) The Special Education Service- A Provider of Services in a Changed 
Public Sector Public Sector 18:3, pp. 12-14. The Treasury (1996) Estimates of Appropriations for the 
Government of New Zealand for the Year Ending 30 June 1997 Volume I, pp. 455,457,462-471. 
26 S. Devine (1995) Purchasing Scientific Research Outputs within the New Science Structures Public Sector 
18:4, p. 7. A. Pearce (1995) Contracting in the Science Sector: A Research Provider's View Public Sector 
18:4, p. II. S. McCutcheon (1995) Purchasing Research: The University Experience Public Sector 18:4, p. 
16. The Treasury (1996) Esti11111tes of Appropriations for the Government of New Zealand for the Year 
Ending 30 June 1997 Volumell,pp.l163, 1172,1174. 
27 J. Stack (1995) The New Zealand Transport Sector Model Public Sector 18:2, p. 4. R. van Barneveld 
(1995) Transit New Zealand's Involvement Public Sector 18:2, p. 8. R. Horan (1995) The State of 
Competition in the Markets for Local Authority and State Highway Roading Contracts 1992-93 Public Sector 
18:2, p. 10. 
28 J. Martin (1991) Devolution and Decentralisation. In J. Boston, J. Martin, J. Pallot and P. Walsh (eds.) 
Reshaping the State: New Zealand's Bureaucratic Revolution p. 288. The Treasury (1996) Estimates of 
Appropriations for the Government of New Zealand for the Year Ending 30 June 1997 Volume II, 
f,P- 1287-1291. 
B. Sage, Chief Adviser, Finance, Information and Administration, Ministry of Commerce, 25 November, 
1996 (personal communication). S. Jones, Contract Co-ordinator, Department of Corrections, 18 November, 
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billion of such services during the 1994-95 financial year, 
30 and a large proportion of the 
expenditure went to external providers.
31 
Several state agencies are authorised and funded by the government by means of a fu
nding 
agreement to purchase services from private suppliers. In the process, there eme
rges a 
cascading series of contracts between funders, purchasers, and producers of services. 
In the 
mid-1990s, a number of crown entities, "more active", to quote Dangerfield, "in cont
racting 
out than departments"," purchased services such as: 
-production and dissemination of early childhood education resources;'' 
-preparation of television, radio and newspaper advertisements for electoral activiti
es;34 
-administration of legal aid- criminal and civil;" 
- supply of protective clothing for firefighters and motor vehicle maintenance;" 
'all. 37 - termm c eanmg; 
-blood processing;" 
- road construction and maintenance;" and 
1996 (personal connnunication). S. Day, for Chief Executive, Ministry of Cultural Affa
irs, 6 December, 1996 
(personal connnunication). S. Hill, Director, Human Resources, New Zealand Customs
 Service, 6 November, 
1996 (personal communication). P. Cambray, Office Services Manager for Chief Revie
w Officer, Education 
Review Office, 13 November, 1996 (personal communication). C. Aitken, Senior Execu
tive Officer, Ministry 
of Fisheries, 28 November, 1996 (personal communication). J. Jeffries, Technical Adv
iser, Government 
Superannuation Fund, 7 November, 1996 (personal communication). S. Snow, Corpora
te Human Resources 
Manager, State Services Commission, 26 November, 1996 (personal communication). 
S. Hamilton, Manager, 
Grants Administration for Chief Executive, Ministry of Youth Affairs, 11 November, 1
996 (personal 
communication). 
30 A. Caffrey (1995) The Limitations of Government by Bureaucracy: A Duty to Contract
? Public Sector 
18:1, p. 3. 
31 Boston (1996) Australian Journal of Public Administration 55:3, p. 106. 
32 G. Dangerfield (1997) Effectiveness, Efficiency and Accountability: Key Issues for the
 Future of Public 
Management. In Future Issues in Public Management p. 54. 
33 C. Garden, Operations Manager, Early Childhood Development Unit, 13 November, 199
6 (personal 
communication). 
34 P. Harris, Chief Executive, Electoral Commission, 7 November, 1996 (personal commu
nication). 
35 D. Smith, Executive Director, Legal Services Board, 15 November 1996 (personal com
munication). 
36 J. Harris, Manager, Information Centre, New Zealand Fire Service, 13 November, 1996
 (personal 
communication). 
37 H. McCarroll, General Manager Operations, Christchurch International Airport Limited
, 7 November, 1996 
crersonal communication). 
3 W. Wilson, Executive Officer, Blood Transfusion Trust, 15 November, 1996 (personal
 communication). 
39 J. Cryer, Communications Manager, Transit New Zealand, 7 February, 1997 (personal 
communication). 
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-medical aid, disability support, and laboratory maintenance.
40 
In 1995-96, the state-owned enterprises purchased a multiplicity of servtces like those 
catering to the need for generation work," meteorological observations," and line 
maintenance and facilities management." 
Prior to 1989, about 70 per cent of the services provided by local authorities were 
undertaken by council departments." The usual approach was to contract out services of a 
capital and substantial nature or those which called for particular skills that local authorities 
did not have." However, amendments to the Local Government Act 1974 in 1989 and 
1992 changed the entire scenario: all local authorities were supposed to consider each and 
every alternative for the provision of services, and submit reports on the reasons behind the 
decision against outsourcing. One of the immediate consequences of what Crook believes 
to be government pressure 
46 was a significant growth in the delivery of services by external 
providers - sometimes in conjunction with the Local Authority Trading Enterprises and 
in-house producers." Indeed, since 1992, there has been a drastic swing towards purchase 
of services from private suppliers in the local government. It is suggested that in 1992-93: 
- in commercial forestry, 62 per cent of councils using external providers spent 80 per 
cent or more of their operating expenditure to purchase services associated with planting, 
tending, and logging;" 
40 M. Ch'ng, Commercial Director, Southern Health, II November, 1996 (personal communication). 
41 M. Nunns, External Relations Adviser, ECNZ, 14 November, 1996 (personal communication). 
42 G. Hodgson, Network Operations Manager, Meteorological Service of New Zealand Limited, 12 
November, 1996 (personal communication). 
43 L. Bunge, Contract Services Manager, Trans Power New Zealand Limited, 18 November, 1996 (personal 
communication). 
44 Department of Internal Affairs (1994) Territorial Authority Service Delivery p. 3. 
45 C. J. Whitlock (1993) Contracting Out- Corporatisation and Privatisation Public Sector 16:3, p. 18. 
46 R. Crook (1994) Local Government Service Delivery and Contracting Out in New Zealand p. 14. 
47 Department oflnternal Affairs (1994) Territorial Authority Service Delivery p. 15. 
48 Ibid, pp. 75, 78. 
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- in legal services, more than 75 per cent of councils using private suppliers spent 80 per 
cent or more of their operating expenditure to purchase services related to routine document 
drafting and conveyancing;" 
- in refuse collection and disposal, 69 per cent of councils using external providers spent 
80 per cent or more of their operating expenditure to purchase services associated with 
emptying street bins outside commercial premises, recycling, and composting;
50 and 
- across the aforementioned services, councils spent more than half of their operating 
expenditure to purchase services from private suppliers. 51 
Variation in the extent of contracting out across policy domains 
While contracting out is growing in New Zealand, its extent varies largely across policy 
domains. Some central government departments and numerous crown entities do not 
usually (and in certain cases, ever) purchase non-departmental outputs from private 
suppliers." Averse to the application of contracting out in the public sector in general, they 
conceive that a few specific services should be retained in-house forever, though non-core 
functions may be delivered by external providers under contract. Contracting out is 
49 Ibid, pp. 85, 87. 
50 Ibid, pp. 41, 45, 47. 51. 
51 Ibid, p. 19. 
52 J. Crookston, Senior Legal Adviser, New Zealand Police, 8 November, 1996 (personal communication). R. 
Boulcott, for Director, Ministry of Civil Defence, 5 November, 1996 (personal communication). L. Kea, for 
Chief Executive, Ministry of Pacific Island Affairs, 6 November, 1996 (personal communication). D. 
Ballantyne, Business Development Manager, Vehicle Testing NZ, 27 November, 1996 (personal 
communication). S. Christie, Manager, Agriculture and Marketing Research and Development Trust, 6 
November, 1996 (personal communication). T. Debenham, Senior Enquiries Officer, Privacy Commissioner, 
4 December, 1996 (personal communication). J. Dennehy, SHR Personnel Services, National Library of New 
Zealand, 6 November, 1996 (personal communication). J. Gillies Corporate Services, Serious Fraud Office 
Manager, 8 November, 1996 (personal communication). J. Hagen, Chair, Accounting Standards Review 
Board, 8 November, 1996 (personal communication). L. Larcombe, Executive Assistant, Overseas Investment 
Commission, 8 November, 1996 (personal communication). N. McConnick, HR Adviser, Airways 
Corporation of New Zealand Ltd, 19 December, 1996 (personal communication). H. Peacock, Chairman, 
Higher Salaries Commission, 13 November, 1996 (personal communication). K. Petersen, Executive Services 
Manager, Health and Disability Commissioner, 6 November, 1996 (personal communication). I. Potter, 
Director, Health Sponsorship Council, 25 November, 1996 (personal communication). B. Simmons, for 
General Manager, Animal Control Products Limited, 4 November, 1996 (personal communication). D. 
Thompson, Information Manager, Management Development Centre Trust, 14 November, 1996 (personal 
communication). 
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confined to peripheral activities in border protection, diplomacy, regulatory services, and 
tax collection, in addition to water supply, administration of sewerage systems, and 
resource management at the local level." The reasons behind the low incidence of 
contracting out in these areas have been raised and debated in several studies." Some of 
the common concerns are: 
-the difficulty in specifying services too precisely in advance in the context of uncertainty 
and changing patterns of demand, defining the quality dimensions of outcomes, and 
developing performance standards; 
-exorbitant transaction costs involved in designing and enforcing contracts; 
- the requirement of confidentiality standing in the way of transparency; 
-problems in comparing the cost-effectiveness of diverse private suppliers; 
- the prevalence of opportunistic producers possessing assets in terms of professional 
skills and sophisticated technology but unwilling to agree to a realistic price; 
- controversies emerging over a question of choice between short-term and long-run 
efficiency gains; and 
-the Jack of sufficient infrastructural facilities. 
Certain central government departments and crown entities are not routinely or currently 
involved in contracting out." 
On the other hand, contracting out is quite extensive in health, education, scientific 
research, transport, and social welfare, many of whose activities are outsourced. In health, a 
53 Boston (1996) Australian Journal of Public Administration 55:3, p. 107. 
54 P. Howden-Chapman (1993) Doing the Splits: Contracting Issues in the New Zealand Health Service Health 
Policy 24:3, pp. 276-285. P. Howden-Chapman and T. Ashton (1994) Shopping for Health: Purchasing 
Health Services through Contracts Health Policy 29:1-2, pp. 65-81. Caffrey (1995) Public Sector 18:1. pp. 
3-5. J. Martin (1995) Contracting and Accountability. In J. Boston (ed.) The State Under Contract pp. 40-
42. Boston (1996) Australian Journal of Public Administration 55:3, p. 108-110. G. Scott (1996) The 
Use of Contracting in the Public Sector Australian Journal of Public Administration p. 99-104. 
55 N. Fryer, for Director, Government Communications Security Bureau, 8 November, 1996 (personal 
communication). M. Griffin, Manager, Strategic Planning and Development, Education and Training Support 
Agency, 8 November, 1996 (personal communication). M. Miller, Personnel Officer (Support), Ministry of 
Defence, 6 November, 1996 (personal communication). E. Smelling, Regional Administration Manager, 
Public Trust, 12 November, 1996 (personal communication). 
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number of steps are taken by the Ministry of Health to develop contracts "as a vehicle for 
improving", in the words of How den-Chapman and Ashton, "the overall management and 
co-ordination of services" .
56 The needs of clients and their communities, the roles, rights 
and responsibilities of the parties, the progamme cost, the inputs, outputs and outcomes, 
and the accountability requirements, performance measures and monitoring mechanisms are 
specified with a fair amount of precision in purchase agreements. Transparency is sought to 
be achieved through, first, public scrutiny enabling the people at large to know if the tax 
dollars are going to be utilised in a proper way; second, consultations with the community 
on allocation of resources and development of service obligations; and third, special 
investigations into the quality of outputs. For effective management of financial risks, 
some purchasing decisions are delegated to private suppliers within a fixed budget or 
capitation payment. To ensure a greater scope for flexibility, efforts are made to strike an 
appropriate balance between explicit ex ante specification and implicit relationship-based 
contracting. In education, the Ministry of Education enters into a variety of contractual 
relationships with a multiplicity of external providers. Among other things, greater 
contestability between producers, improved choice for customers, and community 
involvement are emphasised. Iu scientific research, Parliament empowers the Foundation 
of Research, Science and Technology to purchase research outputs in the interest of public 
good. There is increased focus on value for money, and science outcomes are sought to be 
defined in clear terms. In transport, the Ministry of Transport allows private firms to 
arrange for the provision of services on a commercial, competitive basis. The emphasis is 
on the arrangement of 'safe, sustainable transport at reasonable cost', and consumer 
interests are protected by means of the Consumers Guarantee Act 1993." In social welfare, 
the Department of Child, Youth and Family Services contracts with private suppliers. The 
changing needs and priorities of clients and their communities are taken into account. 
56 Howden-Chapman and Ashton (1994) Shopping for Health: Shopping Health Services through Contracts 
Health Policy 29:1-2, p. 70. 
57 Stack (1995) Public Sector 18:2, pp. 2, 4. 
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External contracting in each of these sectors is fraught with hazards. Examples are: absence 
of commercial environment in health care; dearth of producers for certain specialised 
services in the field of education; non-availability of the information required for the 
purchase of requisite outputs in the domain of scientific research; and difficulties in 
measuring intangible outcomes in social welfare. Nevertheless, outsourcing, overall, is 
claimed to have proven beneficial in terms of productive efficiency, service quality, cost 
savings, and consumer choice." Besides, Boston implies that few services, already 
contracted out, are subsequently brought back in-house." 
While the aforementioned ministries or departments do not hesitate to give vent to their 
reactions (positive or negative) vis-a-vis contracting out, there exist a few which maintain 
absolute secrecy - choosing not to disclose whether they contract at all, or if so, what 
activities are outsourced.
60 Most of them refuse to publish any working papers or 
documents on contracting out, or treat them as confidential. 
61 But this does not, of course, 
imply that they have nothing or very little to do with contracting out. 
Conclusion 
It is to be borne in mind that a greater use of contracting out in New Zealand was the 
outcome of what Mulgan calls a rapid reform process" - more substantial and far-
58 Boston (1996) Australian Journal of Public Administration 55:3, p. 108. 
59 J. Boston (1998) Public Sector Management, Electoral Reform and the Future of the Contract State in New 
Zealand Australian Journal of Public Administration 57:4, p. 37. 
60 D. Mciver, Director of Security, New Zealand Security Intelligence Service, 11 November, 1996 (personal 
communication). E. Voyce, Policy Manager, Crown Company Monitoring Advisory Unit, 5 November, 1996 
Cpersonal communication). 
6 G. Hodgson, Network Operations Manager, Meteorological Service of New Zealand Limited, 12 
November, 1996 (personal communication). K. MacGibbon, Communications Adviser, Office of the 
Retirement Commissioner, 7 November, 1996 (personal communication). 
62 R. Mulgan (1996) The Schick Report: Commentary from an International Perspective Public Sector 19:4, 
p. 9. 
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reaching than anticipated" - during and after the tenure of the fourth Labour government 
"concerned", to quote Scott et al., "with the growth of public expenditure".
64 The 
question often asked is whether contracting out will persist in New Zealand or not. 
Robinson is right in believing that the introduction of contracting out in New Zealand has 
been accompanied by numerous problems and considerable confusion." But, at the same 
time, contracting out, driven, in the words of Quiggin, "as much by ideological enthusiasm 
as by rational analysis"," is still quite popular as an effective policy instrument in New 
Zealand with, to quote Schick, "a robust market sector and established mechanisms for 
enforcing contracts [in place]"." Contracting out is characterised by devolution which, 
according to Bushnell and Scott, has much to offer in designing more efficient systems of 
public administration in New Zealand." However, the above discussion highlights the fact 
that contracting out is but partial - if not almost non-existent - in a number of areas in 
New Zealand. The reason may be that in New Zealand, there is no clear government policy 
framework for contracting out which everyone could understand and work within. In the 
domain of social welfare in New Zealand, contracting out is quite widespread, although, in 
the opinion of the researcher, sacrificing contestability among producers of services seems 
to defeat the very purpose of outsourcing. Whereas contracting out must not encourage 
contractors in New Zealand to engage in cutthroat competition under any circumstances, a 
healthy contest is quite likely to raise the standard of the programmes developed, drive the 
prices of outputs down, provide clients with a greater choice, and make it unnecessary for 
the purchaser to rely on a single external provider or even monitor the performance of 
63 J. Boston and M. Holland (1987) The Fourth Labour Government: Transforming the Political Agenda. In J. 
Boston and M. Holland (eds.) The Fourth Labour Government: Radical Politics in New Zealand p. 6. 
64 G. Scott et al. (1990) Reform of the Public Sector Governance: An International Review of Policy and 
Administration 3:2, p. 138. 
65 D. Robinson (1995) A Manifesto for the Voluntary Community Welfare Sector Signpost (February), p. 6. 
66 J. Quiggin (1999) The Future of Government: Mixed Economy or Minimal State? Australian Journal of 
Public Administration 58:4, p. 51. 
67 A. Schick (1998) Why Most Developing Countries Should Not Try New Zealand Reforms The World 
Bank Research Observer 13:1, p. 127. 
68 P. Bushnell and G. Scott (1988) An Econontic Perspective. In J. Martin and J. Harpar (eds.) Devolution 
and Accountability p. 32. 
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private suppliers. There are several studies to suggest that just as in New Zealand, 
contracting out in the welfare sector in the United States, too, is plagued by the absence of a 
competitive environment (albeit for different reasons) and subsequent reduction in public 
administrative capacity." 
69 R. H. DeHoog (1984) Contracting Out for Human Services: Economic, Political, and Organizational 
Perspectives. J. M. Johnston and B.S. Romzek (1999) Contracting and Accountability in State Medicaid 
Reform: Rhetoric, Theories, and Reality Public Administration Review 59:5, pp. 383-399. D. M. Van Slyke 
(2003) The Mythology of Privatization in Contracting for Social Services Public Administration Review 
63:3, pp. 296-315. 
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Chapter 6 
Purchase of Service Contracting in New Zealand: Changing Trends in the 
Relationship between the Government and the Voluntary Sector 
This chapter relates the phases through which purchase of service contracting evolved in 
New Zealand, and the part played by the Community Funding Agency in the provision of 
social and welfare services. It begins with a discussion of the role of the government and 
the third sector in tbe delivery of social services from the mid-nineteenth century to the 
early 1980s, that is, a decade prior to the emergence of the Community Funding Agency -
describing concurrently how 'the balmy days of prosperity' were followed by 'a period of 
stormy turbulence' -leading to 'tbe piecemeal erosion of the welfare state'. It then comes 
up with a detailed account of the emergence and consolidation of tbe contractual 
relationship between the state and voluntary organisations - formalised by the 
establishment of the Community Funding Agency as one of the business units of the 
Department of Social Welfare. Thereafter, it deals with the structure, functions, and 
obligations of the Community Funding Agency. In conclusion, it refers to some views in 
favour of and against purchase of service contracting as managed by the Community 
Funding Agency. 
Historical background ofthe role of the state and voluntary organisations in New 
Zealand in social service provision 
Two key ideologies, social democratic and neoliberal, have influenced the social policy 
structures in New Zealand. Social democratic tbeory reflects a high degree of collective 
responsibility - seeking a larger role for government in ameliorating inequalities of 
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opportunity by conferring basic social rights. The social welfare characteristics of the state 
are universal entitlements to a broader range of welfare benefits. The dependence of 
citizens upon voluntary organisations is much reduced, although service agencies remain 
valued because of their innovative character and responsiveness to new social issues, their 
cost-effective use of the free good of voluntary contribution, and their role in enabling 
citizens to contribute to the well-being of others. Neoliberalism, on the other hand, prizes 
individual freedom and aspires in its policy formulations to achieve self-reliance of 
individuals and their families. The part played by government is far from conspicuous- it 
just arranges for the basic safeguards for the operation of the economic marketplace where 
all players are free to maximise their utility.
1 Families and voluntary organisations assume 
primary responsibility for welfare - bringing forth additional relief for the poor and the 
needy. 
In New Zealand, the period from the mid-1930s to the early 1970s was characterised by 
large-scale application of the social democratic ideology, encouraging the development of 
service delivery by the government and subsidisation of voluntary organisations involved in 
the production of human services from the earliest colonial times. But, there occurred a 
change in the scenario thereafter: the onset of a prolonged economic crisis in the mid-1970s 
witnessed the emergence of the neoliberal approach accompanied by a characteristic 
invocation of self-sufficiency for the family, dependence on voluntary organisations for 
multifarious services and, in the opinion of Smith, the provision of a basic safety net of 
welfare assistance by the government.' The different stages that the non-statutory service 
suppliers had to pass through require to be examined in some detail to place the contractual 
relationship between the government and voluntary organisations in context and illuminate 
current expectations with regard to the delivery of services. 
1 V. M. Smith (1995) Contracting for Social and Welfare Services: The Changing Relationship between 
Government and the Voluntary Sector in New Zealand p. 10. 
2 Ibid. 
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In the mid-nineteenth century, the need to attract and support new immigrants and build an 
economic infrastructure established an interventionist role for the government in New 
Zealand. The long 1880s depression heightened the awareness of the necessity for 
collective action to help families in distress, and ensured the election of the political party 
committed to direct provision of services. Altruistic voluntary organisations also 
functioned independent of the state - caring for children, unmarried mothers, old people, 
and disadvantaged individuals such as the physically disabled and the intellectually 
handicapped. Indeed, the third sector had a long history of philanthropy, with "charitable 
aid in a range of forms", in the words of Tennant, " ... distributed ... from the 1840s"
3 
The first Labour government entered office in 1935 in the wake of a severe recession in 
New Zealand. Its most significant achievement in fourteen years was to use the powers of 
the government to create, finance, and maintain a variety of welfare programmes that had 
hitherto been either virtually non-existent or accessible only to a limited few,' and 
introduce liberal benefits for elderly people, widows, orphans, children, invalids, miners, 
the sick, and those without jobs, under the Social Security Act 1938
5 -lauded by Sutch as 
meamng more dignity and security in old age, and less anxiety and suffering during 
working life. 6 Voluntary organisations were assigned a supplementary role - extending 
mainstream services rendered by the dominant provider, that is, the government, by means 
of offering an alternative choice to fill up the gaps. As a consequence of the joint 
endeavours of the government and the third sector, the nation became, to quote from a 
report of the State Services Commission (henceforth called the SSC report), "a shining 
example of a successful welfare state".' However, the government and nonprofits followed 
parallel tracks without any sense of partnership, just as Pakeha and Maori service agencies, 
3 M. Tennant (1989) Paupers and Providers: Charitable Aid in New Zealand p. 198 
4 C. Rudd (1997) The Welfare State. In C. Rudd and B. Roper (eds.)The Political Economy of New 
Zealand p. 240. 
5 M. O'Brien and C. Wilkes (1993) The Tragedy of the Market p. 53. 
6 W. B. Sutch (1966) The Quest for Security in New Zealand, 1840 to 1966 p. 237. 
7 State Services Commission (SSC) (1994) New Zealand's Reformed State Sector p. 1. 
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in the words of Nowland-Foreman, "moved in very separate - and frequently unequal -
directions",' 
New Zealand was one of the most sheltered economies in the Western world in the post-
World War II era - the government continually benefiting from preferential ties with 
Britain.' The long boom in this country from 1945 to 1973 fuelled, according to Roper, by 
high levels of profitability and productive investment, full employment, low inflation, 
increasing real wages, and absence of prolonged balance of payment problems due to 
favourable terms of trade
10 enabled the government to live up to the expectation that "the 
State should provide", to quote from the SSC report, "comprehensive education, health and 
social security systems funded from its revenue".Jl However, Rudd argues that throughout 
the 1950s and 1960s, the government did little to make welfare benefits less selective and 
more decommodifying.
12 
Alongside the government, voluntary organisations delivered services to meet new needs 
and/or special requirements highlighted by diverse social and community groups. For 
instance, alternative health services for women were developed by voluntary organisations 
under the influence of the feminist movement.
13 The combined efforts of the state and 
voluntary organisations contributed to the emergence, after the Second World War in 
particular, of a welfare system "more extensive", in the words of Oliver, "and ... generous 
8 G. Nowland-Foreman (1997) Can Voluntary Organisations Survive the Bear Hug of Government Funding 
under a Contracting Regime?- A View from Aotearoa/New Zealand Third Sector Review 3:1. p. 6. 
9 A. Schick (1996) The Spirit of Reform: Managing the New Zealand State Sector in a Time of 
Change p. II. 
10 B. Roper (1993) The End of the Golden Weather: New Zealand's Economic Crisis. In B. Roper and C. 
Rudd (eds.) State and Economy in New Zealand p. 2. 
ll SSC (1994) New Zealand's Reformed State Sector p. I. 
12 Rudd (1997) The Welfare State. In C. Rudd and B. Roper (eds.)The Political Economy 
o{ New Zealand p. 243. 
1 G. Ellis (1994) Social Work in Action. In R. Munford and M. Nash (eds.) Social Work 
in Voluntary Welfare Agencies p. 66. 
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... than the country had known before"" - with the former providing financial assistance 
and administrative support, encouraging exchange of personnel, sponsoring visits of 
international experts, undertaking joint planning of services, allowing access to 
consultation on policy, and permitting lobbying for the disadvantaged, vulnerable or 'at 
risk' members of society.
15 
Following the two great shocks in 1973, namely, to quote Schick, "the entrance of Britain 
into the Common Market [and] the OPEC oil crisis",
16 the balmy days of prosperity in New 
Zealand were replaced by a period of stormy turbulence characterised, in the opinion of 
Roper, by declining profitability and productivity, rise in unemployment, soaring inflation, 
fall in real wage rates, recurrent balance of payment deficits, adverse terms of trade, and 
growing public debt17 and creating, in the words of Barretta-Herman, "critical strains in a 
fallen economy" .
18 There could be little development in the services delivered by the 
government for the have-nots, with the era of unprecedented prosperity coming to an 
inglorious end in the mid-1970s and the 'new times' bringing about, to quote Shannon, "the 
so-called 'crisis of the welfare state"'.
19 These unfortunate people, therefore, became more 
reliant on the third sector than ever before. Besides, the gradual breakdown of the 
community in its old, intimate forms as a result of greater mobility and rapid urbanisation 
contributed to a probable rise in the number of isolates and misfits - incapable of looking 
after themselves." The circumstances worsened with the increase in sole parent 
14 W. H. Oliver (1988) Social Policy in New Zealand: An Historical Overview. In The 
At,ril Report p. 29. 
1 J. Renouf (1995) Changing Relationships between the State and the Voluntary Sector-
the Changing Face of Partnership Social Work Review p. 10. G. Newland-Foreman (1998) 
Purchase-of-Service Contracting, Voluntary Organizations, and Civil Society American 
Behavioral Scientist 42:1, pp. 108-109. 
16 Schick (1996) The Spirit of Refonn: Managing the New Zealand State Sector in a 
Time of Change p. 12. 
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Welfare Policy Context Social Work Review 5:4, p. 4. 
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households and growth in the aging population." The unhappy situation resulted in the 
formation of numerous voluntary organisations to serve the alienated, for whom the state, 
for all practical purposes, did not have any time or resources to spare. 
An economic recession in the early 1980s, accompanied by high public expenditure and a 
crippling national debt forced the government to consider changes in the mission of the 
welfare state
22 which, in SSC's view, cost too much, contributed very little to wealth-
generating production, and was a dead weight on society." At this stage, a residual, 
minimal, last-resort role for the government, together with a greater participation of 
voluntary organisations in the delivery of services was conceived to be the ideal solution 
"by many", in the words of Cheyne et. al., "within the policy and business community"." 
It was also argued that the provision of services by the government for each and all 
undermined the incentive to work and fostered benefit dependency and inefficiency. 
Hence, it was made explicit that the government would create a safety net of targeted 
minimum support for those who demonstrated the greatest need but had no access to 
services, or whose genuine and particular requirements could not be taken care of by the 
mainstream system." Others, it was declared, should be prepared to fend for themselves, 
or in other words, meet most of their needs via the market, the family, and the third sector 
rather than relying, for services, on the government - no more eager to develop universal 
programmes providing, to quote Green, "welfare from the cradle to the grave" .
26 
21 D. Suggate (1995) An Overview of the Voluntary Sector p. 20. 
22 P. G. Koopman-Boyden (1990) Social Policy: Has There Been One? In M. Holland and J. 
Boston (eds.) The Fourth Labour Government: Politics and Policy in New Zealand 
~p- 215-216. 
SSC (1994) New Zealand's Reformed State Sector p. 2. 
24 C. Cheyne et al. (1997) Social Policy in Aotearoa/New Zealand p. 40. 
25 J. Shipley (1991) Social Assistance: Social Assistance: Welfare that Works pp. 13, 
75. 
26 D. Green (1996) From Welfare State to Civil Society: Towards Welfare That Works in New Zealand 
p. I. 
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The cutbacks in government funding" brought about retrenchment, retreat, or roll-back, 
representing a shift from the Keynesian model towards, according to Boston, the neoliberal 
approach28 which, in the opinion of Stephens, was not necessarily appropriate for social 
I
, 29 
po 1cy. According to Britton et al., the 'reforms' initiated in 1984 and thereafter had a 
profound effect on the relationship between the government and the people, who found 
themselves marginalised and locked into a perpetual cycle of economic hardship as a 
consequence of the stark results of state sector restructuring on employment, communities, 
access to services, and household viability." Kelsey believes that between 1987 and 1990, 
the government succeeded in materialising a piecemeal erosion of the welfare state," 
It needs to be mentioned here that the pattern of developments in the funding arrangements 
(or 'technologies') of the government in New Zealand had moved through a number of 
(largely) sequential stages, each of which could be seen as an important leap forward from 
the previous step: donations to reputable and/or worthwhile voluntary organisations; 
programme grants in response to submissions; funds allocated on the basis of some form of 
service planning; and tendering for contracts to render specified services." The idea 
behind financial support was that since voluntary organisations undertook activities which 
were complementary to those embarked upon by the government, a relatively small amount 
of assistance might lead to more widespread or comprehensive availability of outputs." 
The voluntary organisations received rather modest aid from the government." As a report 
27 J. Kelsey (1993) Rolling Back the State pp. 83-85. 
28 J. Boston (1992) Redesigning the Welfare State in New Zealand: From Social Democracy to Market 
Liberalism? Public Sector 15:1, p. 3. J. Boston (1999) New Zealand's Welfare State in Transition. In J. 
Boston et al. (eds.) Redesigning the Welfare State in New Zealand p. 8. J. Boston (1999) Social Justice 
and the Welfare State. In Boston et al. (eds.) Redesigning the Welfare State in New Zealand p. 21. 
29 B. Stephens (1987) Social Policy Reform: In Retrospect and Prospect. In A. Bollard and R Buckle (eds.) 
Economic Liberalisation in New Zealand p. 328. 
30 S. Britton et al. (eds.) Changing Places in New Zealand: A Geography of Restructuring p. 186. 
31 Kelsey (1993) Rolling Back the State p. 82. 
32 Nowland-Foreman (1997) Third Sector Review 3:1, p. 7. Nowland-Foreman (1998) American 
Behavioral Scientist 42:1, p. 113. 
33 Ernst and Young (1996) Thinking About NZCFA's Contracting Approach: Draft p. 3. 
34 Nowland-Foreman (1997) Third Sector Review 3:1, p. 8. Now1and-Foreman (1998) American 
Behavioral Scientist 42:1, p. 113. 
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of the Social Advisory Council points out, large, affluent, and well-resourced voluntary 
organisations had an advantage in negotiating with the government for funding." The 
government seldom directed voluntary organisations, or monitored their activities, or held 
them accountable for the expenditure of public money which it nevertheless expected, in 
the opinion of Newland-Forman, to be put to good use." As a result, voluntary 
organisations succeeded in pursuing their core aims in ways they saw fit, and transaction 
costs for both the government and service agencies, according to Nowland-Ferman, used to 
be minimal." 
The government and voluntary organisations: the emergence of a new relationship 
In the mid-1980s, the government decided to introduce a new scheme regarding the 
delivery of services by voluntary organisations which, in the words of Ellis, "had its 
supporters on both sides of the political spectrum"." It called upon voluntary organisations 
to produce and provide the services required by individuals and families at the lower end of 
the market scale and minority groups on the margins of society. It sought the involvement 
of voluntary organisations not only with the neoliberal motive of curtailing state spending 
in the face of resource constraints but also because the Department of Social Welfare could 
not establish itself as the best agency for the provision of services. Further, it believed that 
a community-based, bottom-up system for the delivery of services "endowed", to quote 
Davey, "with the desired attributes of flexibility, participation, greater coordination, 
efficiency and effectiveness, clearer definition of need and ... increased self-reliance"
39 had 
35 Social Advisory Council (1986) Partnership - The Delivery of Social and Community Services p. 8. 
36 Nowland-Foreman (1997) Third Sector Review 3:1, p. 8. Nowland-Foreman (1998) American 
Behavioral Scientist 42:1, p. 113. 
37 Nowland-Foreman (1997) Third Sector Review 3:1, p. 8. 
38 Ellis (1994) Social Work in Voluntary Welfare Agencies p. 67. 
39 J. Davey (1987) Social Policy Options p. 42. 
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the potential to facilitate cultural pluralism,
40 make voluntary organisations more 
accountable to the funder,'
1 and create a diversified social policy environment." 
With the fourth Labour government entering office in 1984, considerable additional 
funding was made available to voluntary organisations, and several new programmes were 
initiated under the auspices of the Department of Social Welfare." In 1986, 'Circular 
Memorandum 1986/197' was issued by the Department of Social Welfare, detailing the 
responsibility of the staff for community development including the promulgation of 
liaison, cooperation, and coordination among voluntary organisations engaged in the 
production of social services." Every voluntary organisation was required by the 
Department of Social Welfare to furnish comprehensive information on its organisational 
structure and financial status, and explain the nature of, and the need for, the outputs to be 
provided, while applying for funds." The Department of Social Welfare was insistent on 
the delivery of a range of welfare programmes through not only voluntary organisations but 
also community groups, so that locally relevant options were available." In 1988, 
community services teams were established in each local office of the Department of Social 
Welfare to see to it that the communities enjoyed culturally appropriate, cost-effective, and 
well-coordinated services, that the goal of equity in resource allocation was met, and that 
the staff liaised with voluntary organisations and assisted them in their activities, monitored 
40 J. Leigh (1994) Contracting for Social Services: A Process Evaluation of the Community Funding 
Agency's Contracting Procedures p. 8. 
41 Newland-Foreman (1998) American Behavioral Scientist 42:1, p. 115. 
42 Davey (1987) Social Policy Options p. 53. 
43 Crown Law Office cited in V. Smith (1995) Contracting for Social and Welfare Services: The 
Changing Relationship between Government and the Voluntary Sector in New Zealand p. 43. 
44 Department of Social Welfare (DSW) cited in Smith (1995) Contracting for Social and 
Welfare Services: The Changing Relationship between Government and the Voluntary 
Sector in New Zealand p. 43. 
45 Smith (1995) Contracting for Social and Welfare Services: The Changing 
Relationship between Government and the Voluntary Sector in New Zealand p. 43. 
46 DSW cited in Smith (1995) Contracting for Social and Welfare Services: The 
Changing Relationship between Government and the Voluntary Sector in New 
Zealand p. 43. 
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community needs, participated m policy development, and administered funding 
47 
programmes. 
Based on these incremental changes brought about over a period of time, the Department of 
Social Welfare was restructured in consonance with a design completed, in the words of 
Smith, "by a team of eleven staff on a senior management training course in March 1991"." 
The ensuing report stated that the Departruent of Social Welfare could not be managed as a 
single business - reeling under increasing stress, with the managers at all levels 
overstretched and the accountability lines for the provision of services muddled." The 
reorganisation of the Department of Social Welfare, it was maintained, would contribute to 
the specification of goals and standards in unambiguous language, the application of 
resources to outputs, the institution of clear accountability requirements, the variation of 
delivery mechanisms in accordance with the priorities of consumers, and the development 
of an effective organisational structure and culture." The restructuring resulted in the 
creation of the Community Funding Agency as one of the three business units within the 
overall enterprise - reporting to the Departruent of Social Welfare but not directly 
accountable to producers. 
The Community Funding Agency and voluntary organisations - the contractual 
mode of governance 
In 1987 - five years before the Community Funding Agency was set up - the 
Administrative Review Committee for the Departruent of Social Welfare had recommended 
the establishment of arm's length, hands off contractual relationships between the 
47 DSW (1990) Handbook for Community Services p. 8. 
48 Smith (1995) Contracting for Social and Welfare Services: The Changing Relationship between 
Government and the Voluntary Sector in New Zealand p. 44. 
49 DSW cited in Smith (1995) Contracting for Social and Welfare Services: The Changing Relationship 
between Government and the Voluntary Sector in New Zealand p. 45. 
50 Ibid. 
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government and voluntary organisations as a more practical way than the previous funding 
practices for the provision of social services - with "more attention", to quote Cody, 
"towards monitoring and evaluating performance" .
51 Under this pattern, the government 
was to purchase services from, rather than fund the activities of, voluntary organisations 
which could develop only those programmes that the state, in the words of Woods, 
"deemed as important"." Besides, the government retained control over resource and 
policy decisions," unlike prior to the rnid-1980s when the prevailing belief was that the 
state should not interfere in the workings of voluntary organisations." 
In 1989, a Review Team consisting of a representative of iwi, a member from each of the 
three umbrella agencies for voluntary organisations, and six departmental staff was formed 
to formulate the principles and guidelines for the new contracting process." It laid stress 
on the necessity to contract with Maori providers. Secondly, it emphasised the utility of 
training staff in needs appraisal, contract design, agency selection, negotiation, arbitration, 
consultation, accounting, and subcontracting. Thirdly, it called for the selection of efficient 
and cost-effective suppliers. Fourthly, it highlighted the non-negotiable criteria to be 
satisfied by all producers - for example, the cultural appropriateness of the services to be 
delivered and an extensive set of good employer standards such as decent pay, access to 
trade unions, entitlement to salary adjustments, and welfare provisions for employees. 
Fifthly, it focused on the importance of evaluating performance, resolving disagreement 
and conflict, controlling compliance costs, and ensuring equitable allocation of funding. 
Approved by the Social Service Commission in August 1989 and published the following 
51 J. Cody (1990) Devolution, Disengagement and Control in the Statutory Social Services. In P. McKinlay 
(ed.) Redistribution for Power? Devolution in New Zealand p. 180. 
52 M. Woods (1996) Shrinking Government- The Effects on Volunteers. Voluntary Organisations and 
their Clients p. 2. 
53 Ellis (1994) Social Work in Voluntary Welfare Agencies p. 72. 
54 Tie cited in Ellis (1994) Social Work in Voluntary Welfare Agencies p. 72. 
55 Smith (1995) Contracting for Social and Welfare Services: The Changing 
Relationship between Government and the Voluntary Sector in New Zealand p. 50. 
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year," Contracting for Social Services: Principles and Guidelines suggested that 
purchase of service contracting had the potential to address the hazards of funding 
uncertainty, provider capture, ambiguity in the specification of objectives, insufficient 
evaluation of the requirements of clients and their communities, and inadequate 
consultation with consumers or potential customers; develop a fair, explicit, and culturally 
appropriate delivery mechanism; and encourage cooperation and flexibility in the provision 
f 57 o outputs. 
The Department of Social Welfare started issuing some of its grant funding under contract 
in 1990.
58 A Project Team convened in early August 1991 recommended the appointment 
of a General Manager assisted by a central staff of seven people including a lawyer and an 
accountant to receive and assess applications, let contracts, make payments, monitor the 
performance of producers, and approve of providers under the regulations set down by the 
Disabled Persons Community Welfare Act 197 5 and the Children, Young Persons and their 
Families Act 1989." Shortly thereafter, a partial amendment to the proposed model 
entrusted the outreach workers with the authority to evaluate client needs and negotiate 
local contracts.
60 
In September 1991, the Circular Memo upheld that all funding must be provided under 
contract.61 It identified a hierarchy of simple to detailed contracts." It distinguished 
between contracts and grants-in-aid." It confirmed the evolution of the role of the 
Department of Social Welfare away from community development to a focus on the key 
56 Ibid, p. 49. 
57 DSW (1990) Contracting for Social Services: Principles and Guidelines p. 4. 
58 Smith (1995) Contracting for Social and Welfare Services: The Changing 
Relationship between Government and the Voluntary Sector in New Zealand p. 49. 
59 Ibid, pp. 46-47. 
60 Ibid, p. 47. 




activities of contract management: planning, programme development, approvals, and 
funding within specified output areas." 
The Community Funding Agency came into existence in May 1992.
65 It sought to allocate 
funding to voluntary organisations in accordance with the priorities of the government, so 
that all New Zealanders had access to a range of appropriate services." It aimed to be the 
'pre-eminent agency' for the coordination, development, and purchase of quality and iwi -
based outputs in response to the requirements of clients and their communities. 
67 It wanted 
to work in a professional, innovative, and effective way and thereby win the confidence and 
support of producers, consumers, and the funder." 
The Waitangi Tribunal Report informs that the Community Funding Agency had a head 
office and a policy operations group." The head office was responsible for the delivery of 
support services including making payments." The policy operations group dealt with 
planning, development of operational policy, and communications.
71 The Community 
Funding Agency was divided into eight geographic areas - each under the supervision of 
an area team comprising an area manager and several outreach workers." Every outreach 
worker was equipped, to quote Leigh, "with cars, laptop computers and mobile 
telephones". 73 In addition to approving of providers, assessing needs, negotiating 
contracts, allocating budgets, and monitoring performance at the local level, the outreach 
64 lbid. 
65 New Zealand Community Funding Agency (NZCFA) (1996) New Zealand Community Funding Agency: 
Post-Election Briefing Paper p. 4. 
66 DSW cited in Smith (1995) Contracting for Social and Welfare Services: The Changing Relationship 
between Government and the Voluntary Sector in New Zealand p. 48. 
67 NZCFA (1993) National Services Plan: Funding Decisions 1993/94 p. 5. 
68 lbid. 
69 Waitangi Tribunal Report (1998) Te Whanau 0 Waipareira Report p. 81. 
70 Ibid. 
71 lbid. 
72 NZCFA (1993) National Services Plan: Funding Decisions 1993194 p. 4. 
73 Leigh (1994) Contracting for Social Services: A Process Evaluation of the Community Funding 
Agency's Contracting Procedures p. 10. 
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workers, as a report published in Outreach states, were expected to establish a transparent 
picture of the current trends, gaps, and overlaps in service provision, 
74 and look at the 
priorities for funding in the coming year." 
The basic structure of the Community Funding Agency remained more or less the same 
over the years. In 1998, it was composed of 110 staff, out of whom 61 were outreach 
workers." It entrusted those people with, to cite from a report of the Crown Law Office, 
"considerable delegated authority"," so that they could consult with producers and clients, 
sign agreements, in the words of Smith, "for up to $100,000"," and monitor the quality of 
services through regular reporting processes." It accredited all providers on an annual 
basis, following an objective and in-depth review of their organisational structure, financial 
viability, delivery mechanisms, and ability to satisfy a set of non-negotiable criteria such as 
the cultural appropriateness, client-focused nature, and effectiveness of the services to be 
rendered -laid down by the 'Standards for Approval' .
80 In 1998, it contracted with more 
than 1200 community- and iwi-based voluntary organisations" for the purchase of services 
in four sectors, namely, Community Welfare, Disabilities, CYPFS Bednights, and Families 
in Need of Support. 82 In the contract, it specified, inter alia, the services to be delivered, 
the performance standards, the reporting requirements, and the schedule of payments due." 
74 Outreach (1993) Services Planning Progress (April), p. 3. 
75 Outreach (1993) Linking with the Community - The Role of Outreach Workers (June), p. 4. 
76 D. Cameron, Office Administrator New Zealand Community Funding Agency (personal communication) 9 
June 1998. 
77 Crown Law Office quoted in Smith (1995) Contracting for Social and Welfare Services: The Changing 
Relationship between Government and the Voluntary Sector in New Zealand p. 54. 
78 Smith (1995) Contracting for Social and Welfare Services: The Changing Relationship between 
Government and the Voluntary Sector in New Zealand pp. 55-56. 
79 NZCFA (1998) National Services Plan: Funding Decisions 1998199 p. 9. 
80 NZCFA (1995) Standards for Approval. Level One: Child and Family Support Services pp. 20-44. 
NZCFA (1995) Standards for Approval, Level Two: Community Services pp. 15-34. NZCFA (1995) 
Standards for Approval. 1wi Social Services pp. 11-13. NZCFA (1995) Guide for 1wi Social Services 
pp- 8-18. NZCFA (1997) Interim Standards for Approval. Level Two: Vocational Services pp. 16-31. 
NZCFA (1998) National Services Plan: Funding Decisions 1998/99 p. 4. 
82 Ibid. pp. 10-12. 
83 Smith (1995) Contracting for Social and Welfare Services: The Changing 
Relationship between Government and the Voluntary Sector in New Zealand p. 56. 
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Before the confirmation of its own budget in June of each year, the Community Funding 
Agency identified and evaluated, by means of Services Planning and National Needs 
Indicator Index, current and projected needs for services by region following, as a report of 
the New Zealand Community Funding Agency (henceforth called NZCFA) suggests, 
consultation with local communities inclusive of producers, community forums, and hui." 
It made funding decisions in respect of the eight geographic areas with the help of senior 
managers responsible for operations, support services, and audit, while at the local level 
area teams decided how funds were to be allocated after the cost for the national services 
had been taken 'off the top'." It offered, in the opinion of Smith, 25 per cent on average 
towards the expenses for the provision of services," although some other studies maintain 
that the funding ranged from 40 to 55 per cent." It provided 80 per cent of the total 
funding for new programmes." It used to arrange for full funding "only on the basis of', to 
quote from the Waitangi Tribunal Report, "a 'one-off', short-term, injection of funds"," 
subject to conditions like local demand for the service/s, the price structure of the provider, 
and availability of financial resources." Allocating over $110 million every year," it 
represented the largest single funder for most of the producers, 
92 many of which would be 
at risk or fail to survive if funding for services was stopped or materially diminished." 
Rather than limiting financial assistance to a few big providers, it advocated funding a wide 
variety of services rendered by a large number of producers." It approved of multi-year 
84 NZCFA (1998) National Services Plan: Funding Decisions 1998199 p. 8. 
85 Waitangi Tribunal Report (1998) Te Whanau 0 Waipareira Report pp. 89-91. 
86 Smith (1995) Contracting for Social and Welfare Services: The Changing Relationship between 
Government and the Voluntary Sector in New Zealand p. 54. 
87 Ernst and Young (1996) NZCFA- Study on the Viability of the Not-for-Profit Sector in New 
Zealand p. l. Ernst and Young (1996) Thinking about New Zealand's Contracting Approach: Draft p. 
6. NZCFA (1997) National Services Plan: Funding Decisions 1997/98 p. 4. 
88 Suggate (1995) An Overview of the Voluntary Sector p. 71. 
89 Waitangi Tribunal Report (1998) Te Whanau 0 Waipareira Report p. 82. 
90 NZCFA (1995) Contracting p. 9. 
91 Ernst and Young (1996) Thinking about New Zealand's Contracting Approach: Draft p. 6. 
92 Ernst and Young (1996) NZCFA - Study on the Viability of the Not-for-Profit 
Sector in New Zealand pp. 10, 89. 
93 Ibid, p. 10, 56. 
94 Ibid, p. 41. 
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funding for providers delivering priority services and well-established producers taking care 
of, in the words of Smith, "essential core service needs"." It assisted providers in 
developing services by extending seed or establishment funding, supplying relevant 
information, and suggesting who could be of help, for instance the Department of Internal 
Affairs, outreach workers, and experienced producers." 
Out of its steadfast commitment to the ideals of clarity and accountability, the Community 
Funding Agency published details of resource allocation partway through the financial year, 
in addition to instructing staff to be available and willing to explain to providers of 
services, community groups, and common people how and why the funder, to quote from 
an NZCFA report, "arrived at a particular funding decision"." It emphasised the 
importance of the internal appeal process by means of which any decision pertaining to 
funding could be contested by producers, encouraged the use of customer satisfaction 
surveys as a community monitoring mechanism," and stood, among other things, for 
mobilisation of community support, systematic evaluation of the quality of services, 
imposition of sanctions against non-performance, and enhancement of management skills." 
It persuaded providers to prove their professionalism, accountability, and transparency by 
completing KOPPS or Key Operating Policies, Procedures and Systems which required 
them to define what they did to comply with the monitoring and reporting requirements of 
the purchaser. As well, it urged producers to furnish evidence through HROS or Human 
Resources and Operating Statistics that they were operating in conformity with KOPPS. 
The Community Funding Agency did not favour the tendering system which assumed that 
full, not partial, funding was available, that potential providers were sufficiently 
95 Smith (1995) Contracting for Social and Welfare Services: The Changing Relationship between 
Government and the Voluntary Sector in New Zealand p. 80. 
96 Waitangi Tribunal Report (1998) Te Whanau 0 Waipareira Report p. 85. 
97 NZCFA (1998) National Services Plan: Funding Decisions 1998/99 p. 9. 
98 Waitangi Tribunal Report (1998) Te Whanau 0 Waipareira Report p. 104. 
99 Ernst and Young (1996) Thinking about New Zealand's Contracting Approach: Draft p. 9. 
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sophisticated to develop costs of service delivery, and that all outputs could be specified."' 
It preferred cooperation to competition among producers in making applications for 
funding, or in other words, wanted purchase of service contracting to be characterised by a 
complete absence of contestability - a strategy significantly different from welfare 
contracting as practised in general. With a view to achieving seamless contracting, it 
decided, in 1997, to send funding proposals to providers well before current agreements 
expired and allocate more funds to multi-year contracts.
101 In 1998, it simplified the 
monitoring and reporting requirements and encouraged producers to use the 'Monitoring 
and Evaluation System' (MES) - an useful tool for casework management and record 
k 
. 102 
eepmg. At the New Zealand Association of Philanthropic Trusts Conference in 
November 1998, it expressed the wish to forge with the philanthropic sector closer working 
relationships based on information sharing and establishment of joint ventures.
103 
The Community Funding Agency never ceased to claim that it had always worked in 
conformity with the key principles laid down by the Department of Social Welfare
104 and 
the Cabinet Office.
105 It is widely believed that the Community Funding Agency spared no 
effort to operate in a professional, businesslike manner in order to make purchase of service 
contracting a successful venture in New Zealand. According to a report of the New 
Zealand Council of Christian Social Services, the Community Funding Agency strove for 
the creation of the 'right environment' to facilitate the development of a good funding 
system. 106 
100 Waitangi Tribunal Report (1998) Te Whanau 0 Waipareira Report p. 84. 
101 Outreach (1997) Multi-year Contracts Benefit All (June-July), pp. 8-9. 
102 Outreach (1998) NZCFA Makes Multi-year Contracts More User-friendly (October-
November), p. 10. 
103 Outreach (1998) Philanthropy (December), p. 5. 
104 DSW (1990) Contracting for Social Services: Principles and Guidelines pp. 6-27. 
105 Cabinet Office (1992) Office Circular pp. 1-8. 
106 New Zealand Council of Christian Social Services (NZCCSS) (1999) Criteria for 
Judging Government Funding Arrangements for the Community Sector: The Views of 
Community Social Services Providers pp. 1, 2. 
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Conclusion 
The brief review of the phases through which purchase of service contracting evolved in 
New Zealand as an effective policy instrument and the factors contributing to the 
development and consolidation of the role of the Community Funding Agency as the 
purchaser of social services demonstrates how the contractual relationship between the 
government and voluntary organisations was established. Prior to the creation of the 
Community Funding Agency in May 1992 as one of the business units of the Department of 
Social Welfare and the emergence of purchase of service contracting, the arrangement of 
funding by the state for the outputs to be delivered by voluntary organisations was a 
straightforward process. Public sector restructuring was characterised, inter alia, by the 
introduction of purchase of service contracting - resting on a principal-agent relationship 
between the Community Funding Agency and voluntary organisations and necessitating, in 
the words of Tunzelmann, "a wide range of transactions involving the expenditure of public 
money".10
7 The Community Funding Agency was held in high esteem by the protagonists 
of purchase of service contracting, who also commended voluntary organisations for their 
inherent capacity to lend a helping hand to the government, perform much better as service 
suppliers than public agencies, commercial entities and households, and facilitate, to quote 
Kenny, "effective governance and welfare provision".
108 The critics, on the other hand, 
focused on the gaps between the pledges made by the Community Funding Agency and the 
reality of purchase of service contracting - the transaction and compliance costs which it 
was impossible to do away with or even minimise, the unfair privileges (subsidies, tax 
exemptions, volunteer contributions, grants, and donations) enjoyed by voluntary 
organisations that a 'level playing field' would never have permitted, the difficulties in 
evaluating the quality of outputs, and the non-existence of any competition among 
107 A. von Tunzelmann (2000) Funding Conununity Organisations in New Zealand: A View 
from Local Government Public Sector 23:1, p. 6. 
108 Kenny cited inK. McMillan (1998) Contracting for Social Responsibility: Purchase 
of Service Contracting and the Delivery of Ethnic Social Services in New Zealand 
(page number not given). 
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providers. The researcher, however, conceives that purchase of serv1ce contracting, 
competently managed by the Community Funding Agency as it was, achieved over time a 
great deal of maturity - allowing the contract model to reach into the high-risk areas of 





This chapter begins by describing the geographic area that provides the background for the 
research: the size and population of Otago/Southland, its economic and social problems, the 
outputs purchased for the satisfaction of the diverse needs of its people, and the voluntary 
organisations providing a plethora of services to cater to the requirements of its 
communities. It then provides a brief overview of the objectives of the research, the 
approach adopted, and the measures taken to commence the project. Thereafter, it goes on 
to explain how the methods selected for the purpose of the study were used to collect 
information, how the data so obtained were interpreted and evaluated, how problems were 
tackled, and why 'clients' were not included in the research. 
Area profile 
The Otago/Southland region covers 26 per cent of the total area of New Zealand, but only 
about 8.1 per cent of the national population.' Population density has always been low and 
the isolation factor high. The population is concentrated on the east and south coasts. 
Population growth rates vary across the area. For example, between 1994 and 1996 the 
population of Dunedin increased by 3 per cent, while that of Invercargill decreased by 5 per 
cent.2 
In 1998, the region was characterised by a low proportion of people receiving income 
support (15.9 per cent),' compared to the national average of 22 per cent.' However, the 
1 New Zealand Community Funding Agency (NZCFA) (1998) National Services Plan: Funding Decisions 




level of unemployment was quite high (9.2 per cent)' relative to the whole of New Zealand 
(7.7 per cent).' There was a continuing need for meaningful programmes relating to 
community welfare, effective services to support and strengthen families at risk, and more 
vocational training for people with psychiatric disabilities.' 
In 1998, as in the previous six years, the requirements and priorities were identified, 
reviewed, and revised by the Community Funding Agency by means of Services Planning 
and National Needs Indicator Index. The inputs from key members of the community and 
outreach workers in the area were taken into account. Meetings were held throughout the 
region so that interested people could express their opinions. Finally, necessary 
arrangements were made for the purchase of a range of services relevant to 'Community 
Welfare' (budget advice, refuge shelter for women), 'Disabilities' (vocational training for 
people with disabilities, work opportunities for the intellectually handicapped in a sheltered 
environment), 'CYPFS Bednights' (residential care for children and young people in 
response to CYPFS referrals), and 'Families in Need of Support' (counselling for victims 
of domestic violence, homebased support for families at risk) - with $4,651,567.68 
sanctioned for the area.' 
The providers of community and iwi-based services m the region were voluntary 
organisations - catering to the needs of diverse client groups (Pakeha, Maori, Pacific 
Island and Cambodian), and a few of them (CORPAC Budgeting Service Trust, Samoan 
Advisory Council Inc) functioning in more than a single sector. Some voluntary 
organisations -affiliated (Rape Crisis Queenstown, Dunedin Victim Support Group Inc) 
4 Statistics New Zealand (2003) www.stats.govt.nz. 
5 New Zealand Community Funding Agency (NZCFA) (1998) National Services Plan: Funding Decisions 
1998/99 p. 141. 
6 Statistics New Zealand (2003) www.stats.govt.nz. 
7 New Zealand Community Funding Agency (NZCFA) (1998) National Services Plan: Funding Decisions 
1998199 pp. 141-142. 
8 Ibid, pp. 143-145, 149. 
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as well as local (Presbyterian Support Services Southland, Anglican Methodist Family Care 
Centre Alexandra) - had branches tbat contracted individually with the Community 
Funding Agency, and were therefore treated by the researcher as autonomous bodies. There 
were eighty-two voluntary organisations in the area including the branches.' However, 
four voluntary organisations were found closed at the time of the field research (February-
December 1999). When the Community Funding Agency started functioning in May 1992, 
five outreach workers were employed to negotiate contracts with, and monitor the 
performance of, the voluntary organisations mentioned above, but the number had come 
down to three in 1998.10 
Research methodology 
The purpose of the research was to evaluate the success and failure of purchase of service 
contracting in helping tbe voluntary organisations in tbe Otago/Southland region and the 
Community Funding Agency attain certain specific objectives. The researcher adopted a 
positivistic approach, characterised by in-depth analysis of prevailing theoretical evidence 
and objective interpretation of available empirical data. The methods considered most 
appropriate to elicit the required information were, first, a uniform questionnaire, the 
responses to which could be quantified and operationalised and, second, semi-structured, 
one-to-one interviews, conducted to allow the participants tbe opportunity to express their 
own ideas, aspirations, and feelings. 
In the beginning of February 1999, each of the seventy-eight voluntary organisations in the 
area was contacted through a covering letter stating in brief tbe context, content, and 
purpose of the research; a Jetter requesting information on the agency characteristics or 
traits, seeking the permission for a questionnaire to be mailed, and asking for an interview; 
9 Ibid, pp. 143-149. 
10 P. Cook, Outreach Worker, NZCFA, 3 October, 1999, (personal communication). 
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a letter of recommendation from the Supervisor; and a letter of approval from the Ethics 
Committee of the University of Otago. By the middle of the same month, a questionnaire 
was delivered to every probable respondent in person or by post. 
Out of the seventy-eight voluntary organisations, fifty-seven (or 73 per cent) operating in 
four sectors (sixteen in 'Community Welfare', twelve in 'Disabilities', one in 'CYPFS 
Bednights', and twenty-eight in "Families in Need of Support') responded to the 
questionnaire, and the entire feedback was received by the end of May 1999. Twenty-one 
voluntary organisations (or 26 per cent) had, however, informed by the middle of May that 
they would not be able to participate in the research for reasons of confidentiality, minimal 
involvement, or intensive pressure of work. Although the study could not, therefore, cover 
all voluntary organisations in the Otago/Southland region, it, nevertheless, enabled the 
researcher to have quite a clear idea about a) the benefits and costs of purchase of service 
contracting as a means to achieve ten objectives identified in theoretical literature as 
significant goals for both service agencies and government to attain and influenced by a set 
of economic and administrative doctrines, and b) the part played by six agency 
characteristics or traits found, by means of field research, to have a major impact on the 
attitude of the producers towards contracting out in social welfare, in affecting the views of 
the providers on the role of purchase of service contracting. Hence, it helped him 
undertake an objective empirical research on the potential of purchase of service 
contracting as an effective policy instrument, and thereby redress a critical gap in the 
prevailing literature on contractualism, improve the broader knowledge of government, the 
third sector, and the relationship between the two, and contribute to scholarship in the 
fields of public policy, management and administration - apart from adding to the 
insignificant number of case studies on the effects of contracting out in social welfare in 
New Zealand. 
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In order to be tested against the findings of the study, three sets of hypotheses were 
formulated by the researcher: the first suggestive of the perspectives of the producers, the 
second reflecting the views of the purchaser, and the third focusing on the characteristics or 
traits of the participating voluntary organisations. The very same economic and 
administrative doctrines impacting on the objectives to be secured were instrumental in 
providing the theoretical foundation of all three sets of hypotheses -particularly the first 
two. Indeed, the first two sets of hypotheses (and the third as well, albeit to a lesser extent) 
were based on the ideas furnished by public choice theory, new public management, agency 
theory, and transaction cost analysis (see Chapter 3). 
There are three tables given below. Table 7.1 lays down the objectives, Table 7.2 the 
agency characteristics or traits, and Table 7.3 the hypotheses to be tested. 
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Table 7.2 
Classification of the participating voluntary organisations in tenns of the agency 
characteristics or traits 
Agency characteristics or traits Participating voluntary 
orgamsatwns 
Level - affiliated (or attached to a national 1) Affiliated- 30 (52.6%) 
body like National Collective of Rape 2) Local- 27 (47.4%) 
Crisis and Related Groups of Aotearoa or 
NZ Council of Victim Support Groups, but 
operating autonomously at the regional 
level) and local 
Area - urban (or located in cities with a 3) Urban- 37 (64.9%) 
population of 30,000 and above [Dunedin 4) Rural- 20 (35%) 
and Invercargill in the current research]) 
and rural 
Age - old (or set up before the 5) Old- 42 (73.7%) 
establishment of the Community Funding 6) New- 15 (26.3%) 
Agency in 1992) and new 
Size.- large (or consisting of more than 5 7) Large- 18 (31.6%) 
paid staff) and small [the researcher used 8) Small - 38 (66.7%) 
his own discretion in this regard because he N/A- 1 (1.8%) 
found that a) in theoretical literature there 
was no hard and fast rule concerning the 
determination of the size of voluntary 
organisations on the basis of the number of 
paid staff, and b) a clear majority of the 
participating service agecies had more than 
5 paid staff] 
Funding - average (between 25 and 55 per 9)) Average- 17 (29.9%) 
cent of the budget of the service provider 10) Above average [including 3 receiving 
[adopted from studies by Smith11 and Ernst full funding] - 18 (31.6%) 
and Young12J), above average (between 56 11) Below average- 11 (19.3%) 
and 100 per cent), and below average N/A- 11 (19.3%) 
(between 0 and 24 per cent) 
Client Group - Pakeha (New Zealand 12) Pakeha- 38 (66.7%) 
European), non-Pakeha (Maori, Samoan 13) Non-Pakeha -7 (12.3%) [Maori- 5, 
and Cambodian), and mixed Samoan - 1 and Cambodian - 1 
14) Mixed- 12 (21 %) 
' 
, . 
F1gures vahd m December 1998 (see Orgamsatwnal Profile m Appendix 3) 
11 V. Smith (1995) Contracting for Social and Welfare Services: The Changing Relationship between 
Government and the Voluntary Sector in New Zealand p. 54. 
12 Ernst & Young (1996) NZCFA- Study on the Viability of the Not-for-Profit Sector in New Zealand 
p. I. Ernst and Young (1996) Thinking about New Zealand's Contracting Approach: Draft p. 6. 
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Table 7.3 
The hypotheses to be tested 
a) 
Purchase of service contracting was more likely than not to help the voluntary organisations 
interact with the Community Funding Agency on mutually acceptable terms 
Purchase of service contracting was more likely than not to help the voluntary organisations 
provide a wide range of services 
Purchase of service contracting was more likely than not to help the voluntary organisations 
enhance the quality of services 
Purchase of service contracting was more likely than not to help the voluntary organisations 
minimise the cost of services 
Purchase of service contracting was more likely than not to help the voluntary organisations 
deliver new, additional and flexible services 
Purchase of service contracting was more likely than not to help the voluntary organisations 
stay focused on consumer needs and improve overall performance by making them report 
on a regular basis 
1 Purchase of service contracting was more likely than not to help the voluntary organisations 
empower clients and their communities 
Purchase of service contracting was more likely than not to help the voluntary organisations 
comprehend the contractual conditions 
Purchase of service contracting was more likely than not to help the voluntary organisations 
operate in a transparent setting 
Purchase of service contracting was more likely than not to help the voluntary organisations 
serve the interests of the weaker sections of society 
b) 
Purchase of service contracting was more likely than not to enable the Community Funding 
Agency to utilise the experience and expertise of the voluntary organisations through the 
establishment of a genuine partnership with the service agencies 
· Purchase of service contracting was more likely than not to enable the Community Funding 
Agency to identify consumer needs and measure the adequacy of available resources 
Purchase of service contracting was more likely than not to enable the Community Funding 
Agency to ensure the provision of quality outputs on an ongoing basis 
Purchase of service contracting was more likely than not to enable the Community Funding 
Agency to select the cheapest and the best of providers 
Purchase of service contracting was more likely than not to enable the Community Funding 
Agency to to facilitate the development of innovative programmes 
Purchase of service contracting was more likely than not to enable the Community Funding 
Agency to exercise effective control over the providers 
Purchase of service contracting was more likely than not to enable the Community Funding 
Agency to contribute to the generation of community capabilities 
Purchase of service contracting was more likely than not to enable the Community Funding 
Agency to specify the terms of the contract in clear and simple language 
Purchase of service contracting was more likely than not to enable the Community Funding 
Agency to eliminate the hazard of provider capture through the creation of an open 
I environment 
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Purchase of service contracting was more likely than not to enable the Community Funding 
Agency to remove the growing disparities in the communities by means of fair and 
equitable distribution of resources 
c) 
Being well-established, better-resourced and close to the Community Funding Agency in 
general, the affiliated voluntary organisations were more likely than the local service 
agencies to perceive purchase of service contracting as beneficial for the providers 
Being well-established, better-resourced and close to the Community Funding Agency in 
general, the urban voluntary organisations were more likely than the rural service agencies 
to perceive purchase of service contracting as beneficial for the providers 
Being well-established, better-resourced and close to the Community Funding Agency in 
general, the old voluntary organisations were more likely than the new service agencies to 
1 perceive purchase of service contracting as beneficial for the providers 
Being well-established, better-resourced and close to the Community Funding Agency in 
general, the large voluntary organisations were more likely than the small service agencies 
to perceive purchase of service contracting as beneficial for the providers 
Being well-established, better-resourced and close to the Community Funding Agency in 
general, the voluntary organisations on above average funding were more likely than the 
service agencies on average and below average funding to perceive purchase of service 
contracting as beneficial for the providers 
Being well-established, better-resourced and close to the Community Funding Agency in 
general, the Pakeha voluntary organisations were more likely than the non-Pakeha and the 
mixed service agencies to perceive purchase of service contracting as beneficial for the 
providers 
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Consisting of 108 fixed-alternative questions (see Appendix 1), the questionnaire was 
organised around the objectives listed in Table 7.1. There was wide variation in the number 
of the questions designed to measure the different objectives. This reflected the fact that 
while for some objectives a couple of questions were sufficient, for others with a broader 
scope it was necessary to pose more of them. 
Five types of responses to the questions were possible - positive or wholly supportive, 
equivocal-positive or partly supportive, indifferent or neither supportive nor critical, 
negative or totally critical, and equivocal-negative or partially critical - suggesting 
respectively that in respect of the particular issue raised, purchase of service contracting 
looked perfect, or had promise but called for improvement, or could not be regarded as 
either good or bad, or was of no worth, or needed to be enhanced to work better. However, 
the responses were either equivocal-positive, or indifferent, or equivocal-negative- coded 
1, 0, and -1 respectively (see Appendix 4, Table 1). All participating voluntary 
organisations chose not to answer certain questions (not uniform) which were coded N/ A or 
not available (see Appendix 4, Table 1). 
The values assigned to the responses of each participating voluntary organisation to all the 
questions were averaged (see Appendix 4, Table 1). The values ascribed to the responses of 
every participating voluntary organisation to the questions focusing on each objective were 
averaged, too (see Appendix 4, Table 3). 
A majority of the values thus averaged were less than 1 (0.1, 0.08) and -1 (-0.2, -0.09) (see 
Appendix 4, Tables 1 and 3). They were, however, treated by the researcher as the values 
representing equivocal-positive and equivocal-negative responses respectively. 
137 
Contingency tables were created - cross-tabulating the averaged responses of the 
participating voluntary organisations characterised by a specific trait with a particular 
objective (see Tables 1 to 60 in Appendix 6). With regard to every single objective, 
instances of significant difference between the overall responses of the participating 
voluntary organisations in terms of their diverse characteristics were far more than cases of 
marginal variation. 
For the purpose of cross-tabulation, the responses of the participating voluntary 
organisations were coded with the following set of values - 1 for equivocal-positive, 0 for 
indifferent and -1 for equivocal-negative (see Appendix 4, Table 2). I and -1 included 
lesser values (0.1, -0.2) signifying equivocal-positive and equivocal-negative responses 
respectively (see Appendix 4, Table 3). -9 was the value permitted by SPSS to be assigned 
to the unanswered questions (see Appendix 4, Table 2). 
Thirty-one people had been interviewed individually from the middle of July 1999 to the 
end of December 1999 - one manager each from 28 voluntary organisations in the 
Otago/Southland region, and the three outreach workers operating in the same area - all 
selected on the basis of their expertise and experience (see Appendix 5). Every manager 
had worked for three years or more at senior management level in his/her respective 
concern, was directly involved in the negotiation of contracts, and could therefore speak 
with authenticity on the relationship with the Community Funding Agency. Serving as a 
via media between the government and the third sector for quite a while, the outreach 
workers had acquired thorough knowledge in purchase of service contracting in the national 
context. 
The interviews were based on twelve open-ended questions read from a pre-designed 
interview guide (see Appendix 2). Semi-structured and one-to-one, the interviews were 
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recorded by means of a tape recorder. The interviews were found to be interesting and 
thought-provoking at the time of transcription. While speaking of their own experiences 
and perceptions during the interviews, the participants stated that their observations were 
reflective of the viewpoints of the agencies they represented. Based on an assessment of 
the returned questionnaires, an almost equal number of the participating voluntary 
organisations with similar attitude (partly supportive, indifferent and partially critical) 
towards the role of the Community Funding Agency vis-a-vis purchase of service 
contracting were selected for the purpose of the interview. 
The responses to the questionnaire whose numerical values were averaged to generate and 
measure the overall impression of all of the fifty-seven participating voluntary 
organisations characterised by six specific traits, and compare the reactions of each other in 
relation to purchase of service contracting as a whole and every single objective to be 
achieved, constituted the quantitative data which proved to be extremely helpful in 
exploring the efficacy of purchase of service contracting as an effective policy instrument. 
Those who participated in the interviews were encouraged to give expression to their views, 
thoughts, and intentions. The strategy adopted to analyse the interviews after receiving and 
organising the qualitative data collected therefrom was 'cross-case analysis', meaning that 
the answers from the respondents to the diverse questions were grouped together and 
interpreted by the researcher using his methodological skills and analytical capabilities. 
The interviews - non-manipulative, unobtrusive, and non-controlling - complemented 
the questionnaire in the sense that while focused on the same set of objectives, they were 
capable of evoking more revealing responses and producing a greater mass of relevant 
information. 
The study was strengthened through the triangulation of the quantitative and qualitative 
data which were obtained by means of the questionnaire and the interviews respectively and 
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interpreted and assessed with the aim of identifying the emerging patterns and underlying 
themes and presenting comprehensive and in-depth information. The data were compared 
and contrasted to get a more detailed and closer view of the perspectives of the respondents. 
The conclusions arrived at via a rigorous and critical analysis of the data were verified by 
cross-validating the findings with 'written documents' like letters and e-mails from the 
participating service agencies, government reports on state policies pertaining to purchase 
of service contracting, and existing literature, specifically to overcome the limitations posed 
by qualitative (and hence subjective) portrayals of real-world situations, namely, lack of 
precision, reliability, and credibility. 
Of the fifty-seven participating voluntary organisations, seven (or 12.2 per cent) represented 
non-Pakeha communities (Maori-S, Samoan-!, and Cambodian-!) (see Table 7.2 above). 
The researcher tried to learn about the sociocultural structures and belief patterns of non-
Pakeha communities. He encountered no dilemma whatsoever in interacting with non-
Pakeha communities - all of them demonstrating a high degree of enthusiasm in 
participating in the interviews. He, however, found that each of the non-Pakeha 
communities had its own values that differed from those of others. 
The staff members of the Community Funding Agency in Wellington refused to respond to 
the questionnaire sent to them, or to be interviewed. Most of them said (or wrote) that they 
had no time to be involved because of the pressure of work consequent upon restructuring. 
The rest preferred not to make any comment. This could have been seen as factor limiting 
the research, but it was possible to collect adequate information in relation to the impact of 
purchase of service contracting on the government through informal discussion (not semi-
structured interviews) with eight people- formerly working with the Community Funding 
Agency at senior management level. Each of them was contacted by telephone, and 
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detailed notes of the telephone conversations were made. In addition. a lengthy letter was 
received from one of them. 
A number of clients were approached to participate in the project. but for various reasons it 
was not possible to include them in the research. Most of the clients appeared to be either 
unconcerned, or ignorant, or reclusive. To a majority of clients, it did not really matter who 
delivered, so long as they continued to receive the services. A large number of clients (not 
just the intellectually disabled) did not have a clue what the Community Funding Agency 
was all about. Some clients were reluctant to speak out for reasons of their own. Only a 
handful of non-Pakeha clients articulated in categorical terms that they were in favour of 
the local service agencies which developed 'locally-based and culturally relevant' 
programmes. 
The research was conducted in conformity with the ethical standards outlined by the 
University of Otago Ethics Committee. Anonymity of the participants was protected by all 
means (the respondents were, however, given the option to be identified in the text). Every 
bit of information was treated as strictly confidential. 
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Part II 
A Critical Study of the Perceptions of the Respondents in the 
Otago/Southland Region 
Chapter 8 
Purchase of Service Contracting and the Voluntary Organisations in 
Otago/Southland - Benefits and Costs 
This chapter analyses the success and failure of purchase of service contracting in enabling 
the voluntary organisations in the Otago/Southland region to attain the objectives discussed 
in Chapter 3. Also, it reviews the relationship between the characteristics of these 
voluntary organisations and their views on the role of contracting out in social welfare in 
helping the Community Funding Agency attain its goals. The information is collected from 
the responses of fifty-seven voluntary organisations to the postal questionnaire, and the 
semi-structured, one-to-one interviews with twenty-eight managers (one from each service 
agency) and the three outreach workers operating in the area referred to at the time of 
writing. 
Introduction 
The fifty-seven participating voluntary organisations in the Otago/Southland region came 
up with interesting observations in relation to the role of purchase of service contracting in 
enabling them to attain their objectives. The responses of the supportive voluntary 
organisations for, and the critical service agencies against, purchase of service contracting 
in reply to the relevant questions in the questionnaire and the interview guide, together with 
the opinions expressed by the outreach workers, have been discussed below at length, and 
the researcher endeavours to undertake an independent analysis of these views and 
perceptions in the concluding part. Some of the basic facts to be mentioned at the outset 
are: 
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- the voluntary organisations responding to the questionnaire, and the managers and the 
outreach workers interviewed were either partly supportive or partially critical of purchase 
of service contracting; 
- of the fifty-seven voluntary organisations responding to the questionnaire, forty-two or 
73.7 per cent were partly supportive of purchase of service contracting, and thirteen or 22.8 
per cent including all seven non-Pakeha respondents partially critical (see Appendix 4, 
Table 1); 
-of the twenty-eight managers interviewed, twenty or 71.5 per cent were partly supportive 
of purchase of service contracting, and eight or 28.6 per cent including all three non-Pakeha 
'coordinators' partially critical (see Appendix 5); 
- of the three outreach workers interviewed, two were partly supportive of purchase of 
service contracting, and one partially critical (see Appendix 5); and 
- the responses of the fifty-seven voluntary organisations with regard to the ten objectives 
sought to be achieved through purchase of service contracting were found to vary across 
their six characteristics or traits, namely, level, area, age, size, funding, and client group 
which suggested that the service agencies were either affiliated or local, urban or rural, old 
or new, large or small, in receipt of average, or above average, or below average funding, 
and in the service of Pakeha, or Maori, or mixed client groups (see Appendix 6). 
The statements given in italics in the text here (as in the following chapters) are comments 
from the participants in response to the questionnaire or the interviews. 
Achieving genuine partnership 
The supportive voluntary organisations believed that the Community Funding Agency 
contributed to the generation of a genuine partnership, resting on mutual trust and respect, 
between the purchaser and the producers. They were satisfied with the level of consultation 
with the Community Funding Agency regarding identification and assessment of 
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community needs, determination of contractual conditions, and planning and provision of 
services. They felt a kind of personal involvement in the decision-making process, with the 
Community Funding Agency always available for discussion to resolve problems. They 
were happy about sharing information with the Community Funding Agency. They 
conceived that the Community Funding Agency which, among other things, allowed them 
to challenge funding decisions, would never tamper with their independence. They were 
appreciative of the recruitment of outreach workers as a sincere effort on the part of the 
Community Funding Agency to develop good working relations with the providers. 
"Our relationship with CFA was, in a word, excellent . They had absolute 
faith in us". 
"We thought there was no need for greater reciprocity. CFA did believe in 
equality". 
"We refused to lose our identity. CFA had no problem with that". 
"In the previous years, our suggestions for administering the contract were 
rejected by CF A. Eventually in 1998 they came back to us with a proposal to 
set it up basically as we had originally wanted, finding their way too 
complicated". 
"We were happy with our outreach worker. Our main point of contact with 
CF A, she was well-meaning, reliable, supportive, and friendly - contributing 
a lot to the development of a lasting relationship". 
On the other hand, the critical voluntary organisations asserted that the contract system was 
based on unbalanced relations of power, rather than a sense of genuine partnership 
characterised by mutual trust and respect. They did not enjoy the same level of authority -
there was little negotiation concerning the services to be purchased, the terms and 
conditions, and the amount of funding, and rarely any consultation on pre-decided 
contractual issues, such as the basis for the prioritisation and evaluation of the requirements 
of clients and their communities, or the pattern of service provision. More often than not, 
they felt excluded because involvement in decision-making was far from possible. They 
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were annoyed with the Community Funding Agency as it was ignorant and disrespectful of 
their activities and uninterested in sharing any information on policies and procedures, the 
outcomes of meetings, or the reasons behind the shifts in the allocation of resources. They 
lamented over the absence of mutuality: challenging the funding decisions of the purchaser, 
or questioning its commitment to community consultations, or criticising its unwillingness 
to adopt a collaborative approach and reach an agreement on key issues was indeed beyond 
their capacity. The non-Pakeha service agencies gave vent to their despair as well, 
regretting that the outreach worker, if a Pakeha, knew almost nothing about their needs, 
interests, and values, used plenty of unintelligible jargon, and did not appear to be too 
willing to develop a close and personal relationship with them. 
"CFA seemed to be suffering from what may be called 'consultation fatigue'. 
It seldom allowed sufficient time for discussion or negotiation. This kind of an 
attitude worsened the inequality already existing between them and us". 
"We had no scope for a meaningful and clear dialogue with CFA for the 
identification of community needs, settlement of funding problems, and provision 
of quality services. It was as if we were left out of the loop". 
"We received information from Wellington only on what was expected of us. 
CFA was not interested in the least in what we had to say. We could not 
expect any kind of partnership in a situation where reciprocity and good faith 
did not exist and the goals were not shared". 
"Due to lack of faith, committnent, and cooperation on the part of CFA which 
did not have a good understanding of our objectives as well, we never felt 
safe and were always suspicious of a culture of contempt prevailing all over. 
We found the whole system too restrictive and far from responsive to our 
priorities, rights, and interests, but were unable to criticise it out of the fear of 
'biting the hand that feeds'. We were considered to be second rate, and much 
to our frustration seldom consulted in the needs analysis process . We were 
not free to develop our own policies and programmes. We were distanced 
from the government decision-makers, had no authority whatsoever to influence 
funding cycles or contract terms to our advantage, and could do nothing to 
remedy the power imbalance implicit in the contracting model". 
"In general, the outreach workers were not prompt in replying to messages or 
returning calls. They were frequently absent through sickness, family 
commitments, and leave. As they were often not available for face- to- face 
meetings, there was need for more contact with the head office in Wellington. 
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Whatever 'message' they were able to pass on was always in general terms, 
and therefore of little use. Also, they were unable to have access to some 
information held higher up. Those who were Pakeha had a very limited 
understanding of our working methods, the dynamics of our organisation, our 
requirements, and the policies and programmes attuned to our needs. And they 
were far from eager to get closer to us". 
Secondly, the contracting process, one-sided and dictatorial, resulted in micro-management 
and excessive control. The Community Funding Agency laid down rigid contractual 
specifications, determining and prioritising what services had to be delivered, for whom and 
how, while remaining silent about its own responsibilities. Failure to abide by the 
directives might lead to cancellation of funding. The inflexible 'take it or leave it' approach 
reduced the voluntary organisations, especially those which were small and new, into de 
facto agents of the purchaser - with their independence curtailed and mission 
compromised. The specific funding requirements forced the service agencies to be more 
business-like and concerned only with the production and delivery of a wide range of cost-
effective outputs. 
"It was a top- down rather than a bottom-up approach - very unequal and 
far from democratic. In fact , what we had was an oligarchy. We did 
whatever CFA, who held all the cards, wanted us to do. Otherwise, we 
wouldn't get the money. It is not without reason that we never claimed 
independence or recognition for our wider role in society. Obviously, we 
suffered a huge loss of morale.". 
"CFA often lost sight of the whole service by narrowly specifying the terms 
and conditions. However, we had to stay focused on meeting the needs 
identified by the 'boss'- ignoring the requirements of our particular clients. 
Contracts were given as 'here it is', without much mutual consultation". 
"Not that we could not negotiate with CFA regarding funding. We could and 
did, but the directions from Wellington never changed". 
"There was no reciprocity in the master/servant relationship. CF A had the 
funds, wielded the power, and made us work according to its specifications. 
While wanting us to look and act like commercial entities, it seldom treated 
us in a professional manner. Besides, what it provided was never sufficient to 
meet the costs involved in recruiting people, imparting training, streamlining 
services, developing standards, monitoring performance, and managing risks. I 
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believe it never wished to have a level playing field but wanted us to remain 
heavily dependent on government funding for ever". 
"The bigger and stronger agencies, particularly those at the national level, 
were able to deliberate with CFA on equal terms. We the smaller providers 
could not". 
In the opinion of two outreach workers, the Community Funding Agency did, in fact, 
discuss the terms and conditions of the contract with the voluntary organisations during the 
Services Planning Process. The lack of negotiation, however, was inevitable, given the 
financial restrictions under which the purchaser had to operate. 
"CFA had the intention, but there was little room to move. Its limited funding 
resources impacted upon the extent to which the level of funding for the 
agencies could be negotiated". 
However, one outreach worker maintained that while the resources of the Community 
Funding Agency were limited, it used to ascribe greater importance to the technical, as 
opposed to the social, aspects of the contract system. The increasing focus of the purchaser 
on the productive efficiency of the voluntary organisations weakened the human element 
involved in service provision. 
"The replacement of idealistic coordinators by hardcore professionals in 
conformity with the efforts of the providers to look more 'business-like' was 
against the values upheld by the third sector". 
In respect of 'achieving equal partnership', the responses of the supportive and critical 
voluntary organisations were found to vary substantially across three of their characteristics 
or traits, namely, level, funding, and client group. Seventy per cent of the affiliated 
voluntary organisations were partially critical compared to less than 60 per cent of the local 
service agencies (Table I, Appendix 6). Over one-fifth of the voluntary organisations on 
above average funding were partly supportive compared to less than 10 per cent of the 
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service agencies on below average funding (Table 5, Appendix 6). Finally, nearly three-
quarters of the non-Pakeha voluntary organisations were partially critical compared to less 
than 60 per cent of the mixed service agencies (Table 6, Appendix 6). 
"We were happy with our relationship with CF A which had complete faith in 
us". 
(A local, mixed voluntary organisation 
in response to Q3 in the Questionnaire) 
"CFA rarely consulted with us regarding the identification of our own needs. 
We were hardly encouraged to develop our own policies and programmes". 
Increasing quantity 
(An affiliated, non-Pakeha voluntary 
organisation in reply to Ql in the 
Questionnaire) 
The supportive voluntary organisations were of the view that Services Planning and 
National Needs Indicator Index helped them focus on the particular needs of their clients 
and match those requirements with the priorities of the government They were able to plan 
in advance for the continuation of existing services, multiplication of outputs, and delivery 
of new programmes without laying their workers off, decreasing spending on administrative 
support and maintenance or replacement of assets, incurring debt, or inflating price, since 
funding from the Community Funding Agency was timely, stable, and adequate, and 
mobilising alternative sources posed no problem whatsoever, They were in possession of 
the manpower needed to discharge their contractual obligations. They were able to pay 
their staff reasonable wages (close to market rates) and provide acceptable working 
conditions, arrange for the training and professional development of all employees, and take 
care of the difficulties of every single consumer. 
"The Services Planning Process and the National Needs Indicator Index 
allowed for the needs to be identified. Our expertise was made use of by CF A 
whenever necessary". 
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"The funding was sufficient for us, though we did look for other sources such 
as HFA, COGS, CYPFS, and NZQA. It was on very rare occasions that CFA 
reduced funding, say, after identifying a significant decrease in the need for a 
particular programme. It was prepared to provide full, even additional funding 
in the event of a genuine growth in the demand for an absolutely essential 
service. Besides, it was extremely particular about making payments on time. 
Sometimes, of course, it was late, but the delay could be attributed to waiting 
for money to come through from Treasury. It wanted us not only to survive 
but succeed". 
"Nothing can be further from the truth that our internally generated resources 
were sucked into subsidising the narrowly determined government priorities. 
Because, in the first place, CFA funding was sufficient, and secondly, it either 
increased or remained the same, but never decreased". 
"We did not have to look for assistance from CFA to up grade the 
professional skills of our staff The help received from our commercial 
sponsors was often enough". 
On the other hand, the critical voluntary organisations argued that the Services Planning 
Process did not take their experience in community work into account or pay heed to the 
information supplied by them on social needs, provide a clear, value-free rationale for the 
funding decisions, link itself with the budget cycle, and seemed, on the whole, to be nothing 
more than a means to justify the distribution of the scarce resources of the Community 
Funding Agency. They considered the National Needs Indicator Index to be confusing -
producing results far from replicable with available data, containing superfluous indicators, 
failing to provide reasonable explanations for the weightings used, and appearing to be a 
mere tool to secure funding, rather than a mechanism capable of identifying the extent of 
the requirements of clients and their communities or quantifying the adequacy of available 
resources with accuracy. They had substantial cash-flow problems because of delay or 
disruption in payments, brevity of the contractual term, and insufficiency of funding 
covering just a small percentage of their total expenses. In their effort to seek top-up 
funding from other sources, they found the task complicated, time consuming, and entailing 
unhealthy competition. With the future of funding hanging in balance, they could not plan 
ahead with confidence, focus on long-term objectives, embark upon fresh projects, take 
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risks, deliver essential services despite high demand, recruit staff and pay them at 
commercial rates, reimburse the expenses of volunteers, invest in training and research, 
spend on administrative support, and replace and/or maintain their capital assets. Also, they 
were forced to provide more outputs with a diminished resource base, place consumers on 
the waiting list, work harder to meet the growing expectations of customers, incur debt, and 
lay aside some of their financial commitments. They were critical of the purchaser for its 
reluctance to have any concern for their establishment, administrative, and overhead costs 
which kept on rising with the overall expansion of organisational activities. They were 
frustrated about going on applying for financial assistance without any certainty for their 
money to come in: besides, approval took months to materialise. Not having sufficient time 
between the expiry of their previous contract and the beginning of the subsequent 
agreement, they were often at sea in coping with significant variations under the new 
circumstances. The non-Pakeha service agencies were not happy with what they received, 
had few philanthropic trusts to bank upon, and lacked the resources necessary for 
professional development. 
"The contracting procedure could seldom be completed within the target date 
( 30 July) because of the failure of the Services Planning Process to forge a 
link between planning and budget cycles. The National Needs Indicator Index 
rarely succeeded in quantifying the extent of community needs, as a result of 
which funding was almost always wrongly allocated. We were not allowed to 
be involved in the real sense in service development and needs analysis ". 
"In spite of being de facto implementers of state policy, we did not have any 
financial security, because CF A funded just twenty to twenty-five per cent of 
the total expenses on average. We had to deliver a service in its entirety even 
if it was part-funded. With little ability to pay off debts coupled with low 
levels of reserves at our disposal, we were exposed to all kinds of fiscal risks 
including insolvency, and found it exceedingly difficult to survive. We could 
not help doing away with some of our services, retrenching key staff, cutting 
back on skill development, and paying all employees about 15% below market 
rates. We used to spend a lot of our time chasing around for alternative 
resources by means of which the gap between government funding and the 
actual cost of providing an output could be bridged, but often failed to find 
them. We had a constant feeling of insecurity , because while July 1 was the 
beginning of the financial year, nothing could be known about the grant until 
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October, and the contract was signed in November. There was not a chance 
to get a cent if we had cash in reserve, although in theory it was not 
necessary to carry it over until the money come through. However, even in 
the case of a roll-over which, incidentally, prevented us from negotiating 
better contract terms, what we got was only increased service levels for the 
same funding: so, there was no positive change in circumstances". 
"CPA funding was insufficient and uncertain, and tapping other resources on 
an ongoing basis impossible for us. P or all practical purposes, we had to 
bear a huge cost - having to subsidise the contracts by at least sixty to 
seventy-five per cent". 
"During re-negotiation, we did not have enough time to plan for changes in 
services to accommodate the alterations in funding. Besides, how could all 
problems be solved in a year? CPA's short-term focus proved its lack of 
committnent to achieve long-run positive development of service producers 
beyond all reasonable doubt". 
According to two outreach workers, the claw-back clause in the contract was quite 
justifiable. If a voluntary organisation did not deliver the services it had promised to 
render, the Community Funding Agency could definitely ask for the money to be paid back. 
"If the services contracted for were undelivered, I do not see why the clause 
could not be used". 
However, one outreach worker contended that the claw-back clause was harsh and unfair. 
It permitted the Community Funding Agency to demand return of funds from the voluntary 
organisations which had met, say, ninety per cent of their targets while receiving only ten 
per cent of the total cost of service provision. 
"Repayment was justifiable only in the event of non-performance ". 
In relation to 'increasing quantity', the responses of the supportive and critical voluntary 
organisations were found to vary significantly across five of their characteristics or traits, 
namely, area, age, size, funding, and client group. Over 75 per cent of the urban voluntary 
organisations were partly supportive compared to 65 per cent of the rural service agencies 
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(Table 8, Appendix 6). Over one-third of the new voluntary organisations were partially 
critical compared to 19 per cent of the old service agencies (Table 9, Appendix 6). Over 83 
per cent of the large voluntary organisations were partly supportive compared to less than 
69 per cent of the small service agencies (Table 10, Appendix 6). Over one-third of the 
voluntary organisations on above average funding were partially critical compared to less 
than 12 per cent of the service agencies on average funding (Table II, Appendix 6). 
Finally, over 75 per cent of the Pakeha voluntary organisations were partly supportive 
compared to less than 60 per cent of the mixed service agencies (Table 12, Appendix 6). 
"What CFA provided was sufficient for us. Further, the finder almost never 
paid late. 
(A large, Pakeha voluntary organisation in 
response to Q 13 in the Questionnaire) 
"We were often at sea as funding from CFA inadequate and tapping other 
sources difficult, while demand for services went on increasing. 
Improving quality 
(A small non-Pakeha organisation in reply to 
Q 1 in the Questionnaire) 
The supportive voluntary organisations believed that the Community Funding Agency 
encouraged them to assign top priority to client needs and continue to provide a wide range 
of quality services for their consumers. It inspired them to improve the quality of their 
programmes notwithstanding the constraints (inadequate funding, staff shortage, changing 
rules). It stimulated them to enhance their overall performance in planning, producing, and 
providing quality outputs. 
"CFA encouraged us to adopt measures like greater emphasis on staff 
trazmng and programme development, so we could improve the quality of our 
services and raise the level of our overall performance ". 
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On the other hand, the critical voluntary organisations asserted that it was not possible for 
them to deliver high quality social services. They were not provided by the Community 
Funding Agency with adequate resources required for the production of high quality social 
services. The non-Pakeha service agencies felt the same way, believing that the purchaser 
unrealistically expected them to render high quality social services without bothering how 
they could. 
"Part-funding was a constant source of tension for us. Although CFA wanted 
quality services for the vulnerable, it was always reluctant to provide the 
funding needed for the purpose. Developing evaluation systems for the 
measurement of standard was impossible due to lack of funding. Outcome-
based funding was a like hoping for the moon". 
Secondly, it was not possible for the voluntary organisations to measure, m terms of 
contract specifications, the quality of the services provided by them, or assess their own 
accomplishment against the standards agreed upon. Neither the providers nor the 
Community Funding Agency had yet been able to design a comprehensive quality-based 
measurement system, or devise effective performance evaluation mechanisms. A 
conventional contractual model seemed to be appropriate for quantifiable outputs rather 
than hard-to-measure outcomes. 
"Performance indicators were not sufficiently developed. So, no wonder service 
standard was measured in terms of statistics, for instance, the number of clients 
served or hours spent delivering a service. Customer satisfaction surveys could 
not say much about the level of client satisfaction". 
In the opinion of two outreach workers, the Community Funding Agency encouraged the 
voluntary organisations to generate positive outcomes for clients and their communities. It 
inspired them to demonstrate the salutary effects of their services on society. 
"Agencies were urged by CFA to display the beneficial impact of their 
services. For instance, it wanted those operating in the disabilities sector to 
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show how many people with physical or intellectual handicaps were helped by 
them to be able take some control over their own lives". 
However, one outreach worker maintained that the Community Funding Agency seldom 
specified outcomes in the contract. In fact, it was far from easy to define intangible 
outcomes. Sometimes, outcomes were expressed in the agreement all right but too vaguely 
for the voluntary organisations to see the big picture. 
"The providers did not often know what the outcomes were and where their 
activities fitted in the larger scheme of things ". 
With regard to 'improving quality', the responses of the supportive and critical voluntary 
organisations were found to vary substantially across all their six characteristics or traits, 
namely, level, area, age, size, funding, and client group. Over 44 per cent of the local 
voluntary organisations were partly supportive compared to less than 37 per cent of the 
affiliated service agencies (Table 13, Appendix 6). Over two-fifth of the urban voluntary 
organisations were partially critical compared to 30 per cent of the rural service agencies 
(Table 14, Appendix 6). Over 53 per cent of the new voluntary organisations were partly 
supportive compared to less than 36 per cent of the old service agencies (Table 15, 
Appendix 6). Half of the large voluntary organisations were partly supportive compared to 
less than 35 per cent of the small service agencies (Table 16, Appendix 6). Over 55 per 
cent of the voluntary organisations on above average funding were partially critical 
compared to less than 36 per cent of the service agencies on average funding (Table 17, 
Appendix 6). Finally, over three-quarters of the Pakeha voluntary organisations were partly 
supportive compared to less than 60 per cent of the mixed service agencies (Table 18, 
Appendix 6). 
"CF A helped us to improve upon the quality of the services we were 
supposed to deliver to our customers". 
(A large, Pakeha voluntary organisation in 
response to Q49 in the Questionnaire) 
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"CFA always wanted us to enhance the quality of our services, but we were 
never provided with enough resources. For example, we received 40, 
sometimes 60, but never 100 per cent. We had to scramble around and get 
money from the lotteries to get the job going". 
Reducing cost 
(A small, mixed voluntary organisation m 
reply to Q49 in the Questionnaire) 
The supportive voluntary organisations were of the v1ew that purchase of service 
contracting had considerable ideological appeal which, in tum, contributed to a continuous 
and increasing flow of volunteer support. In addition, community grants and private 
donations enabled them to purchase or upgrade the equipment capable of producing more 
services for less. 
"We had idealistic volunteers who were more than willing to work virtually 
for nothing. Besides, grants from COGS, the District Council and the Police 
Guild, donations and bequests undoubtedly helped us produce services on the 
cheap". 
On the other hand, the critical voluntary organisations argued that the level of volunteer 
support was far from high, and community grants and private donations were rarely enough 
to help them lower the production cost, or add to the quantity, or improve the quality of 
their services. The non-Pakeha service agencies found the communities, within which they 
operated, much less concerned about the needs of the vulnerable than ever before. 
"Nobody was interested in wasting her time working as an unpaid volunteer. 
Community grants were too insignificant to enable us to become cost-effective 
providers of services . No assistance could be expected from communities with 
meagre financial capabilities or little emotional attachment to the values of the 
sector we represented". 
Secondly, while the Community Funding Agency did arrange for multi-year contracting, 
only a few voluntary organisations with excellent track record were selected to receive 
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funding for a longer term. Further, multi-year contracting could do nothing to minimise the 
costs associated with the increase in bureaucracy and growth in supervision and reporting. 
"Multi-year contracting was not good enough to help us tackle the problem of 
rising compliance costs and accumulate substantial savings". 
According to two outreach workers, the voluntary organisations did not have to depend 
solely on the funding provided by the Community Funding Agency. They used to tap 
alternative resources like financial assistance from other ministries, corporate sponsors and 
philanthropic trusts, tax exemptions, cash contributions, and service charges which helped 
them produce services at cheaper rates. 
"The providers made continuous efforts to source additional jitnding from 
bodies other than CFA in a bid to establish their reputation as cost-effective 
producers of services. More often than not they were successjitl in their 
ventures''. 
However, one outreach worker contended that accessing sources other than the Community 
Funding Agency - particularly on an ongoing basis - was not easy at all. Every 
voluntary organisation in the area competed for funds; the funding requirements of the 
government departments were often rigid; and several funders had a policy of refusing to 
finance service agencies supported by the state. 
"The agencies, even when under-resourced and survzvzng on a 'shoe string', 
were cheaper out of their unwavering commitment to their poor and needy 
clients and not because of their ability to tap additional jitnding on a regular 
basis". 
In respect of 'reducing cost', the responses of the critical voluntary organisations were 
found to vary significantly across all their characteristics or traits. Over 60 per cent of the 
local voluntary organisations were partially critical compared to less than 27 per cent of the 
affiliated service agencies (Table 19, Appendix 6). Nearly three-fifth of the rural voluntary 
organisations were partially critical compared to less than 36 per cent of the urban service 
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agencies (Table 20, Appendix 6). Over 64 per cent of the new voluntary organisations were 
partially critical compared to less than 36 per cent of the old service agencies (Table 21, 
Appendix 6). Over half of the small voluntary organisations were partially critical 
compared to less than 28 per cent of the large service agencies (Table 22, Appendix 6). 
Over 44 per cent of the voluntary organisations on below average funding were partially 
critical compared to less than 30 per cent of the service agencies on average funding (Table 
23, Appendix 6). Finally, nearly three-quarters of the mixed voluntary organisations were 
partially critical compared to less than 35 per cent of the Pakeha service agencies (Table 24, 
Appendix 6). 





old, Pakeha voluntary 
response to Q54 in the 
"We could not produce cost-effective services because of inadequate funding 
from CFA, insufficient community grants, and most important, decreasing 
volunteer support'. 
Responding to changes 
(A rural, new, mixed voluntary organisation 
in reply to Q24 in the Questionnaire) 
The supportive voluntary organisations believed that the Community Funding Agency 
allowed them to develop a variety of new services and additional programmes for their 
clients. Freedom of action made it easier for them to cater to the changing priorities and 
increasing needs of their customers. 
"Thanks to CF A, we could develop a wide range of services not provided 
earlier- stripped as they were of regulatory nonsense. Those of our clients 
whose needs we failed to meet used to be referred to other agencies ". 
On the other hand, the critical voluntary organisations asserted that the reluctance of the 
Community Funding Agency to arrange for sufficient funding, let alone supplementary 
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On the other hand, the critical voluntary organisations asserted that the reluctance of the 
Community Funding Agency to arrange for sufficient funding, let alone supplementary 
reimbursement, incapacitated them to tailor their services to new situations and changing 
circumstances. The non-Pakeha service agencies were worse off - struggling to make 
ends meet. 
"Out of our conviction that a high priority had to be accorded to client needs, 
we used to provide flexible services even at a personal cost. For example, we 
had to make staff work for hours on end every week. We had to ignore the 
monetary value of their contribution. We had to suffer from what could be 
interpreted as the exploitation of the over-worked, under-resourced, and 
devalued voluntary sector by the government". 
Secondly, whereas most of the volunteers displayed a high degree of commitment and 
enthusiasm in their work, and the value of the long hours spent by them in stressful 
situations was no less than funding from all sources taken together including the 
Community Funding Agency, these committed and energetic individuals were, more often 
than not, exploited beyond measure. In most cases, the voluntary organisations could not 
afford to pay them or arrange for their training because of resource constraints. 
"Our volunteers faced stress, burnout, and depression from the demand of 
increasing workloads and the burden of constant fundraising. Secondly, while 
they needed greater skills to tackle complex client problems, we did not have 
adequate resources to train and supervise them". 
In the opinion of two outreach workers, the Community Funding Agency patronised the 
development of innovative programmes to meet the growing demand of clients for 
specialised services. Hence, it permitted the voluntary organisations to experiment with 
their outputs and patterns of service provision. 
"CFA wanted the providers to spark new zmtzatzves while attempting to deliver 
innovative services . No wonder it encouraged optimum utilisation of their 
creative capacity ". 
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However, one outreach worker maintained that the compliant outlook of the voluntary 
organisations, developed as a result of acting in strict conformity with the contract 
specifications set forth by the Community Funding Agency, virtually made them listless and 
inactive. They had no interest in, or energy for, experimentations, and refrained from 
evolving innovative programmes and providing specialised services for their clients who, in 
turn, were left with reduced choice. 
"Rigid contract specifications demanding uniformity affected the ability of the 
agencies to render particularistic services characterised by their personal 
touch". 
In relation to 'responding to changes', the responses of the supportive and critical voluntary 
organisations were found to vary substantially across four of their characteristics or traits, 
namely, age, size, funding, and client group. Over 53 per cent of the new voluntary 
organisations were partially critical compared to less than 30 per cent of the old service 
agencies (Table 27, Appendix 6). Over three-fifth of the large voluntary organisations were 
partly supportive compared to less than 48 per cent of the small service agencies (Table 28, 
Appendix 6). Over 64 per cent of the voluntary organisations on average funding were 
partly supportive compared to less than 45 per cent of the service agencies on above 
average funding (Table 29, Appendix 6). Finally, half of the mixed voluntary organisations 
were partially critical compared to less than 29 per cent of the non-Pakeha service agencies 
(Table 30, Appendix 6). 
"Adequate funding from CF A and freedom of action made it easier for us to 
produce new and innovative services for our consumers". 
(An old, large voluntary organisation in 
response to Q53 in the Questionnaire) 
"The reluctance of CFA to provide for sufficient funding, in addition to 
excessive regulation incapacitated us to cater to the changing priorities and 
increasing needs of our customers". 
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Ensuring accountability 
(A new, small voluntary organisation in 
reply to Q61 in the Questionnaire) 
The supportive voluntary organisations were of the view that the reporting requirements of 
the Community Funding Agency enabled them to stay focused on the needs of clients and 
enhance the quality of the services produced as well as the standard of overall performance. 
Collecting data, keeping records, and reporting to the Community Funding Agency did not 
need a huge amount of money. As a matter of fact, the Community Funding Agency 
simplified its system of reporting, and made it more cost-effective and convenient. 
"We were more responsible than ever before, with the reporting requirements 
in place. CFA used to provide us with the MES software free of charge. 
Documents like KOPPS and HROS helped us feel that we were professional, 
accountable, and transparent. Also, they saved huge costs particularly for 
smaller agencies like us". 
On the other hand, the critical voluntary organisations argued that they had to respond to the 
rapidly increasing and constantly changing application and reporting requirements, 
notwithstanding enormous client workload and inadequate funding. As a consequence, they 
had to spend more time, energy, and money in accumulating and processing information 
(excessive and irrelevant for the most part), rather than measuring and improving service 
quality and performance standard. They were not provided with additional funding to cover 
the costs involved in sending reports to the Community Funding Agency, and therefore had 
to divert substantial resources from direct service delivery to extra paperwork. They had to 
apply to a number of other funding sources and bear considerable administrative and 
financial burden in the process. The non-Pakeha service agencies neither had the means 
(finance, manpower, sophisticated information systems) to meet the need to report at 
regular intervals nor received any extra cash for, or training in, data collection, record 
keeping, and information management. 
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"We had to invest significant capital in expensive and sophisticated computer 
systems to generate information for reporting - reducing our cash reserves 
and making ourselves more vulnerable in an uncertain environment. We used 
to spend a lot of time doing administrative work rather than helping clients 
and meeting their needs. The compliance costs required to fight the 'paper 
war', that is, accommodate time-consuming funding application processes, and 
complex reporting requirements often exceeded the funding we received. 
Besides, the rules kept changing all the time, and so we lagged behind. We 
were accountable to other providers as well, although some of them happened 
to be more liberal than CFA with regard to funding, reporting, and 
monitoring. Needless to say, we found the pressures of accountability onerous 
and even frightening". 
Secondly, the performance reports sent by the voluntary organisations were often 
overlooked by the Community Funding Agency. Thus, a service agency seldom received 
any feedback from the purchaser or had a chance to compare its achievement with that of 
another contractor operating in the same or a similar area. Besides, the producers were 
never told how the information collected from them was going to be used. 
"We had no idea what CFA would be doing with the information received from 
" us . 
Thirdly, the Community Funding Agency sought to control the internal affairs of the 
voluntary organisations, wanted them to report on whatever they did, and demanded 
absolute compliance while funding only a part of the total cost of service provision. On the 
other hand, it was impossible for the producers to hold the purchaser accountable for, say, 
its failure to meet timelines or targets. 
"While we were accountable to CFA, the 'boss' could not be held it 
responsible for whatever it did. The one-way process was indeed unjust and 
unfair. It created emotional anguish, damaged morale, fostered fear, eroded 
trust, and caused intrigue and divisiveness". 
According to two outreach workers, the accreditation system introduced by the Community 
Funding Agency emphasised a high minimum standard that encouraged excellence in 
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service delivery on the part of the voluntary organisations. While the approval process was 
stringent, it served as a credential of a supplier's worth which other funders could rely on. 
"The approval process wanted optimal or 'best practice' standards to be 
adhered to by the providers". 
However, one outreach worker contended that the Community Funding Agency could not 
afford to fund the prohibitive costs of the manifold tests that were to be taken by the 
voluntary organisations to meet the accreditation standard. Besides, the approval process 
was unable to involve clients and peers. 
"The approval process was expensive and time consuming, and participation of 
other agencies or customers far from possible". 
With regard to 'ensuring accountability', the responses of the supportive and critical 
voluntary organisations were found to vary significantly across all their characteristics or 
traits. Over 73 per cent of the affiliated voluntary organisations were partly supportive 
compared to less than 60 per cent of the local service agencies (Table 31, Appendix 6). 
Thirty-five per cent of the rural voluntary organisations were partially critical compared to 
less than 17 per cent of the urban service agencies (Table 32, Appendix 6). Over 70 per 
cent of the old voluntary organisations were partly supportive compared to less than 54 per 
cent of the new service agencies (Table 33, Appendix 6). Over four-fifth of the large 
voluntary organisations were partly supportive compared to less than 58 per cent of the 
small service agencies (Table 34, Appendix 6). Over 45 per cent of the voluntary 
organisations on below average funding were partially critical compared to less than 17 per 
cent of the service agencies on above average funding (Table 35, Appendix 6). Finally, 
nearly three-quarters of the non-Pakeha voluntary organisations were partially critical 
compared to less than 17 per cent of the mixed service agencies (Table 36, Appendix 6). 
"The accountability requirements of CFA enabled us to stay focused on the 
needs of our customers and improve the quality of the services we produced". 
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(An urban, old, large voluntary organisation 
in response to Q72 in the Questionnaire) 
"The service peiformance reports sent by us were often overlooked by CF A. 
Thus, we rarely received any feedback from them on our performance". 
Empowering communities 
(A rural, new, small voluntary organisation 
in reply to Q75 in the Questionnaire) 
The supportive voluntary organisations believed that it was the Community Funding 
Agency which made it possible for them to act as catalysts for social change. It encouraged 
them to communicate, cooperate, and network with each other to share information, ideas, 
and experiences; identify the changing requirements of clients; articulate the necessity for 
new services; serve the vulnerable by means of advocacy, preventive, and developmental 
work; protect the special interests of minority communities; make consumers conscious and 
vocal of their own rights; and plead for the involvement of users in policy formulation. 
"We had the freedom to share information and facilities. CFA recognised us 
as the lifeblood of the community and appreciated our efforts to locate 
community needs, provide adequate services, and encourage clients to 
participate in the planning and provision of outputs. Our endeavours for the 
development of stronger communities were rewarded with an increase in the 
support and acknowledgement from the purchaser, service users, and common 
people". 
On the other hand, the critical voluntary organisations asserted that the Community Funding 
Agency hardly stimulated them to develop networks to share information, ideas, and 
experiences with each other. Further, it was only on very rare occasions that they were 
inspired to undertake advocacy, preventive, and developmental work in order to empower 
and protect the interests of clients. The non-Pakeha service agencies rarely endeavoured to 
pressurise the purchaser -the only source of finance for them in a majority of cases - to 
formulate policies specific to their own communities, allow participation of their consumers 
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in decision-making, or invest in building their capacity to contribute to the development of 
social capital. 
"It was not easy for us to network and share infonnation with each other. 
CFA seldom cared for our needs, rarely provided us with sufficient resources 
required to build our capabilities, had no understanding of our values, 
cultures, and beliefs, ignored our wider role in civil society, and practically 
did nothing to contribute to our long-tenn positive development. In confonnity 
with the 'spare parts' approach to service provision, we had to keep ourselves 
confined to the task of delivering particular outputs as per a set of narrowly 
defined and fiscally specified contract specifications, and could not afford to 
be the training ground for greater community good". 
In the opinion of two outreach workers, the Community Funding Agency encouraged the 
involvement of the local voluntary organisations in the planning and provision of services at 
the local level. The purpose was to confer on those service agencies the opportunity to 
acquire the competence required to take care of local needs, and help local clients feel a 
sense of participation in the development of policies and enjoy a partial experience of 
citizenship. 
"CFA knew for certain that local problems were better solved by local 
providers receiving valuable inputs from individuals and groups endowed with 
local knowledge and experience". 
Secondly, the Community Funding Agency stimulated many small and new voluntary 
organisations to combine resources and form alliances. Besides, it inspired the formation of 
strategic partnerships between them and the large and well-established providers -
resulting in improved services for clients. 
"CFA was happy to see the smaller agencies network, liaise, and support 
each other". 
However, one outreach worker maintained that the local voluntary organisations were 
seldom called upon to participate in the planning and delivery of services. There was 
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always an emphasis on the part of the Community Funding Agency on centralised decision-
making, rather than devolving the task of policy development to local service agencies. 
"Although the local providers knew the community much better, CFA rarely 
considered the prospect of involving them in the task of policy formulation". 
Secondly, most of the small and new voluntary organisations did not have the opportunity 
to make themselves stronger by networking and liaising with each other. They were either 
squeezed out by the big and powerful nonprofits - on which the Community Funding 
Agency had no control whatever - or amalgamated into huge centralised structures. 
"CFA could not do much to help the smaller agencies in their fight for 
survival against the bigger ones which were both resourceful and influential ". 
In respect of 'empowering communities', the responses of the supportive and critical 
voluntary organisations were found to vary substantially across three of their characteristics 
or traits, namely, age, funding, and client group. Over 90 per cent of the old voluntary 
organisations were partly supportive compared to less than 74 per cent of the new service 
agencies (Table 39, Appendix 6). Nearly 95 per cent of the voluntary organisations on 
above average funding were partly supportive compared to less than 73 per cent of the 
service agencies on below average funding (Table 41, Appendix 6). Finally, nearly 15 per 
cent of the non-Pakeha voluntary organisations were partially critical compared to less than 
3 per cent of the Pakeha service agencies (Table 42, Appendix 6). 
"CFA encouraged us to share information between ourselves, articulate the 
need for new services, and serve the weaker sections of society by means of 
developmental work". 
(An old, Pakeha voluntary organisation in 
response to Q84 in the Questionnaire) 
"It was far from easy to develop capabilities, and CFA seldom bothered. 
Besides, despite all our advocacy, preventive and developmental activities, we 
did not always succeed in empowering our clients and protecting their 
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interests. A lot of our time was spent on paperwork, rather than serving 
people in need". 
Promoting clarity 
(A new, non-Pakeha voluntary organisation 
in reply to Q86 in the Questionnaire) 
The supportive voluntary organisations were of the view that there was no problem for 
them to understand the contract specifications laid down by the Community Funding 
Agency. The funding decisions, the reporting requirements, the accountability standards, 
and the processes of awarding and withdrawing support were reasonably clear and easy to 
comprehend. 
"The contractual conditions were always specified in a simple, unambiguous 
language. We knew for sure what our obligations were". 
On the other hand, the critical voluntary organisations argued that the Community Funding 
Agency was not always clear in respect of the contractual conditions. Sometimes, it did not 
make explicit statements on the objectives of the agreement, the responsibilities of the 
parties, and the costs of services. More often than not, the non-Pakeha service agencies 
found the contracts too complicated and jargonistic. 
"The documents were hard to understand. We were often in the dark about 
what was to be done". 
Secondly, it was impossible for the Community Funding Agency to define complex 
outcomes. As well, it used to avoid including in the contract outcomes that took a long 
time to come into effect - for instance, the impact of early childhood education 
programmes embarked upon by the voluntary organisations. 
"It was beyond the capacity of CFA to define, much less quantify, fuzzy, 
idiosyncratic, and unpredictable outcomes. However, it tried measure some of 
them in terms of number. For example, to determine the level of client 
satisfaction, it counted how many times a victim of domestic family violence 
had been visited by a counsellor ". 
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According to two outreach workers, the Community Funding Agency specified outputs in 
no uncertain terms. It was not at all problematic for the voluntary organisations to 
understand what services they were supposed to deliver. 
"The outputs were discrete, measurable, and by no means incomprehensible". 
However, one outreach worker contended that while specifying the services to be produced 
by the voluntary organisations, the Community Funding Agency failed at times to define 
certain expressions with precision. Sometimes, it used to omit some essential details, too. 
"Contracts contained tenns like 'satisfactory' which were not clearly defined 
by CFA at all. Sometimes, they did not have certain necessary details such as 
the account number of POBOCs . However, specifications for the provision of 
simple services such as tax collection appeared to be quite precise". 
In relation to 'promoting clarity', the responses of the supportive and critical voluntary 
organisations were found to vary significantly across all their characteristics or traits. Over 
80 per cent of the local voluntary organisations were partly supportive compared to 70 per 
cent of the affiliated service agencies (Table 43, Appendix 6). Over one-fifth of the urban 
voluntary organisations were partially critical compared to 5 per cent of the rural service 
agencies (Table 44, Appendix 6). Nineteen per cent of the old voluntary organisations were 
partially critical compared to less than 7 per cent of the new service agencies (Table 45, 
Appendix 6). Over four-fifth of the small voluntary organisations were partly supportive 
compared to less than 67 per cent of the large service agencies (Table 46, Appendix 6). 
Over 23 per cent of the voluntary organisations on average funding were partially critical 
compared to less than 10 per cent of the service agencies on below average funding (Table 
47, Appendix 6). Finally, over four-fifth of the mixed voluntary organisations were partly 
supportive compared to less than 72 per cent of the non-Pakeha service agencies (Table 48, 
Appendix 6). 
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"We found the contractual terms and condtions reasonably clear and fairly 
easy to understand". 
(A rural, old voluntary organisation m 
response to Q92 in the Questionnaire) 
"CFA did not always make explicit statements on the objectives of the 
contract or our rights and responsibilities'. 
Facilitating transparency 
(An urban, new voluntary organisation m 
reply to Q93 in the Questionnaire) 
The supportive voluntary organisations believed that they operated in a transparent 
environment. In its annual report, National Services Plan - Funding Decisions, the 
Community Funding Agency clearly specified the conditions for the allocation of resources, 
the processes and procedures for the selection of service agencies, and the rationale for the 
adoption of the funding decisions - for the perusal of the producers, clients, and all other 
interested parties. 
"We felt that among other things, the funding criteria of CFA were quite 
clear". 
On the other hand, the critical voluntary organisations asserted that the Community Funding 
Agency did not permit absolute transparency. It refused to communicate with them on pre-
determined issues such as the reasons behind resource allocation, the factors influencing 
agency selection, and the criteria for funding the service agencies. It often denied them 
access to information on grounds of commercial confidentiality. The non-Pakeha service 
agencies in particular felt gagged by the confidentiality clauses which forbade them to 
disclose the terms and conditions of the contract or divulge any information pertaining to 
the agreement to a third party, and thereby took away their freedom of working together and 
supporting each other in an open environment. 
"We demanded more information and clearer explanations particularly at the 
time of intense policy change, but CF A never listened. An information gulf 
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existed between them and us. A lot of progress could be made if the Official 
Information Act was less frequently used as a device for constraining the 
release of important information. 
In the opinion of two outreach workers, the contract system was quite opeu in terms of the 
feedback sent by the voluntary organisations to the Community Funding Agency and vice 
versa. The transparency enabled both the purchaser and the supplier to know more about 
the principles, goals, and anticipations of each other. 
"The relationship between the purchaser and the provider was characterised 
by openness: the one seldom held back any information from the other". 
However, one outreach worker maintained that the voluntary organisations were cautious to 
the point of being secretive about sending feedback to the Community Funding Agency. 
They feared that showing a 'surplus' might jeopardise future funding arrangements. 
"Many agencies guarded information closely , feeling that CFA would never 
want to give them funding if they received financial assistance from alternative 
sources, or fundraised, or had money in reserve". 
With regard to 'facilitating transparency', the responses of the supportive voluntary 
organisations were found to vary substantially across four of their characteristics or traits, 
namely, age, size, funding, and client group. Over 35 per cent of the new voluntary 
organisations were partly supportive compared to 19 per cent of the old service agencies 
(Table 51, Appendix 6). Nearly one-third of the small voluntary organisations were partly 
supportive compared to less than 12 per cent of the large service agencies (Table 52, 
Appendix 6). Over 30 per cent of the voluntary organisations on above average funding 
were partly supportive compared to less than 12 per cent of the service agencies on average 
funding (Table 53, Appendix 6). Finally, over one-third of the mixed voluntary 
organisations were partly supportive compared to less than 22 per cent of the Pakeha 
service agencies (Table 54, Appendix 6). 
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"CFA allowed us to use whatever information we needed. We had no 
problem whatsoever". 
(A rural, new voluntary organisation m 
response to Q95 in the Questionnaire) 
"We operated in a more or less transparent environment. But, we were not 
permitted immediate access to information. CF A wanted to be sure first that 
we could be trusted". 
Encouraging justice 
(An urban, old voluntary organisation in 
reply to Q95 in the Questionnaire) 
The supportive voluntary organisations were of the view that the Community Funding 
Agency encouraged them to produce outputs focused on relief and care for the weaker 
sections of society and treat all clients with compassion. It inspired them to serve people at 
distant places and allow those unfortunate individuals -most of whom felt alienated from 
the mainstream of community life- access to particularistic services. 
"We treated each case individually as the needs of some users were greater 
than those of others. We tried to make our services accessible. We had a 
preference for disadvantaged clients. CF A always encouraged us in our efforts, 
perhaps more so as we operated in a remote, rural area ". 
On the other hand, tbe critical voluntary organisations argued that funding was allocated on 
the basis of geographical population rather tban the level of client needs, as a consequence 
of which the voluntary organisations in rural areas were often adversely affected. There 
were differences in the rates of funding between the providers for the same type of output. 
Powerful, better-resourced, and competitive producers used to receive a large proportion of 
funding from Wellington, with little or nothing left for small and new suppliers whose 
requirements were greater. The non-Pakeha service agencies were of the opinion that the 
Community Funding Agency lacked sufficient knowledge of their cultural values and 
community needs, rarely provided adequate funding to help them develop and manage their 
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expertise and infrastructure, never cared to support, recognise, and fund holistic services in 
the interest of their people, seldom expressed any concern to reduce the disparity in 
resource allocation impacting on their social and economic development, and did nothing to 
satisfy their quest for self-determination. 
"CFA always looked at the issue of service prov!swn from a European, 
monocultural perspective. It never bothered about the need for long-term 
investment in the community sector and delivery of outputs in a culturally and 
linguistically appropriate manner . It seldom stopped to think that we often had 
to underprice our services to win a contract, out of a strong commitment to 
meet the requirements of our people - drawing on reserves and cross-
subsidies from other projects. It rarely appreciated us for what we, driven by 
compassion as well as a sense of moral obligation, did to provide care and 
assistance. In the absence of any overarching agreement on Treaty obligations, 
it did not have to show any concern whatsoever for our own perspectives, our 
distinct cultural identities, our needs and interests, our unique problems, and 
our constant longing for tina rangatiratanga. Infact, it made us feel uncertain 
about our ongoing viability". 
According to two outreach workers, the Community Funding Agency encouraged the 
voluntary organisations to display equal concern for, and mete out fair treatment to, all 
client groups. It matched outputs with the diverse requirements and pluralistic preferences 
of users, and arranged for equitable distribution of funding across areas. 
"CFA's policies were fairly consistent in relation to the client groups. It 
sought to spread resources evenly over entire affected populations". 
Secondly, the Community Funding Agency took stock of nothing but the needs of clients 
while providing funding to the voluntary organisations. It reshuffled resources, whenever 
necessary, among communities with a disproportionate demand for services. 
"It was not uncommon for CFA to shift fimding from regions with well-
established social and welfare networks to underresourced areas with greater 
needs". 
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However, one outreach worker contended that the Community Funding Agency preferred to 
fund specified client groups which were not necessarily the poorest or the weakest. The 
voluntary organisations were often forced to ignore the requirements of minority 
communities. Regular discrepancy between the level of needs and that of voluntary action 
undertaken by the service agencies led to unevenness in service provision and gave rise to 
doubts about the capacity of the third sector to achieve its redistributive goals. 
"CFA 's preference for certain restricted client groups made one wonder if it 
really wanted distributive justice to prevail". 
Secondly, the Community Funding Agency never appeared to realise that moving resources 
from one sector to another could well be interpreted as cost shifting in the garb of equity. 
Further, by cutting or transferring funding, the purchaser earned the displeasure of several 
overworked, undercapitalised Pakeha voluntary organisations. 
"Many Pakeha agencies with increasing workload and declining financial 
reserves often felt that CFA was heavily biased in favour of Maori and Pacific 
Island groups". 
In respect of 'encouraging justice', the responses of the supportive voluntary organisations 
were found to vary significantly across three of their characteristics or traits, namely, size, 
funding, and client group. Nearly 95 per cent of the small voluntary organisations were 
partly supportive compared to less than 84 per cent of the large service agencies (Table 58, 
Appendix 6). One hundred per cent of the voluntary organisations on below average 
funding were partly supportive compared to less than 83 per cent of the service agencies on 
average funding (Table 59, Appendix 6). Finally, 100 per cent of the non-Pakeha voluntary 
organisations were partly supportive compared to less than 90 per cent of the Pakeha 
service agencies (Table 60, Appendix 6). 
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"CFA allocated resources in a manner fair and just - grvmg top priority to 
the provision of relief and care for the weaker sections of society by smaller 
and newer providers like us". 
(A small, non-Pakeha voluntary organisation 
in response to Q98 in the Questionnaire) 
"CFA had an obsession for the so-called poor non-Pakeha agencies. It just 
seemed to forget that we had to serve a larger clientele with greater needs". 
(A large, Pakeha voluntary organisation in 
reply to Q99 in the Questionnaire) 
Conclusion 
The responses of the participating voluntary organisations and the outreach workers in the 
Otago/Southland region in favour of and against purchase of service contracting have been 
discussed above. It is necessary now to state the findings about the perceptions of the 
respondents vis-a-vis the benefits and costs of purchase of service contracting in the area 
referred to - based on their coded responses to the questionnaire and comments made 
during the interviews. Also, the extent to which the responses of the participants to the role 
of purchase of service contracting was influenced by their agency characteristics or traits 
needs to be reviewed. 
The averaged responses of every participating voluntary organisation to all the questions in 
the questionnaire were indicative of a rather favourable attitude of more service agencies 
(forty-two or 73.7 per cent) towards purchase of service contracting (see Appendix 4, Table 
1). The averaged responses to the questions focusing on each objective were able to 
demonstrate a partial support on the part of the participating voluntary organisations. For 
example, the averaged responses of a) forty-one or 72 per cent participating voluntary 
organisations in relation to 'increasing quantity', b) twenty-three or 40.4 per cent with 
regard to 'improving quality', c) twenty-nine or 50.9 per cent in respect of 'responding to 
changes', d) thirty-eight or 66.7 per cent pertaining to 'ensuring accountability', e) forty-
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nine or 86 per cent regarding 'empowering communities', f) forty-four or 77.2 per cent 
relating to 'promoting clarity', and g) fifty-two or 91.2 per cent concerning 'encouraging 
justice' were equivocal-positive or partly supportive (see Appendix 4, Table 3). In other 
words, in relation to these seven objectives, a majority of the participating voluntary 
organisations believed that purchase of service contracting was full of promise but needed 
improvement. With regard to 'achieving genuine partnership', the averaged responses of 
thirty-seven or 64.9 per cent participating voluntary organisations were equivocal-negative 
or just partially critical (see Appendix 4, Table 3). To be precise, in respect of this 
objective, a majority of the participating voluntary organisations felt that while purchase of 
service contracting was not without merit, it required to be enhanced. In relation to 
'reducing cost' and 'facilitating transparency', the averaged responses of twenty-nine or 
50.9 per cent and forty-three or 75.5 per cent participating voluntary organisations 
respectively were indifferent or neither supportive nor critical (see Appendix 4, Table 3). 
This implied that with regard to these two objectives, a majority of the participating 
voluntary organisations conceived that by itself, purchase of service contracting could not 
be considered as either effective or useless- it all depended on how the strategy was used. 
The views held by a majority of the participating voluntary organisations were partly 
supportive of the following hypotheses in respect of seven out of the ten objectives 
supposed to be secured by the service agencies: 
1. Purchase of service contracting was more likely than not to help the voluntary 
organisations provide a wide range of services. 
2. Purchase of service contracting was more likely than not to help the voluntary 
organisations enhance the quality of services. 
3. Purchase of service contracting was more likely than not to help the voluntary 
organisations deliver new, additional and flexible services .. 
4. Purchase of service contracting was more likely than not to help the voluntary 
organisations stay focused on consumer needs and improve overall performance by 
making them report on a regular basis. 
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5. Purchase of service contracting was more likely than not to help the voluntary 
organisations empower clients and their communities. 
6. Purchase of service contracting was more likely than not to help the voluntary 
organisations comprehend contractual terms and conditions. 
7. Purchase of service contracting was more likely than not to help the voluntary 
organisations serve the interests of the weaker sections of society. 
A larger number of people interviewed argued that purchase of service contracting was, on 
the whole, beneficial for the participating voluntary organisations. The interviewees 
included twenty or 71.5 per cent voluntary sector managers and two out of three outreach 
workers (see Appendix 5). 
However, it was altogether a different story with the non-Pakeha respondents. All seven 
non-Pakeha voluntary organisations responding to the questionnaire and the three 
'coordinators' interviewed were partially critical -not so much in relation to purchase of 
service contracting per se, as with regard to the Community Funding Agency (see 
Appendix 5). They wanted the purchaser to be supporting, enabling, and facilitating rather 
than dominating, demanding, and standing aloof. 
The cross-tabulations confirmed the basic findings regarding the responses of a majority of 
the participating voluntary organisations towards purchase of service contracting. They 
showed that the overall responses of the participating voluntary organisations in terms of all 
their characteristics or traits were equivocal-positive or partly supportive in respect of seven 
objectives ('increasing quantity', 'improving quality', 'responding to changes', 'ensuring 
accountability', 'empowering communities', 'promoting clarity', and 'encouraging 
justice'); equivocal-negative or just partially critical in relation to one ('achieving genuine 
partnership'); and indifferent or neither supportive nor critical with regard to two ('reducing 
cost' and 'facilitating transparency'). 
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Secondly, the cross-tabulations were suggestive of the fact that the old voluntary 
organisations and the large service agencies- generally influential and resourceful, usually 
close to the Community Funding Agency, and having virtually no problem in obtaining 
liberal funding from the purchaser and tapping alternative sources- were partly supportive 
of purchase of service contracting in respect of a majority of the objectives. Conversely, the 
new voluntary organisations and the small service agencies - lacking influence and 
resources, distanced from the Community Funding Agency by its preference for an arm's 
length, hands off relationship, and rarely receiving sufficient funding from Wellington -
were partially critical of purchase of service contracting in relation to a majority of the 
objectives. Although the urban voluntary organisations happened to be much better placed 
than the rural service agencies in their relationship with the Community Funding Agency, 
both were partly supportive of purchase of service contracting with regard to five objectives 
and partially critical of it iil respect of another five. 
Thirdly, the cross-tabulations demonstrated that the local voluntary organisations, the non-
Pakeha and the mixed service agencies taken together, and the nonprofits on average 
funding were partly supportive of purchase of service contracting in relation to a majority of 
the objectives: in fact, the outreach workers succeeded in, first, making those disadvantaged 
voluntary organisations believe that the Community Funding Agency, albeit well-meaning, 
had to operate under resource constraints, and second, encouraging them to render a wide 
range of quality, cost-effective, and innovative services with a view to building strong, 
vibrant, democratic communities. While it is quite understandable that the voluntary 
organisations on below average funding could never be happy with the Community Funding 
Agency which, in their opinion, a! ways demanded more and more for less and less, the 
reasons why the service agencies on above average funding were partially critical of 
purchase of service contracting with regard to a majority of the objectives are not 
immediately clear, and merit further investigation. Besides, the fact that the affiliated 
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voluntary organisations and the Pakeha service agencies - most of them influential and 
resourceful - were partially critical of purchase of service contracting in relation to a 
majority of the objectives proves that the negative feelings of these suppliers could not be 
explained away as merely the disappointment of unsuccessful applicants who did not get 
what they anticipated from the Community Funding Agency. 
Fourthly, the cross-tabulations revealed that the responses of the voluntary organisations 
characterised by a particular trait were not similar in respect of all the objectives. For 
instance, the voluntary organisations on average funding were partly supportive of purchase 
of service contracting as a strategy contributing to the enhancement of programme quality 
or the development of flexible and responsive services, but partially critical of it as a means 
to facilitate the emergence of a genuine partnership resting on respect for each other or the 
formulation of contractual conditions in clear terms. To cite another example, the Pakeha 
voluntary organisations were partly supportive of purchase of service contracting as an 
instrument responsible for the generation of a variety of outputs or the establishment of a 
relationship characterised by mutual accountability, but partially critical of it as a way of 
ensuring empowerment of communities or equitable distribution of resources. 
From the analysis of the cross-tabulations, it is evident to the researcher that purchase of 
service contracting was thought of by a majority of the participating voluntary organisations 
as more or less advantageous for the purchaser as well as the providers. Further, the overall 
responses of the majority of the voluntary organisations were partly supportive of the 
following hypotheses with regard to two of the agency characteristics or traits, namely, age 
and size: 
1. Being well-established, better-resourced and close to the Community Funding 
Agency in general, the old voluntary organisations were more likely than the new 
service agencies to perceive purchase of service contracting as beneficial for the 
providers. 
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However, 'being well-established, better-resourced and close to the Community Funding 
Agency in general' was not always enough to make a majority of the participating voluntary 
organisations supportive of the four other hypotheses, namely: 
1. Being well-established, better-resourced and close to the Community Funding 
Agency in general, the affiliated voluntary organisations were more likely than the 
local service agencies to perceive purchase of service contracting as beneficial for 
the providers. 
2. Being well-established, better-resourced and close to the Community Funding 
Agency in general, the urban voluntary organisations were more likely than the 
rural service agencies to perceive purchase of service contracting as beneficial for 
the providers. 
3. Being well-established, better-resourced and close to the Community Funding 
Agency in general, the voluntary organisations on above average funding were more 
likely than the service agencies on average and below average funding to perceive 
purchase of service contracting as beneficial for the providers. 
4. Being well-established, better-resourced and close to the Community Funding 
Agency in general, the Pakeha voluntary organisations were more likely than the 
non-Pakeha and the mixed service agencies to perceive purchase of service 
contracting as beneficial for the providers. 
Besides, the participating voluntary organisations did not display an absolutely favourable 
attitude towards purchase of service contracting. The overall responses of none of them 
were wholly supportive (or, of course, totally critical) of purchase of service contracting in 
relation to any specific objective. Clearly, they refused to think of purchase of service 
contracting as a cure-all at the disposal of the Community Funding Agency - needing no 
further improvement. 
The researcher believes that for a good many of the alleged costs of purchase of service 
contracting for the participating voluntary organisations, like absence of information 
sharing and joint participation in decision making, the Community Funding Agency was to 
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The researcher believes that for a good many of the alleged costs of purchase of service 
contracting for the participating voluntary organisations, like absence of information 
sharing and joint participation in decision making, tbe Community Funding Agency was to 
be held accountable. But, for some, neither tbe Community Funding Agency nor purchase 
of service contracting was responsible. For example, tbe factors supposedly incapacitating 
tbe Community Funding Agency to consult with the participating voluntary organisations 
on equal terms, or arrange for adequate funding for tbe service agencies on an ongoing 
basis, or induce the larger nonprofits to deliver services for the vulnerable sections of 
society were well beyond the control of the purchaser, just as there was nothing that 
purchase of service contracting could do about the deficiencies of the Services Planning 
Process or the National Needs Indicator Index. As a matter of fact, purchase of service 
contracting was not to blame for any of the shortcomings ascribed to it. Overall, it was 
reasonable to assume that if improved upon, purchase of service contracting could be 
utilised by the participating voluntary organisations irrespective of their characteristics or 
traits as an effective policy instrument. 
180 
Chapter9 
Purchase of Service Contracting and the Community Funding Agency in 
Otago/Southland: Benefits and Costs 
This chapter examines the success and failure of purchase of service contracting in helping 
the Community Funding Agency achieve its objectives dealt with in Chapter 4. The 
information is collected from informal discussion with eight people formerly associated 
with the Community Funding Agency, and semi-structured, one-to-one interviews with the 
three outreach workers operating in the Otago/Southland region at the time of writing. 
Introduction 
Six of the former Agency staff approached believed that purchase of service contracting 
was advantageous for the Community Funding Agency on the whole. According to two, 
purchase of service contracting had its loopholes, and there was plenty of room for 
improvement in its operations. Of the three outreach workers in the Otago/Southland 
region, two appeared to be more or less appreciative of the role of purchase of service 
contracting. But one of them had reservations in respect of the efficacy of purchase of 
service contracting as a policy instrument. The arguments forwarded by former Agency 
staff and the outreach workers to demonstrate how purchase of service contracting helped 
the purchaser secure its objectives are discussed below. Also, an effort is made to explore 
alongside the counterarguments seeking to prove that purchase of service contracting could 
by no means be extolled as a panacea. In the concluding section, the researcher attempts an 
objective assessment of the opinions and perceptions - both positive and negative - of 
the respondents in relation to purchase of service contracting. 
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Achieving genuine partnership 
The supportive agency staff believed that the Community Funding Agency endeavoured to 
promote a sense of genuine partnership with the voluntary organisations which had vast 
experience and immense expertise in locating and evaluating community needs, developing 
policies, and producing services. It shared information with the service agencies, and 
allowed them involvement in contractual decision-making with a view to establishing an 
ongoing, two-way relationship beneficial for the purchaser as well as the provider. 
"CFA tried to bring about greater reciprocity in its dealings with the agencies 
whose skills it wanted to be utilised to the full. No wonder its focus was on 
mutual consultation and relationship building, leading to greater collaboration 
across the sector for the achievement of shared goals. Its constant efforts 
towards reconciliation of the priorities of both parties did improve dialogue 
and understanding between them". 
On the other hand, the critical agency staff asserted that it was the Community Funding 
Agency which identified and prioritised the requirements of clients and their communities, 
determined the services to be purchased, and took the funding decisions. It did not like to 
share information with the voluntary organisations, or permit them to participate in the 
formulation of contractual policies. As a consequence, however, the purchaser used to be 
the loser. It often missed the opportunity to take advantage of the knowledge, expertise, 
and experience of the service agencies in producing outputs and outcomes. It had to hire 
consultants - inexperienced in working with the third sector - for advice, and pay them 
large sums of money for the services rendered. 
"CFA actually deprived itself of the enormous skills of the providers by 
making them work according to specifications. Its reluctance to utilise the 
potential contribution of the voluntary sector was indeed a barrier to 
achieving quality outcomes. Its preference for consultants recruited from 
outside entailed unnecessary expenditure: there were a host of community 
experts available". 
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Secondly, the Community Funding Agency found it almost impossible to establish with the 
voluntary organisations a genuine partnership based on mutual faith and respect for the 
independence of each other. A stable and positive relationship between the producers and 
a single outreach worker for a number of years was necessary the purpose. 
"Most of the outreach workers either left or were swapped around. There was 
hardly any scope for a meaningful rapport to develop". 
Thirdly, when new voluntary organisations came into a contract situation, the Community 
Funding Agency could not afford to confide in them right from the outset, for they had no 
track record. Establishment of trust often took a very long time. 
"When fresh entrants turned up, CFA used to keep its fingers crossed. It could 
not start having faith in them right away - not knowing how they would 
perform, or what their professional workers might be like". 
In the opinion of two outreach workers, the Community Funding Agency wanted to work in 
cooperation with the voluntary organisations. With this end in view, it allowed them 
mutuality in the negotiation of agreements. 
"CFA did realise the importance of entrusting the agencies with the right to 
negotiate on equal terms if a close relationship was to be developed". 
However, one outreach worker maintained that the Community Funding Agency had to 
operate within the constraints of governmental priorities, fiscal restrictions, and limited 
funding resources. There was, thus, little room for negotiation with the voluntary 
organisations. 
"In most cases, there was really no negotlatzon with the providers, because 




The supportive agency staff were of the view that the Services Planning Process and the 
National Needs Indicator Index enabled the Community Funding Agency to locate 
community needs and assess the urgency for development in particular areas. As well, they 
helped the purchaser measure the ability of the suppliers to provide services under contract. 
"In 1992 and 1993, the needs assessment procedures could not be carried out 
as thoroughly as they should have been. But the situation improved in 1994. 
Government funding in the third sector increased . More time was spent on 
liaising with clients and key people in the community, mandated representatives 
of all community groups, and other interested bodies such as local authorities, 
schools, the police, and the health sector. CF A wanted producers and 
stakeholders to be actively involved in the contracting process and contribute 
to its ongoing development. Outreach workers - professional, competent, and 
endowed with the knowledge of the services the suppliers were capable of 
producing and delivering - travelled all over to communicate with them. 
Consumers were encouraged to speak of their problems, so the purchaser 
could know and take the necessary action". 
On the other hand, the critical agency staff argued that the Community Funding Agency 
never succeeded in identifying and evaluating the diverse requirements of clients with 
extreme precision. Nor could it ever assess with pinpoint accuracy the capacity of the 
voluntary sector for service delivery. 
"Services Planning and National Needs Indicator Index were often ineffective 
in finding out what was really expected of the purchaser and how the service 
agencies could help". 
Secondly, the Community Funding Agency was always found lacking the resources needed 
to train its own employees in contract management skills. Dearth of funds did impact on 
the professional development of staff (including volunteers). 
"Because of its limited resources, CF A could rarely arrange for proper 
training of its staff - paid or otherwise". 
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According to two outreach workers, the Community Funding Agency used to recruit 
competent providers through skilful letting of contracts. Also, it succeeded in retaining 
them by means of stable funding. 
"CFA always managed to contract with result- oriented agencies". 
However, one outreach worker contended that the Community Funding Agency could not 
always manage to employ and maintain better producers of services. The reason, in most 
cases, was resource constraint. 
"Due to shortage of funds, CFA sometimes had to select providers less than 
ideal for the task". 
Improving quality 
The supportive agency staff believed that the Community Funding Agency was concerned 
about the welfare of the vulnerable sections of society. It spared no effort to ensure the 
production and provision of a multiplicity of quality services on an ongoing basis. 
"CFA was never reluctant to guide and fund the agencies for the provision of 
quality services. The standard definitely improved". 
On the other hand, the critical agency staff asserted that the resources of the Community 
Funding Agency were limited. The insufficiency affected its ability to purchase a wide 
range of quality services for clients and their communities. 
"CFA lacked resources all the time. It failed to arrange for more funding for 
purchase of services even when informed of shortage of cash". 
Secondly, some of the quality services took a long time to produce the desired results. 
Much against its will, the Community Funding Agency was forced to prefer those outputs 
that were immediately measurable. 
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"CFA had no problem with the outputs of feeding, shelter, and health care -
they could be measured in no time. But, it was not as easy with some others 
whose impact might be felt only after several years. 
Thirdly, most of the outcomes were intangible and did not lend themselves to 
quantification. The Community Funding Agency found them problematic to deal with. 
"Intangible outcomes were a pain in the neck. Measuring the level of 
customer satisfaction, for example, was easier said than done. The quality of 
outputs was, however, measured in terms of numbers. Numbers were very 
important". 
Fourthly, most of the larger voluntary organisations were profit-motivated. It was beyond 
the capacity of the Community Funding Agency to force them to provide a variety of 
quality services for the weaker sections of society, and win everlasting confidence of the 
community in the process. 
"Some big providers ran after profit. CFA seldom succeeded in making them 
conscious of their responsibility towards the vulnerable". 
In the opinion of two outreach workers, the Community Funding Agency required to be 
satisfied with the standard of the services to be purchased from the voluntary organisations. 
With this end in view, it used to evaluate the quality of all outputs at regular intervals, 
threaten sanctions for non-performance, and promise rewards to motivate the suppliers. 
"Given CFA 's concern for standardisation of services, it was but natural for 
the purchaser to monitor service quality and use penalties or rewards 
depending on the circumstances". 
However, one outreach worker maintained that the performance evaluation mechanisms 
needed to assess the standard of the services delivered by the voluntary organisations were 
still at an early stage of development. Thus, it was not possible for the Community Funding 
Agency to evaluate the quality of complex services or social outcomes. 
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"I believe the peifonnance evaluation mechanisms were not sufficiently 
developed. This problem often caused the focus of conventional contracting to 
be shifted from achievement of quality outcomes to management of fiscal risks, 
with an emphasis on price". 
Reducing cost 
The supportive agency staff were of the v1ew that one of the basic motives of the 
Community Funding Agency behind contracting with the voluntary organisations was to 
save cost. It tried to select the best provider in terms of price as well as quality. 
"As the custodian of POBOCS, CFA sought to achieve maximum service for 
minimum cost. For one thing, it made every possible effort to contract with 
cost-effective agencies which could develop quality services at cheaper rates". 
On the other hand, the critical agency staff argued that the funds at the disposal of the 
Community Funding Agency were meagre. Scarcity of resources compelled it to use the 
voluntary organisation. that was the cheapest, but not necessarily the best, producer in terms 
of the ability to render high quality services. 
"The provider who submitted the most cost-effective tender was, in a majority 
of cases, far from the best. But unfortunately CFA had no option". 
According to two outreach workers, as most of the voluntary organisations were financed 
by other funders and enjoyed volunteer support, they could afford to produce a wide range 
of services at cheaper rates. Thus, it was not hazardous for the Community Funding 
Agency to fund those service agencies. 
"Funding the cost-effective nonprofits was not risky by any means". 
However, one outreach worker contended that the Community Funding Agency did not 
have any concrete evidence to demonstrate that the voluntary organisations were necessarily 
less expensive than their statutory counterparts. In fact, it often took the risk of contracting 
with larger service agencies- dearer than local authorites of a similar scale. 
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"Nothing could be further from truth that all agencies were inexpensive and 
therefore safe to contract with". 
Secondly, organising the contracting process entailed substantial financial burden to be 
borne by the Community Funding Agency. The procedures for inspecting and approving of 
the voluntary organisations, inviting tenders, processing applications, drafting contracts, 
negotiating with unknown providers, and monitoring performance in particular led to a 
growth in bureaucracy - involving substantial staff time and massive transaction costs. 
Besides, the savings accumulated (if at all) stood the risk of shrinking (and even 
disappearing) as a result of contract failure. 
"Evaluating most of the social services was not simple. It required 
establishment of country-wide networks, recruitment of skilled personnel, and a 
lot of paperwork round the year. On the whole, it was a costly affair for 
CF A. Achieving cost savings was really a myth. Financially speaking, the 
purchaser never gained". 
Responding to changes 
The supportive agency staff were of the view that the Community Funding Agency 
contracted with a variety of suppliers to serve a diversity of clients. It encouraged the 
voluntary organisations to deliver a vast array of innovative services responding to the 
changing needs of users. 
"Contracting helped CFA a great deal in adjusting to the changes in the 
demand for services". 
On the other hand, the critical agency staff argued that the Community Funding Agency 
made the voluntary organisations - always on the lookout for contract finance - act in 
accordance with its rigid specifications. Working within such a stringent regime, the 
producers found it impossible to provide a multiplicity of flexible services for consumers. 
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"The specifications of CF A stood in the way of utilising the creative capacity 
of the providers for the delivery of innovative services". 
According to two outreach workers, the Conununity Funding Agency initiated new services 
while preserving and/or modifying those in existence. Sometimes, it shifted funding to the 
voluntary organisations promising to develop exciting services. Further, it used to alter 
programme directions and thereby enable the service agencies to produce flexible services 
and improve the standard of the same. 
"CFA often called for the development of innovative progammes - not 
undertaken ever before to allow for emergencies and changed 
circumstances". 
However, one outreach worker contended that the voluntary organisations rarely over-
performed to deliver new services. The belief was that if they did, the Community Funding 
Agency might lower future funding levels. 
"Most of the agencies feared that over- performance would lead to reduction 
of purchase prices". 
Ensuring accountability 
The supportive agency staff believed that the accreditation, information, and reporting 
requirements of the Community Funding Agency helped it to have a clear vision of the 
objectives and activities of the voluntary organisations. This transparency, in turn, made it 
easier for the purchaser to exercise effective control over the providers with regard to the 
delivery of services. 
"Contracting enabled CFA to understand where its money was going and 
what outcomes were to be delivered. The old system was too open. And, there 
were no guidelines". 
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On the other hand, the critical agency staff asserted that several voluntary organisations 
were inclined to secrecy concerning their working methods and alternative sources of 
income, and refused to provide sufficient feedback to the Community Funding Agency -
disagreeing to disclose the information that they considered to be confidential. Thus, it was 
far from easy for the purchaser to have a high degree of control over the producers. 
"Because of commercial confidentiality, it was extremely difficult for CFA to 
keep the providers in check. Indeed, there was not much that it could do 
because of what is known as the 'conspiracy of silence"'. 
Secondly, it was beyond the capacity of the Community Funding Agency to write into a 
contract the accountability for rendering all the necessary services. Besides, the purchaser 
had neither time nor resources to hold hundreds of people working in large voluntary 
organisations into account, or monitor the activities of the service agencies located at a 
great distance. 
"You could not write down all the nitty-gritty in the agreement, or seek 
explanations from a thousand people on what they all were doing, or afford 
to monitor from Wellington all that was going on at the coal face in remote 
areas". 
In the opinion of two outreach workers, the Community Funding Agency often compared 
the voluntary organisations with each other to have an idea about who did what best. It 
used effective data collection and evaluation systems like KOPPS, HROS, and MES to 
monitor and review their performance and viability. 
"Those systems lent credibility to CFA as the leading purchaser and regulator 
of social services, and were instrumental in achieving the full confidence of the 
government". 
However, one outreach worker maintained that the data collection and evaluation systems 
employed by the Community Funding Agency sometimes failed to yield the desired result. 
The reason was that many voluntary organisations had neither the time nor the knowledge 
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required to use KOPPS, HROS, or MES. Further, these mechanisms did not require the 
service agencies to demonstrate what they were doing to deliver outcomes. 
"Most of the agencies found that those documents took a lot of time. To a 
good many, they were largely incomprehensible - utterly difficult to come to 
grips with ". 
Empowering communities 
The supportive agency staff were of the view that the Community Funding Agency 
encouraged the voluntary organisations to be responsive to the needs of the vulnerable and 
establish a close and personal relationship with clients and their communities. It never 
ceased to stimulate the service agencies to play the role of a catalyst in the development 
process. 
"CFA appreciated the providers calling for active participation of the service 
agencies in needs assessment, programme planning, service provision, and 
performance appraisal at the local level. It always remembered that they did 
not exist just for the sake of serving the government, but had their own 
priorities, goals, and values". 
On the other hand, the critical agency staff argued that contracting arrangements resulted in 
fragmentation among the voluntary organisations. Despite sincere efforts on the part of the 
Community Funding Agency, a host of suppliers chose not to bother about the requirements 
of the weaker sections of society or the best possible pattern of service provision, but 
seemed to be more interested in competing with each other for contracts. 
"Several agencies had little or no concern for the poor and the weak. CFA 
could not convince them of their social responsibilities". 
According to two outreach workers, the end goal of the Community Funding Agency was 
achievement of social justice. Thus, it encouraged the voluntary organisations in their 
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preventive, advocacy, and developmental work for the empowerment of individuals and 
communities. 
"CFA never forgot that the providers had a community building role which 
was greater than the delivery of a specific social service. It always wanted 
them to be engaged in a wide range of social, cultural, and developmental 
issues, such as providing communities with necessary outlets for expression of 
concerns, developing a sense of belonging within individuals, and representing 
specific interest groups". 
However, one outreach worker contended that it was doubtful if all voluntary organisations 
helped government in generating social capital. The Community Funding Agency knew for 
sure that few service agencies cared for community development. 
"Most of the agencies had little concern for developmental work. There was 
more competition and less cooperation, more suspicion and less trust". 
Promoting clarity 
The supportive agency staff believed that the Community Funding Agency spared no effort 
to establish clarity which had the potential to stabilise the relationship between the 
purchaser and the provider. It preferred simple contracts wherein the terms and conditions 
were unambiguous, the expectations from, and the responsibilities of, the producers 
specific, and the processes of awarding and withdrawing funds transparent. 
"Since the contractual conditions were spelt out in clear terms, both CFA and 
the providers knew for sure what they were supposed to do to ensure effective 
use of Crown revenue". 
On the other hand, the critical agency staff asserted that it was difficult for the Community 
Funding Agency to specify complex services in a clear language and in detail. As a 
consequence, certain contracts tended to be written in very general terms, permitting the 
particularities to be settled later and thus preparing the foundation for future tensions. 
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"Many contracts did not state precisely what the agencies were to provide, 
but left the details to be negotiated at the time of delivery - creating the 
scope for a possible conflict between the purchaser and the contractors at a 
later stage". 
Secondly, in the case of services reflecting subtle policy intentions, the Community 
Funding Agency could not make explicit statements covering the objectives of the 
agreement, the responsibilities of the parties, and the price to be paid for outputs and 
outcomes. The suppliers were often left in the dark as to what was to be done. 
"Sometimes the providers were confused, as they could not understand what 
their specific responsibilities were". 
In the opinion of two outreach workers, the Community Funding Agency sought to avoid 
any kind of misunderstanding between the parties to a contract. With this end in view, it 
took every step to specify the contractual terms and conditions in simple language, making 
them clear enough for the purchaser as well as the provider to understand. 
"CFA realised the importance of clarity as a means for the avoidance of 
future disputes". 
However, one outreach worker maintained that even if the contractual conditions were 
clearly spelt out, the Community Funding Agency had every chance of getting into trouble. 
Opportunistic voluntary organisations, especially those enjoying a monopoly over particular 
services, might take advantage of the situation - dictating terms, charging higher prices 
than settled earlier, and refusing to fulfil their contractual obligations. 
"CFA could have been exploited by corrupt contractors, notwithstanding clear 
specification of the terms of the contract . Fortunately, we have never had 
many of them in New Zealand". 
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Facilitating transparency 
The supportive agency staff were of the view that the Community Funding Agency 
furnished relevant facts on the procedures for agency selection and the rationale behind 
funding decisions in different reports and briefing papers published every year. The 
transparency of information helped the purchaser and the producers to operate freely in an 
open environment. 
"CFA's method of operation was one of the most transparent compared to 
other funding agencies we had a relationship with". 
Secondly, the Community Funding Agency sought to eliminate the hazard of provider 
capture by making the responsibilities of the purchaser and the suppliers in the deli very of 
public services explicit. With this end in view, it permitted public scrutiny of the contracts 
through annual publication of the relevant documents. 
"Transparency was not only an accountability tool but a means at the 
disposal of CFA to counter provider capture". 
On the other hand, the critical agency staff argued that the Community Funding Agency 
never allowed the contracting process to be absolutely open. The absence of transparency 
was evident from the gaps and overlaps in the provision of numerous services. 
"The gaps and overlaps were indeed suggestive of a low level of 
transparency". 
Secondly, certain unprincipled contractors used to be very secretive about themselves -
supplying little or no feedback on their financial viability and/or political connections. The 
Community Funding Agency often failed to detect their ulterior motives at the time of 
contracting with them. Hence, the risk of provider capture prevailed. 
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"The fear of provider capture remained because of the existence of some 
corrupt agencies which preferred to keep quite until they had set their foot in 
the door". 
According to two outreach workers, the Community Funding Agency provided clients with 
the opportunity to scrutinise the contracting decisions taken up in Wellington. By making 
all information pertaining to any contract accessible, it was able to win public support. 
"Anybody interested could access any information relating to any contract 
between CFA and the agencies". 
However, one outreach worker contended that the Community Funding Agency had 
become very unpopular when, in 1998, it introduced a confidentiality clause into a number 
of residential care contracts in order to prevent funding decisions from becoming 
established as precedents for other producers. The providers had no opportunity 
whatsoever to access, let alone scrutinise, the information relating to those agreements 
whose contents were not to be disclosed to a third party. 
"The confidentiality clause left the providers absolutely in the dark". 
Encouraging justice 
The supportive agency staff believed that the Community Funding Agency succeeded in 
proving its commitment to distributive justice. Non-parochial and unbiased, it displayed 
equal concern for, and meted out fair treatment to, all voluntary organisations; made every 
effort to match services with client needs; arranged for equitable distribution of funding; 
reshuffled resources among communities with a disproportionate demand for services; and 
stimulated the producers to set up comprehensive systems of social care for the vulnerable 
including women and people living in remote rural areas. 
"CFA tried for better distribution of available resources in order to remove 
the growing disparity in the community. Also, it always urged the agencies to 
deliver services at the edge". 
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On the other hand, the critical agency staff asserted that CFA could never prevent the large 
and well-established voluntary organisations from serving only those consumer groups 
which were easier, cheaper, and quicker to treat. Ever eager to monopolise contracts and 
engage in ruthless competition for funding, these suppliers with strong clout used to ignore 
severe cases, for instance, poor clients with genuine requirements and minority 
communities in far-flung regions. 
"CFA could do nothing to control the bigger providers preferring a few large 
clients with huge dollar contracts". 
In the opinion of two outreach workers, the Community Funding Agency was keen to prove 
its commitment to biculturalism and multiculturalism. Thus, it sought to encourage the 
production and provision of culturally appropriate services for Maori and other minority 
groups. 
"CFA wanted services to be provided for Maori and other minority 
communzt1es in their own settings. It loved to attach considerable importance 
to the needs and priorities of all ethnic groups, thereby demonstrating a 
genuine concern for their long-term positive development ". 
However, one outreach worker maintained that the Community Funding Agency did not 
always make sincere efforts to demonstrate that it was committed to biculturalism and 
multiculturalism. Almost all non-Pakeha service agencies were far from happy on the 
grounds that the purchaser seldom cared for their needs or helped them produce culturally 
appropriate services for their clients. 
"Frankly speaking, CFA needed to do much more for Maori and other non-
Pakeha agencies which were financially disadvantaged, faced greater caseloads, 
and had extensive training and information needs ". 
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Conclusion 
The former Agency staff and the outreach workers operating in the Otago/Southland region 
who expressed their views on the positive impact of purchase of service contracting on the 
Community Funding Agency were partly rather than wholly supportive of the strategy. 
Further, they were not equally emphatic regarding the benefits of purchase of service 
contracting for the Community Funding Agency. Two out of six of the former Agency 
staff, who had been with the Community Funding Agency for a much shorter time of 
course, were less appreciative of purchase of service contracting (see Appendix 5). Of the 
two outreach workers, one appeared to be more critical than the other of the new regime of 
purchase of service contracting that had failed, in her view, to bring about any remarkable 
improvement in the relationship between the Community Funding Agency and the Maori 
voluntary organisations which were still complaining most of the time. However, the 
opinions held by a majority of the participants (eight out of eleven) were supportive of the 
following hypotheses vis-a-vis the goals of the Community Funding Agency - each of 
which was to be attained through purchase of service contracting: 
1. Purchase of service contracting was more likely than not to enable the 
Community Funding Agency to utilise the experience and expertise of the voluntary 
organisations through the establishment of a genuine partnership with the service 
agencies. 
2. Purchase of service contracting was more likely than not to enable the 
Community Funding Agency to identify consumer needs and measure the adequacy 
of available resources. 
3. Purchase of service contracting was more likely than not to enable the 
Community Funding Agency to ensure the provision of quality outputs on an 
ongoing basis. 
4. Purchase of service contracting was more likely than not to enable the 
Community Funding Agency to select the cheapest and the best of providers. 
5. Purchase of service contracting was more likely than not to enable the Community 
Funding Agency to facilitate the development of innovative programmes. 
6. Purchase of service contracting was more likely than not to enable the 





of service contracting was more likely than not to enable the 
Funding Agency to contribute to the generation of community 
8. Purchase of service contracting was more likely than not to enable the 
Community Funding Agency to write the contract in unambiguous language. 
9. Purchase of service contracting was more likely than not to enable the 
Community Funding Agency to eliminate the hazard of provider capture through the 
creation of an open environment. 
10. Purchase of service contracting was more likely than not to enable the 
Community Funding Agency to remove the growing disparities in the communities 
by means of fair and equitable distribution of resources. 
The critics of purchase of service contracting, while highlighting the shortfalls of the 
strategy, implied that the Community Funding Agency occasionally succeeded in taking 
advantage of the utility of the 'device' which was not without merits. They insinuated that 
the Community Funding Agency sometimes managed to select a provider who was the 
cheapest and the best, exercise effective control over some producers, specify certain 
services in clear terms, and encourage some suppliers to be more 'open' about themselves. 
They hinted that with the removal of resource constraint which incapacitated the 
Community Funding Agency to a considerable extent, contracting out in social welfare was 
quite likely to enable the purchaser to achieve its objectives. 
The researcher would wish to reiterate what he observed while concluding Chapter 8, that 
is, purchase of service contracting per se was not responsible for any of its alleged costs. 
For some of them, such as absence of mutuality in the negotiation of agreements and 
involvement in the formulation of policies, the Community Funding Agency was to be held 
accountable. For the rest, neither the Community Funding Agency nor purchase of service 
contracting was to blame. For example, the factors making it impossible for the purchaser 
to obtain cost savings, or force the larger voluntary organisations to assist small and new 
service agencies, were beyond the control of the Community Funding Agency, just as there 
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was nothing that purchase of service contracting could do to rectify the omissions and 
commissions of the Services Planning Process and the National Needs Indicator Index. 
Overall, the researcher found the scales to be weighted in favour of purchase of service 
contracting. The reasons are simple. To repeat, more participants (six of the former Agency 
staff and two outreach workers) conceived that on the whole purchase of service contracting 
enabled the Community Funding Agency to attain its objectives. Secondly, even the critics 
of purchase of service contracting felt that it was, on occasion, helpful for the purchaser. 
Finally, purchase of service contracting could not be accused of any of its alleged costs. All 
told, it seemed quite probable that if improved upon, purchase of service contracting might 
be utilised by the Community Funding Agency as an effective policy instrument. 
199 
Part III 
A. Concluding Comments 
Chapter 10 
Purchase of Service Contracting at the Crossroads 
This chapter summarises the basic findings of the research based on a comprehensive 
analysis of the responses of the participants with regard to the success and failure of 
purchase of service contracting in helping the voluntary organisations in the 
Otago/Southland region and the Community Funding Agency achieve a set of specific 
objectives. It then refers to some interesting facts emerging from the cross-tabulations 
studying the relationship between purchase of service contracting and some particular 
characteristics or traits of the service agencies. Thereafter, it reviews the role of the 
contract system including contracting out and purchase of service contracting in 
implementing the neoliberal policy prescriptions for the enhancement of the productive 
efficiency, and the reduction of the level of expenditure, of the public sector in New 
Zealand. Before concluding, it makes a few positive comments on the future of purchase of 
service contracting, but at the same time reflects upon the 'strains' which are believed by 
many to have the potential to challenge the very existence of the strategy, not only in this 
country but wherever outsourcing is in use in the domain of social welfare. In conclusion, it 
highlights the need for a series of concrete measures to be taken to make purchase of 
service contracting an effective policy instrument at the disposal of the government. 
Summary of the basic research findings 
The current research suggests that in the Otago/Southland region, the number of the 
supporters of purchase of service contracting was more than that of its opponents. The 
advocates upheld that purchase of service contracting was, on the whole, beneficial for the 
participating voluntary organisations as well as the Community Funding Agency in terms of 
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achieving a genuine partnership between the purchaser and the providers, increasing the 
quantity of services, enhancing the quality of programmes, reducing the cost of production, 
responding to the changes in the demands of users, ensuring mutual accountability, 
empowering clients and their communities, promoting clarity of terms and conditions, 
facilitating transparency of the contracting process, and encouraging fair and just 
distribution of resources and outputs. The protagonists, partly supportive of purchase of 
service contracting, claimed that the strategy was full of promise, although it needed to be 
improved upon. 
The critics pointed out the shortcomings of purchase of service contracting to prove that it 
was far from a panacea, requiring no further improvement. However, they implied that 
purchase of service contracting was at least occasionally successful in promoting cost-
effectiveness, accountability, clarity, and transparency. They hinted that with the removal 
of resource constraint which considerably weakened the Community Funding Agency, 
purchase of service contracting was quite likely to enable the purchaser to secure its 
objectives. 
The cross-tabulations showed that with regard to seven objectives, the overall responses of 
a majority of the participating voluntary organisations were partly supportive irrespective of 
their characteristics; in respect of one, partially critical; and in relation to two, indifferent or 
neither supportive nor critical. Relating the responses of the participating voluntary 
organisations characterised by a particular trait to a specific goal, the contingency tables 
demonstrated that with regard to a majority of the objectives, the old and the large service 
agencies were partly supportive of purchase of service contracting, while the new and the 
small voluntary organisations were partially criticaf of it. The local service agencies, the 
non-Pakeha and the mixed voluntary organisations taken together, and the nonprofits on 
average funding were partly supportive of purchase of service contracting, whereas the 
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affiliated service agencies, the Pakeha voluntary organisations, and the nonprofits on above 
average funding were partially critical of it. There is need for extensive research to find out 
why the voluntary organisations on above average funding- almost all of them influential, 
resourceful, and well-established - were partially critical of purchase of service 
contracting in respect of a majority of the objectives. The outreach workers, however, 
played a remarkable role in brightening the image of the Community Funding Agency: they 
were able to convince a multiplicity of disadvantaged voluntary organisations that because 
of insufficiency of resources, the purchaser, while well-meaning, could not always succeed 
in doing for the producers what it wanted to do. 
The views expressed by a majority of the respondents were partly supportive of the 
hypotheses in relation to most of the goals (seven out of ten) to be attained by the 
participating voluntary organisations. The opinions held by most of the participants (eight 
out of eleven) were partly supportive of the hypotheses with regard to the objectives to be 
achieved by the Community Funding Agency. The cross-tabulations showed that while the 
overall responses of a majority of the service agencies were partly supportive of only two 
hypotheses, purchase of service contracting could be looked upon as advantageous for both 
the purchaser and the providers on the whole. 
The concrete empirical evidence in the form of a huge mass of qualitative and quantitative 
data was more supportive of the theoretical views on the positive, rather than the negative, 
impact of purchase of service contracting on voluntary organisations and government 
discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. At the time of the initiation of purchase of service 
contracting in New Zealand, the Department of Social Welfare portrayed it as a major 
change in the way the Community Funding Agency was to relate to voluntary organisations 
- a 'learning' and time-consuming process needing much understating for the necessary 
adjustment. Over years, the Community Funding Agency and voluntary organisations made 
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sincere efforts to attain a set of common goals through purchase of service contracting. For 
instance, to minimise the risks of adverse selection and moral hazard, the Community 
Funding Agency published the reasons behind its funding decisions for the perusal of the 
voluntary organisations with whom it contracted, and often shifted more resources to the 
service agencies operating in areas with greater demand for outputs. Most of the voluntary 
organisations sent their performance reports on time and received the feedback from the 
Community Funding Agency without inordinate delay. In the process, the Community 
Funding Agency and voluntary organisations learned to be respectful of the values, 
priorities, and expectations of each other. All this, of course, holds good of the relationship 
that prevailed between the Community Funding Agency and the participating voluntary 
organisations operating in the Otago/Southland region. 
However, all non-Pakeha respondents partaking in the research were dissatisfied not so 
much with purchase of service contracting per se as the way the Community Funding 
Agency had been managing the contracting process. They were unhappy primarily out of 
the conviction that: 
- neither the Services Planning Process nor the National Needs Indicator Index - both 
devised by the Community Funding Agency - included their requirements or the rights 
they were entitled to; 
- they were seldom consulted by the Community Funding Agency or permitted by it to be 
involved in setting the policy agenda, determining options, making decisions, and 
monitoring and evaluating outputs and outcomes; 
- they were rarely fortunate to receive from the Community Funding Agency the full cost 
of producing services; 
- they were often unable to make the Community Funding Agency provide funding for 
new programmes and infrastructural support; 
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- the Community Funding Agency was unwilling to recognise their values, cultures, and 
beliefs; 
- the Community Funding Agency was far from eager to understand their interests, 
activities, and wider role in society; 
- the Community Funding Agency was reluctant to invest in their long-term positive 
development; and 
- the Community Funding Agency was not concerned about their desire for self-
governance. 
The Treaty of Waitangi which was the historical foundation of the modem New Zealand 
society, contained the reciprocal obligations by the Crown and Maori tribes who signed in 
1840: the Crown guaranteeing to Maori tino rangatiratanga (unqualified chieftainship of 
the latter over their own resources - lands, estates, forests, and fisheries), and Maori 
ceding to the Crown kawanatanga (government). The Maori producers maintained that 
from a broader perspective, the position of a large section of the Maori population became 
one of disadvantage and deprivation, as borne out by health, education, unemployment, and 
social welfare statistics, in glaring contravention of the Treaty standing for the prohibition 
of discrimination, the diminution of social and economic disparities, the development of a 
genuine partnership, and the recognition of the right to self-determination. Neither National 
nor Labour had ever been really successful in addressing the Treaty issues. The proposals 
in Puao-te-ata-tu (a report of the 'Ministerial Advisory Committee on a Maori Perspective 
for the Department of Social Welfare' -released in 1986) and Te Urupare Rangapu (a 
Government policy statement on the bicultural strategy- issued in 1988) concerning the 
implementation of the principles embodied in the Treaty were not carried out as expected. 
From the standpoint of purchase of service contracting, the Community Funding Agency 
appeared to have forgetten its responsibility to demonstrate a commitment to Maori service 
agencies as Treaty partners and not just community groups. Among other things, the 
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Community Funding Agency failed to display a genuine desire to develop a collaborative, 
or at least a 'robust and respectful', relationship with the Maori providers and allow them to 
be involved in policy formation and build their capability, through financial assistance and 
technical and/or administrative support, for the delivery of culturally appropriate services in 
conformity with the practice of manaakitanga (caring for each other). Instead of treating 
the Maori producers as equals, the Community Funding Agency almost always 
demonstrated an authoritarian, or at any rate, a condescending attitude towards them, much 
to their chagrin and displeasure. 
Notwithstanding the attitude of the non-Pakeha respondents exhibiting deep levels of 
frustration, mistrust, cynicism and resentment, it seemed that the scales were weighted in 
favour of purchase of service contracting. More people felt that purchase of service 
contracting, in general, was advantageous for both parties: the participating voluntary 
organisations and the Community Funding Agency. Secondly, even the critics of purchase 
of service contracting insinuated that the 'tactic' might be helpful on occasion. Thirdly, in 
terms of characteristics or traits, the service agencies were partly supportive of purchase of 
service contracting in respect of a majority of the objectives. It may be argued that purchase 
of service contracting was not responsible for any of its alleged shortcomings. For quite a 
few of them, the Community Funding Agency rather than purchase of service contracting 
per se had to be to blamed. For the rest, neither the purchaser nor purchase of service 
contracting could be held accountable. 
The present research has its own worth. In Chapter 2, it examines the bigger role of the 
contract system as a neoliberal strategy to facilitate the enhancement of the productive 
efficiency, and the reduction of the level of expenditure, of the public sector. Thereafter, it 
undertakes an objective empirical study, preceded by an extensive theoretical analysis, of 
the potential of purchase of service contracting as an effective policy instrument. By so 
206 
doing, it redresses two critical gaps in the prevailing literature on contractualism, enhances 
the broader knowledge of government, the third sector, and the relationship between the 
two, and contributes to scholarship in the fields of public policy, management, and 
administration - apart from adding to the insignificant number of case studies on the 
effects of contracting out in social welfare in New Zealand. 
Some observations on the contract system as part of the neoliberal agenda for 
public sector restructuring 
The public sector reforms in New Zealand were sweeping and particularly, the country 
pushed the neoliberal logic of contractualism further and faster than any other nation, so 
much so that it came to be referred to as a 'contract state'. As indicated by the current 
research, the contract system including contracting out and purchase of service contracting, 
with its theoretical foundation provided by a set of economic and administrative doctrines, 
namely, public choice theory, new public management, agency theory, and transaction cost 
analysis, contributed significantly to the reconceptualisation of the role of the public sector. 
Indeed, it played a crucial role in improving the overall efficiency of the public sector by 
delegating the task of rendering a multiplicity of high quality and flexible services to 
providers; ensuring mutual accountability of the purchaser and producers; monitoring the 
performance of providers against service specifications on a regular basis; controlling 
producers by including in the agreement sanctions to discipline contractors and rewards to 
motivate them; and minimising the risk of misunderstanding between the purchaser and 
providers by specifying the contractual conditions in clear terms. Secondly, it facilitated 
the establishment of a robust public sector by emphasising the necessity for the creation of 
a strong civil society through building the capacity of voluntary organisations and 
empowering clients and their communities, and the implemention of the ideal of 
distributive justice by means of fair and just allocation of resources and outputs. Thirdly, it 
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freed government departments from centralised regulations and persuaded chief executives 
to manage the ministries in proper alignment with the country's policy goals; helped the 
legislature hold the executive responsible; enabled bureaucrats to understand their 
responsibilities and inspired them to perform better; and made it imperative on the part of 
the public sector to be accountable to the public. All in all, it opened up new opportunities 
for the future development of the public sector.' 
At the same time, however, the present research suggests that the introduction of the 
contract system as part of the neoliberal agenda for the redesigning of the public sector in 
New Zealand brought in its train several problems as well for the state, including those of 
arranging for the provision of a wide range of quality services and recruiting the best 
contractor in terms of standard and price in spite of resource constraints; developing 
innovative programmes for clients, with contract specifications laid down by the purchaser 
in no uncertain terms; specifying intangible outcomes - poorly defined and, in the words 
of Ashton, "notoriously difficult to measure";' cutting down expenditure in the face of high 
administration costs; evaluating performance despite the inadequacy of monitoring 
arrangements; and, to quote Smith, "[b]alancing the need for accountability with the 
legitimate desire of non profits for programmatic autonomy and discretion" 
3 Secondly, the 
contract system was not always capable of helping the public sector enhance its relationship 
with voluntary organisations bound to act in accordance with the will of the funder or the 
purchaser; or Jay the foundation of a robust social system with the help of the service 
agencies that failed, on most occasions, to build their own capacities and strengthen 
communities; or translate the ideal of distributive justice into practice, with profit-
motivated nonprofits often reluctant to serve clients with genuine needs. Thirdly, because 
'A. Matheson (1996) The Impact of Contracts on Public Management in New Zealand Public Sector 19:1, p. 
8. 
'T. Ashton (1992) Contracting for Health Services: The Challenge of the 1990s Public Sector 15:4, p. 7. 
'S. R. Smith (2003) Governments and Nonprofits in the Modern Age Society 40:4, p. 45. 
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of the impossibility in many cases of specifying service standards in advance, tbe contract 
system found it difficult to inform tbe public sector whether the desired level of quality 
could be met. Fourthly, the performance evaluation mechanisms at the disposal of tbe 
government, on which the efficacy of tbe contract system depended to a considerable 
extent, were at an early stage of development and quite unlikely to furnish tbe public sector 
with accurate information on tbe results of state spending. Fifthly, the hazard of 'provider 
capture' was far from easy for the public sector to get rid of through the contract system, 
since a few extremely resourceful and/or highly specialised producers were destined to 
enjoy a natural monopoly. Sixthly, it was not at all simple for the public sector to manage 
competition effectively by means of the contract system: the contract had every chance of 
being won by an unprincipled tenderer attempting to renegotiate prices upward after 'setting 
foot at the door'. Seventhly, restraining the opportunistic behaviour of influential and 
powerful contractors and getting the relevant contractual obligations enforced were 
problematic for the public sector - even if the contract system was in force. Finally, tbe 
merits of multiple purchasing for the public sector could not be overestimated in the 
domain of social welfare that was (and still is) characterised by the absence of contestability 
- one of the fundamental characteristics of the contract system - in addition to the 
existence of, in the words of Ashton, "an environment of community responsibility and 
cooperation between providers".' 
The current research indicates that overall New Zealand did succeed in realising, through 
the contract system, some of the most far-reaching neoliberal reforms to make the state 
work better. Steady advances are being made in New Zealand in outsourcing not only 
social services, but such activities as prison management and tax collection. However, New 
'T. Ashton (1992) Reform of the Health Services: Will the New Health System be More Efficient and More 
Equitable? Public Sector 15:1, p. 12 (12-13). 
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Zealand does not, as yet, have an explicit contracting policy in place: the decision to 
contract out is at the discretion of individual departments or ministries. 
Purchase of service contracting: reasons for hope and causes for concern 
The present research suggests that with purchase of service contracting improved upon, it 
is quite possible that big gains in the policy objectives will be made in New Zealand in the 
future. In fact, in implementing any substantial change in the organisation of services, "the 
first phase", to quote 6, "involves building the tools, diffusing them across the system and 
enabling the practitioners to learn how to use them" .
5 Success comes only at a later stage. 
Purchase of service contracting should not be regarded as a grand policy failure just because 
it has proved an uncomfortable experience for a few voluntary organisations in New 
Zealand. Comparison has had to be made between purchase of service contracting and 
direct delivery. A voluntary sector manager has argued that it was purchase of service 
contracting which compelled many service agencies to serve more poor people than they 
might have under public provision, or even the grant system. A policy analyst formerly 
working with the Community Funding Agency has not hesitated to consider contracting out, 
including purchase of service contracting, as "the only public administrative solution to the 
problems of fiscal crisis and globalisation". It has to be borne in mind that while 
suggestions to enhance or alter some of the procedures relating to purchase of service 
contracting are frequent, there is little demand for the abandonment of the contract system. 
Nevertheless, what an outreach worker has observed, while expressing her views on 
purchase of service contracting, makes sense: 
"In choosing between the two alternatives for service delivery, the fundamental 
issue should be providing the best value for money and meeting the 
aspirations of clients and their communities". 
'P. 6 (1997) The New Politics of Welfare Contracting. In P. 6 and J. Kendall (eds.) The Contract Culture in 
Public Services: Studies from Britain, Europe and the USA p. 185. 
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As another outreach worker, no less objective than her co-worker (cited above) vis-a-vis 
purchase of service contracting has commented: 
"I think we should try a mixture of government provzszon and service 
contracting which is healthier. We have always had these strategies in place. 
But, we never measured the outcomes of both in a cooperative, planned, and 
structured manner. That's what we are supposed to do". 
The growth of new research interest in purchase of service contracting in New Zealand in 
the 1990s has not been without a consequence - it is being considered as the factor 
responsible for the current availability of more empirical information pertaining to the 
contracting process. The impact of purchase of service contracting on the third sector is 
being thoroughly investigated. The stringent fiscal situation in which purchase of service 
contracting operates is being assessed. In short, a deeper understanding of the dynamics of 
purchase of service contracting is being attempted. 
At the same time, however, the researcher feels that in the advanced industrialised 
democracies including New Zealand, purchase of service contracting is confronted with 
several challenges which, over time, may become more difficult to grapple with. Before 
concluding, it would be worthwhile to deal with them in brief. 
Purchase of service contracting leads to greater decentralisation, as it involves more 
providers, and fewer common institutions like employment contracts and pay negotiation 
structures. Granting more discretion to a multiplicity of actors, decentralisation makes it 
harder to achieve a set of specific objectives across a whole sector. The fragmentation 
created by decentralisation has the potential to undermine the ability of the contract system 
to deliver any general policy aims. 
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Many politicians and economists are of the opinion that purchase of service contracting is a 
market-like system. From this perspective, the solutions to the problems of inefficiency, 
escalation of costs, lack of innovation, poor accountability, absence of clarity and 
transparency, and unequal distribution look rather straightforward. Producing a wide range 
of quality outputs and social outcomes, selecting tenderers able to do more with less, 
experimenting with programmes, monitoring performance, specifying contractual 
conditions in clear terms, guaranteeing access to relevant information, and skewing the 
resources to the worse off are the main instruments of policy which ought to be resorted to. 
The obstacles to the attainment of these goals must be removed by the state in the name of 
public good. However, the role of contracts cannot be judged by yardsticks drawn from the 
commercial arena, but has to be considered against the criteria that are embedded in the 
processes of government and the nature of the nonprofit sector. Further, in the words of 6, 
"contract welfare ... emerged in response to political problems ... [was] structured by 
political forces and ... will have to be dealt with by ... political strategies".' 
With purchase of service contracting growing in popularity, government is steadily 
relinquishing the responsibility for direct delivery of social services. User charges are 
probably going to be introduced, and competition between producers promoted. Private 
firms may continue to penetrate the social market, making it increasingly difficult for 
voluntary organisations to compete. 
Welfare markets are becoming more international - a trend which is claimed to have the 
potential to challenge the very existence of purchase of service contracting. Numerous 
welfare organisations are operating across frontiers, and in a few cases, trans-continent. 
Regulatory instruments designed for welfare systems in a particular nation state are 
'Ibid, p. 192. 
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becoming blunt. Chances are that large providers with enormous leverage over local and 
national purchasers will probably make their appearance in different social welfare fields. 
New information and communication technologies are quite likely to bring about great 
transformations in welfare systems all over the world. As a consequence, social welfare 
administration, it is believed, will become a technology-intensive, high-skill business. 
Under such circumstances, purchase of service contracting, ideal for low-skill, labour-
intensive welfare markets, may become obsolete. 
The current separations between services (say, health and social care) could well break 
down in the next few years. With the barriers, now under more pressure than ever before 
across the world, gone and the purchasing systems merged, questions, such as what should 
be purchased by which statutory purchaser, may emerge - unlikely to be solved through 
purchase of service contracting. 
It is hard to forecast demand pressures for social services. The rise in the number of people 
approaching retirement age with the expectation of living longer, combined with increasing 
unemployment notwithstanding economic growth, may result in a much greater need for 
social services. However, the termination of tax cuts for the welfare sector and a decline in 
the capability of government to make major investments therein - the two perceptible 
features of the capitalist economies in the West - could, on the other hand, thwart the 
efforts of voluntary organisations to arrange for the production and provision of social 
services. In such circumstances, purchase of service contracting stands little chance to have 
a significant role to play in relation to the development and delivery of social services. 
The political centre of gravity appears to be shifting inconsistently across the western 
world. For example, in the United States, the conservatives are more intent on stripping 
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down taxes than preserving the contract system, while in the United Kingdom, the Labour 
Party is ascribing more importance to partnership and accountability than efficiency or even 
flexibility with regard to the contracting process.' These trends could sharply re-configure 
the political climate within which policy makers must create room for manoeuvre in 
purchase of service contracting. 
With the gradual weakening of voluntary organisations, purchase of service contracting has 
every chance of losing its relevance. It seems that in near future, local authorities would 
become more autonomous and better-resourced than at present. The long-standing system 
of political patronage, which has protected several voluntary organisations, "might well not 
survive", to quote 6, "a renascence of local government".' Secondly, public policy 
pressures to develop competition may pit voluntary organisations against for-profit private 
firms. The performance of nonprofits in such contests is almost sure to be unimpressive. 
Thirdly, voluntary organisations in contracted markets are already beginning to be exposed 
to greater public scrutiny and criticism. Popular support for their role can no longer be 
taken for granted. Fourthly, it will be far from easy for voluntary organisations to rise to the 
challenges of trans-nationalisation - scaling up operations, managing high-technology 
systems, and responding to the volatilities of demand. However, if they fail to perform 
these tasks, no amount of partnership would be able to stabilise their long-term future in 
social welfare markets. 
Examining the scope of these 'imminent dangers' which might have an adverse impact on 
purchase of service contracting in the coming years is beyond the scope of the current 
research. But the hazards should be referred to, as New Zealand can be susceptible to a 
good many of them. 




Purchase of service contracting represents, inter alia, a major shift from direct delivery to 
the purchase of outputs by government from voluntary organisations to complete an overall 
pattern of desired social services. It sets the scene for a different model of relationships 
between the state and service agencies - challenging communitarian 'welfare orthodoxy' 
which assumes that government is a much better 'guardian' of citizenship responsibilities. 
It supports individual freedom and opposes bureaucratic paternalistic authority, and 
champions the political and moral claims of ethnic 'peoples' for 'sectarian' or 
'particularistic' social services. It has the potential to create a strengthened partnership of 
the state with the third sector, leading to an increased availability and refinement in the 
production and provision of a wide range of high quality and flexible social services. It 
ensures the accountability of the purchaser and the producer to each other, clarity of 
contractual terms, and equitable distribution of social services. It is both an administrative 
policy option for addressing the specific issues of the social legitimacy of the government 
involved in direct social services and an effort to borrow from the entrepreneurial 
development systems of cost-benefit analyais and management by objectives. It injects a 
new element into the old debate between 'state socialism' and 'private enterprise' and 
attempts to redesign the structure as well as the vision of a welfare society. 
The researcher thought that it was worthwhile to explore the implications of purchase of 
service contracting as it represented a significant redrafting of some of the strongest 
assumptions about altruistic social exchange integral to the understanding of the welfare 
state. Secondly, since most of the studies on the contractual system of governance were 
focused on normative and/or theoretical discussion and reflected an ideological and/or 
partisan interest, the researcher considered it necessary to undertake an objective empirical 
research on the utility of purchase of service contracting as an effective policy instrument. 
Thirdly, as observed earlier in this chapter (p. 255), the researcher believed that such an 
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endeavour would be instrumental in improving the broader knowledge of government, the 
third sector, and the relationship between the two, and contributing to scholarship in the 
fields of public policy, management, and administration - apart from adding to the 
insignificant number of case studies on the effects of the contract system, especially 
purchase of service contracting, in New Zealand. 
The researcher conceives that purchase of service contracting will stay on in New Zealand 
as an effective policy instrument. However, both contemporary theory and practical 
experience shows that while full of promise, purchase of service contracting needs to 
enhance its capacity to provide a variety of high quality and innovative services, assure of 
mutual accountability, empower communities, and encourage a fair distribution of 
resources; withstand the challenges from internationalisation, changing technologies, 
demand movements, and shifts in the centre of political gravity; and enhance the 
relationship between government and voluntary organisations. 
The researcher argues that in order to be a greater policy success, purchase of service 
contracting requires, above everything else, sustained investment by the state. The benefits 
of purchase of service contracting can hardly be realised if the government is not fiscally 
strong, politically effective, and socially dedicated. Without a continued commitment on 
the part of the state towards partnership building, needs determination and evaluation, 
output and outcome specification, sufficient service funding, and monitoring and 
supervision, the advantages of purchase of service contracting are likely to prove elusive. 
Besides, the government should, among other things, try to improve the contractual 
procedures, develop a policy framework for outsourcing, re-orient the contract model to 
reflect the ingenuity of the third sector, and separate out the two distinct motivations for 
using purchase of service contracting: purchasing specified services in an efficient manner 
and enhancing social conditions. Finally, there must be a shift in the culture and mindset of 
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not only the state but also voluntary organisations towards the development of the 
motivation to forge, over time, an open, positive, and ongoing relationship based on mutual 
respect, appreciation of diverse viewpoints, and shared effort - if they want purchase of 
service contracting to survive and flourish, seek to create a healthy civil society, and wish to 
contribute to what Giddens calls the deepening of democracy.' It would not be out of place 
to refer to some relevant comments made during the interviews on what the Community 
Funding Agency, representing the government in New Zealand, 'should do' in a purchase of 
service contracting situation: 
"CPA should see to it that there is mutual trust, respect, and commitment between 
the purchaser and the provider". 
"CPA should be able to contribute to the improvement in the quantity and quality 
of the programmes to be delivered. 
"CPA should properly fund the voluntary organisations, so they can produce services 
at cheaper rates". 
"CPA should create a situation where service agencies like us are encouraged to 
innovate and work in the areas that are not identified by the government". 
"CPA should know where the funds are all going". 
"CPA should be capable of contributing to the development of social capital and 
the emergence of a civil society". 
"CPA should realise that contracting cannot be an attractive option if it is not a 
clear, straightforward process". 
"CPA should publish the contracts on a regular basis , so that interested parties 
might be able to get hold of them". 
'~CPA should be fair and just - giving all providers equal treatment and allocating 
the resources according to needs". 
'A. Giddens cited in Ministry of Social Policy (2001) Communities and Govemment- Potential for 
Pannership Whakatopu Whakaaro p. 80. 
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In the final chapter that follows, certain concrete measures have been suggested which, 
while unable to take care of bottlenecks like political instability and economic slump, might 
be able to utilise the potential of purchase of service contracting for the empowerment of 
individuals, families, community groups, and voluntary organisations, and the enhancement 
in the relationship between government and service agencies, They have got to be adopted 
by the purchaser on a long-term basis and diffused coherently and consistently across the 
welfare system to make purchase of service contracting a successful policy venture. It 
needs to be mentioned here that since the merger of the Community Funding Agency with 
the Children, Young Persons and Their Families Service in January, 1999, a number of 
strategies, similar to those identified by the researcher, have been recommended to secure 
the benefits, and eliminate, or at least lower, the costs, believed to be associated with 
purchase of service contracting in New Zealand. For instance, the Children, Young Persons 
and Their Families Agency, the Department of Child, Youth and Family Services, Te Puni 
Kokiri, the Ministry of Social Development, the Ministry of Social Policy, and the Treasury 
have come up with a wide range of 'guidelines' for a much better management of purchase 
of service contracting.
10 In the opinion of Morrison, there is a glimmer of hope that the 
barriers obstructing the implementation of purchase of service contracting have been 
recognised and defined.
11 
"Children, Young Persons and their Families Agency (1999) The Blue Print- Decisions Part II: 
Contracting Group Phase Two. Child, Youth and Family (2000) Contracting Strategy. Te Puni Kokiri 
(2000) Maori Provider Views of Government Funding: Key Issues from the Literature and Interviews. 
Ministry of Social Development (2001) Statement of Government Intentions for an Improved Community· 
Government Relationship. Ministry of Social Policy (2001) Communities and Government- Potential for 
Partnership Whakatopu Whakaaro. The Treasury (2001) Guidelines for Contracting with Non-
Government Organisations for Services Sought by the Crown. 
n Al Morrison, Kim Hill Show, RNZ, 07112/2001. 
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Chapterll 
The Future of Purchase of Service Contracting: The Way Ahead 
This chapter concludes the thesis by setting out the recommendations that need to be 
adhered to by the purchaser and providers in order to establish the conditions under which 
purchase of service contracting is likely to work better as an useful mechanism of service 
delivery and an effective policy instrument than at present. First, the measures required to 
be undertaken to achieve the specific objectives by means of purchase of service contracting 
are specified. This is followed by a series of proposals for the enhancement of the overall 
efficacy of purchase of service contracting as a tool of social policy. The suggestions, made 
by the researcher on the basis of his study of purchase of service contracting in 
Otago/Southland, however, have applicability for New Zealand as a whole. 
Need for proposals 
It is believed that by examining the implications of the contract system as a neoliberal 
strategy and undertaking an objective empirical research on the potential of purchase of 
service contracting as an effective policy instrument, the present study has redressed two 
critical gaps in the prevailing literature on contractualism, enhanced the broader knowledge 
of government, the third sector, and the relationship between the two, and contributed to 
scholarship in the fields of public policy, management and administration - apart from 
adding to the insignificant number of case studies on the effects of contracting out in social 
welfare in New Zealand. Here in the concluding chapter, it, however, suggests a series of 
concrete measures to be undertaken by the purchaser (the Community Funding Agency till 
December 1998, then the Contracting Group of the Children, Young Persons and Their 
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Families Agency until September 1999, and now tbe Department of Child, Youth, and 
Family Services) in close consultation with the national umbrella agencies, voluntary 
organisations, and clients, to a) attain its objectives in terms of achieving a genuine 
partnership with suppliers, increasing the quantity of services, improving tbe quality of 
programmes, reducing production costs, responding to changes in the demands of users, 
empowering clients and their communities, promoting clarity of contractual conditions, 
facilitating transparency of tbe contracting process, and encouraging fair and just 
distribution of resources and outputs, and b) enhance the efficacy of purchase of service 
contracting as a tool of social policy. The recommendations it comes up with have 
applicability for New Zealand as a whole- not just the Otago/Southland region. 
Achieving genuine partnership 
The purchaser should acknowledge tbat providers of services have complementary (not 
parallel) strengths, regard producers as partners rather than subsidiaries, and recognise the 
independence and autonomy of suppliers. The necessity for an active, open, two-way 
communication with providers should be admitted; a positive working relationship witb 
producers based on honesty and respect, reciprocity and mutual faith, compassion and 
caring, and commitment to common objectives has to be established; and information, good 
governance practices, workshops, and training must be shared with suppliers. From the 
initial stage to the final, the purchaser should discuss with providers every basic issue 
pertaining to the agreement (determining options, making and changing decisions, 
evaluating services and policy impacts, shifting resources); outline in writing, prior to 
contracting witb producers, tbe accountability structure, the non-negotiable conditions, and 
the termination clauses; and settle differences with suppliers in an amicable manner. A 
plan of action should be devised regarding the development of a close rapport with 
providers for fully funded and highly supported situations, and a charter document to act as 
a framework for partnering strategy formulated in collaboration with producers. The 
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purchaser should allow suppliers to bargain and negotiate with voluntary organisations 
within a clear set of parameters; permit providers to review, comment on, and even 
challenge its priorities, policies, and failures; strive to concur with producers on all key 
issues for the implementation of agreed procedures, achievement of shared goals, and 
realisation of mutual interests; and avoid controlling those activities of contractors which 
have nothing to do with their contractual obligations. Suppliers are not without 
responsibilities as well: the purchaser should be trusted by providers, and its constraints, 
priorities and accountability demands duly acknowledged by them. Besides, while 
participating in the consultation process, producers should accurately represent the views of 
consumers, staff, and members. 
Increasing quantity 
The purchaser should know for sure what objectives it seeks to attain, commence 
negotiations early in the year to get them completed as soon as possible, and contract with 
competent and committed suppliers. During services planning (to be organised when 
providers are not worried about their individual funding and have adequate time to respond 
to contractual issues), a detailed assessment of needs (emerging, current, and projected), 
trends, and gaps in services in each geographic area should be made in consultation with 
producers and customers, and the time frame for deliberations with the community 
extended. The purchaser should get the appropriateness and comprehensiveness of needs 
analysis independently reviewed by an expert panel. Steps should be taken to recruit and 
retain motivated and skilled staff, pay them at market rates, and invest in their professional 
development. In addition, the purchaser should employ qualified and experienced outreach 
workers and contract managers, assign roles and responsibilities to them, adjust their 
caseloads, and arrange for the training that they need to undergo. The outreach workers in 
particular should be allowed sufficient time and provided with adequate resources required 
for the development of personal relations with suppliers and community groups, and every 
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effort must be made to prevent their high turnover to ensure that they continue rather than 
leave. The purchaser should recognise the early warning signs of the financial vulnerability 
of providers and identify the changes needed; share fiscal risks with producers; permit 
suppliers to hold substantial accumulated reserves; develop appropriate trading activities; 
raise funds; and see to it that there is sufficient time for providers between the expiry of the 
previous agreement and the beginning of the subsequent contract. The services should be 
comprehensively defined and carefully costed, the claw-back clause revoked, and penalties 
paid for delayed reimbursements. If the technical efficiency of producers is to be improved, 
serious consideration has to be given to the issue of funding. The purchaser should have a 
well-defined, simple, debatable, flexible, transparent, and accessible framework of funding. 
Clear, written guidelines pertaining to funding should be formulated. The purchaser should 
possess adequate resources to provide for sufficient funding. Stability or consistency of 
funding should be ensured, the payment has to be made on time in accordance with the 
conditions set out in the agreement if there is no breach in the terms of the contract, and 
suppliers are to be kept informed of financial uncertainties and/or budget constraints right 
from the start. The purchaser should arrange for i) interim funding if late in completing 
contract arrangements; ii) 'pro rata' (roll over) funding in case of unreasonable delays in 
contract negotiations, resource allocation decisions, and payments; iii) long-term funding 
(three to five years) for high risk providers with established infrastructure, proven track 
record, and ongoing community support including commercial sponsorship; iv) short-term 
funding where the amount of money involved is not significant, or a new initiative is going 
to be tested or piloted, or a change of policy is announced, or there is a doubt about the 
ability of the producer to deliver; v) not only full funding of all programmes but also the 
payment of establishment, overhead, and transaction costs; vi) part funding in exceptional 
cases like marginal extension of an activity already undertaken by the supplier, an 
agreement entered into for a limited time, contributions made by the provider, and resources 
tapped from alternative sources; vii) additional funding to meet greater client demand for 
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more services, and invest in training as well as research and development; and viii) 
sufficient funding so that community-generated resources do not have to be used by 
producers to subsidise purchaser-determined priorities. Suppliers should be encouraged to 
contact the relevant area manager if unhappy about resource allocation decisions, and 
allowed to modify, discontinue, and seek aid and assistance from elsewhere. The purchaser 
should try, together with providers, to address the concerns relating to funding 
arrangements. The appropriateness of current funding policies should be critically assessed. 
Producers, for their part, should endeavour to fundraise and approach other government 
departments, public agencies, and private trusts for additional funding instead of blaming 
the purchaser of parsimony. Further, sincere and competent staff should be employed by 
suppliers and trained in the skills that contract management necessitates. 
Improving quality 
The purchaser should have a clear idea about the standard of the services it wants to 
purchase, specify the quality of the outputs and outcomes to be provided, and encourage 
providers to raise the level of whatever they deliver. Performance measures (in terms of 
which the quality of outputs and outcomes can be evaluated both during and after service 
provision) should be devised in consultation with producers, a benchmarking process 
established, and comparisons with international experiences made. The purchaser should 
give due weighting to the unique capacity of suppliers to arrange for safe and professional 
delivery of a wide range of quality outputs and outcomes, and arrange for not only output-
but also outcome-based funding. Periodic reviews should be conducted by community 
groups and users to assess the performance of providers in developing quality outputs and 
outcomes. Producers should personally strive as well as wholeheartedly cooperate with the 
purchaser to enhance the standard of outputs and outcomes, and consider adopting an 
accredited quality management system. 
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Reducing cost 
The purchaser should have a thorough understanding of the cost of contract management, 
select suppliers who can produce quality services at cheaper rates, look for alliances with a 
large number of small voluntary organisations, and think of contracting conjointly with 
providers of the same programme delivered in different areas. Contractual conditions and 
accountability requirements should be standardised, performance measures and standards 
simplified, and a benchmarking process set up to determine the price of providing outputs. 
Producers should investigate ways to reduce costs of production, such as redesigning 
working practices, economising on resource use, recruiting volunteers and/or unpaid staff, 
and arranging for extra funding to purchase and/or upgrade equipment. 
Responding to changes 
The purchaser should endeavour to bring about a shift in its attitude to choice and diversity, 
see to it that service specifications are not so tight as to affect innovation and creativity, and 
avoid excessive interference in the autonomy of suppliers which might blunt their initiative. 
Fresh providers should be selected and encouraged by all means to develop and deliver new 
services to cater to the changing requirements of consumers, and funding arrangements 
have had be flexible enough to permit adjustments in the costs of service provision. 
Producers should be responsive to community needs and not just purchaser-determined 
priorities. Besides, volunteers are required to be taken care of: under no circumstances 
should suppliers force them to work without pay and/or for longer hours. 
Ensuring accountability 
The purchaser should collect provider details and evaluate the financial viability of 
producers before entering into an agreement, adopt a more conservative approach to service 
specification when dealing with a supplier without a proven track record, and continue to 
refine contractual arrangements in order to have a firm control on the production and 
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provision of outputs and outcomes. Steps should be taken to develop a set of objective 
criteria to analyse the specific strengths of the different providers, and create an information 
database on producers to monitor sustainability, pick up danger signals, and undertake 
remedial action. The purchaser should remind suppliers of sending feedback on their 
activities at regular intervals, impose sanctions on providers in the event of non-
performance, and make it obligatory on the part of suppliers to use customer satisfaction 
surveys in order to measure client outcomes. At the same time, efforts should be made to 
reward providers for doing well; assist small and new producers by providing advice and 
training on the operation of data collection and accounting systems; develop an internal 
appeal process by means of which suppliers can contest funding decisions; set up advisory 
committees composed of representatives from the contracting agency, providers, and users 
so as to facilitate effective flow of unfiltered information between all service stakeholders; 
streamline the accreditation process to make it less time consuming and more universal; and 
develop performance measures and standards that not only focus on specific producers but 
allow for inter-organisational and cross-sectoral comparisons of performance. The 
purchaser should be accountable to suppliers and consumers, and penalised for not meeting 
timelines and targets; formulate clear, written guidelines pertaining to its own levels of 
accountability to providers; send feedback to producers on what it thinks of their 
performance; ask for reports from suppliers only if there exists a clear rationale behind the 
information called for; see to it that the level of accountability of providers is linked to the 
amount of the resources sanctioned and the degree of risk involved; remember that 
producers have to cater to legitimate accountability expectations of other key funders, too; 
critically evaluate its own suitability as the standard approval body; and thoroughly assess 
the feasibility of models like independent accreditation and peer review. The purchaser has 
to be particularly concerned about the accountability requirements of service suppliers. A 
set of reasonable and relevant accountability requirements should be developed. The 
purchaser should consider all available options for improving the accountability 
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requirements. The accountability requirements should be simple where the contract is 
straightforward and the funding either partial or unsubstantial. The purchaser should avoid 
making frequent changes in the policy relating to the accountability requirements. The 
paperwork and the expenditure pertaining to the accountability requirements should be cut 
short. The purchaser should arrange for funding to cover the costs of meeting the 
accountability requirements where providers are small and new. Easier accountability 
requirements should be in place for the producers delivering low-to-medium support 
services. The purchaser should permit greater involvement of suppliers in the development 
of the accountability requirements. The accountability system should, however, be based 
on mutual faith: providers have got to report to the purchaser on an ongoing basis on how 
they are performing in conformity with the specifications set out in the contract. 
Empowering communities 
The purchaser should acknowledge that the governance arrangements, work culture, and 
operating realities of all producers are not the same; show its appreciation for pluralism by 
supporting different types of voluntary organisations engaged in a variety of activities and 
operating in diverse areas; work out ways to balance its own needs and objectives with 
those of suppliers; and state in the agreement its commitment to community empowerment 
and recognise in the preamble to the contract the distinctive values of providers which 
differentiate them from commercial enterprises. Producers should be stimulated to form 
networks and share information and expertise (although a healthy competitive environment 
has to prevail when they are out to win a contract); encouraged to uphold their own cultural, 
philosophical, and ethical beliefs and carry out advocacy, preventive, and developmental 
work; provided with long-term funding to enable them to build and/or maintain their 
capabilities; respected for their knowledge and experience; and adored for their unique 
potential to develop strong communities and a democratic civil society. The purchaser 
should establish cordial relationships with suppliers before contracts are negotiated and 
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work out a set of ground rules for the consolidation of future relations; consult with 
providers often endowed with a much better understanding of the specific requirements of 
the communities; utilise the expertise of producers in enhancing programmes and policies 
and achieving the shared goal of social participation; and encourage suppliers to participate 
in planning, decision making, resource allocation, policy development, and service delivery 
at the local level. Effective strategies should be devised in collaboration with providers to 
address such needs as developing and delivering programmes, and training and managing 
staff. The purchaser should urge producers to 'professionalise' their style of production and 
provision; review the values, capabilities, and activities of suppliers without interfering in 
their internal affairs; keep the government informed of the health and viability of providers; 
and support, resource, and liaise with the umbrella bodies (NZCCSS, NZCOSS, 
NZFVWO). Certain special measures need to be taken in relation to clients. Apart from 
consulting with clients and acknowledging the value of their support, the purchaser should 
establish a code of consumer rights for them. Social and cultural audits should be 
conducted to verify if the requirements of clients are being addressed, and an accessible 
complaints process created for users and producers. The purchaser should fund more 
preventive programmes and early intervention services attuned to the needs of clients. 
Suppliers should do everything they can to develop their own strength, empower the 
communities, and protect the interests of clients. 
Promoting clarity 
The purchaser should formulate clear policies m respect of all aspects of the contract 
lifecycle - planning, tendering, negotiation, performance evaluation, and termination of 
the agreement, and develop robust contracts, specifying therein the contractual conditions in 
unambiguous language. Further, there should be written guidelines on accreditation and 
contract management, and the key terms associated with the contract system must be 
defined in no uncertain terms. During the consultation process, providers should get their 
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doubts with regard to any provision in the agreement clarified, and assist the purchaser, if 
necessary, in writing complex contracts. 
Facilitating transparency 
The purchaser should arrange for timely release of key reports relating to its contracting 
policies, and permit producers and clients instant access to all relevant information 
pertaining to the contract in normal circumstances. Confidentiality or 'gagging' clauses 
should not be included in the agreement, and the Official Information Act 1982 can be used 
only when absolutely necessary. Suppliers should be Jess secretive about their working 
methods and alternative sources of income, and stop sending only guarded feedback to the 
purchaser. 
Encouraging justice 
Small and new providers have to be taken care of. The purchaser should recognise the 
contribution made, and the wider role played, by them; simplify the tendering procedure, 
the accreditation process, and the accountability requirements for them; provide them with 
not only funding but also subsidies and grants-in-aid; keep the contracting process under 
constant surveillance to ensure that it does not discriminate against them; and call upon 
large and well-established producers to help them in every possible way. Some positive 
steps are required to be taken to alleviate the frustration of non-Pakeha suppliers. The 
purchaser should be aware and appreciative of their culture and the values and beliefs 
upheld by them; get them involved in consultation, planning, and policy processes to enable 
their traditionally 'silent' voices to be heard; arrange for liberal financial aid and relevant 
technical assistance to help them develop their infrastructure and expertise, manage their 
own service delivery options, and deliver quality outputs and improved outcomes for their 
consumers; encourage them (endowed with local knowledge and experience as they are) to 
render culturally sensitive and appropriate services for the enhancement of the social well-
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being of their communities; convene forums at the national level at regular intervals (say, 
once a year) to give them the opportunity to assume greater ownership of the contracting 
framework; see to it that the recommendations made by them are taken account of; and 
consider setting up a service team responsible for approval, funding, contract management, 
and performance appraisal exclusively for them. In order to ensure fair and just distribution 
of resources and outputs, certain general measures are to be undertaken. The purchaser 
should focus on producing services which respond to the demands of clients, rather than 
designing programmes that fit into its own structural arrangements; distribute funding in 
accordance with the level of consumer needs; employ more staff (especially outreach 
workers) belonging to the different ethnic groups, for they will have a deeper understanding 
of the cultural and societal values of their own communities; and see to it that all suppliers 
receive information relating to the contract in their own language. Providers should 
periodically review the changing requirements and unmet needs of customers and 
immediately bring them to the notice of the purchaser. 
Enhancing the efficacy of purchase of service contracting 
Improving the efficacy of purchase of service contracting as an effective policy instrument 
with the potential to bring about significant changes vis-a-vis the service delivery 
mechanism, perceptible improvement in the relationship between the purchaser and 
producers, and substantial empowerment of voluntary organisations - entails a host of 
activities. The purchaser should make a thorough and impartial assessment of tenderers 
against a set of clearly defined selection criteria like programme quality and business 
viability; keep on reviewing its contract management against departmental guidelines, 
feedback from suppliers and consumers, and performance of other agencies, and pondering 
on the enhancements that can be made; reflect on what to do in future (renegotiating the 
contract with the provider or rolling it over, selecting another contractor, discontinuing the 
service) well before the end of an agreement and inform the producer of its decision; 
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consult other government departments in a contractual relationship with the same suppliers; 
check if the services currently delivered are more important or effective than those no 
longer provided; and directly contract for outcomes where providers are capable of 
producing them and can be held responsible for the purpose. Due consideration should be 
given to introducing a grant programme in the case of community-defined initiatives, 
employing separate staff with specialist skills in such areas as agency selection and 
consultation, setting up a call centre which will allow the producer instant access to the 
information pertaining to funding or approvals, and releasing a report on previous year's 
contracting round - listing therein the services which should have been funded but were 
not. To make purchase of service contracting not just work better but contribute to the 
enhancement of the overall efficiency of the public sector, the purchaser should weigh its 
benefits and costs against those of other existing and potential funding arrangements; 
monitor, on an ongoing basis, its impact on the government, the contracting agency, the 
voluntary sector, and users; develop its policy framework which must be easy to understand 
and work within; avoid making frequent alterations in its structure and functions; and take 
on board all long-standing concerns in relation to its operation and management. Finally, 
the Treaty of Waitangi should be respected, Maori suppliers regarded as Treaty partners, 
and the contracting strategy implemented in the light of the Treaty. Providers, on the 
whole, should engage in a healthy competition with each other while applying for funding, 
act in conformity with the specifications laid down by the purchaser in delivering a wide 
range of high quality, cost-effective and flexible services for all categories of clients, and 





The following questions are divided into six sections - achieving equal partnership, 
increasing quantity, improving quality, saving costs, reporting and monitoring, 
empowering clients and communities, promoting clarity, facilitating accessibility and 
encouraging fairness and justice. To answer a question, you need to circle a number which 
is closest to the view held by you. You are requested to make comments whenever you feel 
like - using the blank space on the other side of each page, if necessary . 
Achieving equal partnership 
1. Is there a genuine partnership between CF A and your organisation with regard to: 
1. Contractual decision-making 
2. Identification and assessment of community needs 
3. Information sharing 
4. Consultation and negotiation of agreements 
5. All of these 
6. Some of these (please specify) 
7. One of these (please specify) 
8. None ofthese 
9. Don't know 





4. All of these 
5. Some of these (please specify) 
6. One of these (please specify) 
7. None of these 
8. Don't know 
3. Does CFA have faith in your organisation? 
1. Absolute faith 
2. Some faith 
3. Little faith 
4. No faith at all 
5. Don't know 
4. Has purchase of service contracting resulted in greater accessibility of your organisation 
to governmental decision-making? 
1. Certain! y 
2. To some extent 
3. Not really 
4. Not at all 
5. Don't know 
5. Has CF A curtailed the independence of your organisation? 
1. Not at all 
2. Not really 
3. To some extent 
4. Significantly 
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5. Don't know 
6. Has the fusion of the processes of approval and service purchasing led to concentration 
of monopsony power in the hands of CF A in relation to your organisation? 
1. Not at all 
2. Not really 
3. To some extent 
4. Certainly 
5. Don't know 
7. Is it necessary to bring about greater reciprocity in the relationship between CF A and 
your organisation? 
1. Not necessary at all 
2. Not really necessary 
3. Quite necessary 
4. Absolutely necessary 
5. Don't know 
Increasing quantity 
8. Does the 'Services Planning' process involve: 
I. Taking into account the experience of service agencies or the information provided by them 
2. Quantifying the extent of needs and the adequacy of resources 
3. Allowing sufficient time for negotiation and consultation 
4. All of these 
5. Some of these (please specify) 
6. One of these (please specify) 
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7. None of these 
8. Don't know 
9. Does the 'National Needs Indicator Index' : 
1. Produce results that are replicable with available information 
2. Use effective indicators 
3. Provide documented rationales for the weightings used 
4. All of these 
5. Some of these (please specify) 
6. One of these (please specify) 
7. None of these 
8. Don't know 
10. Are the services that your organisation provides as per the contract funded partly or 
wholly by CF A? 
1. Wholly 
2. Either wholly or partly depending on the service 
3. Almost always partly 
4. Always partly 
5. Don't know 
11. Is CF A funding for the your organisation: 
1. Always above average 
2. Sometimes above average 
3. AI ways average 
4. Always below average 
5. Don't know 
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12. Can yonr organisation carry on withont CF A funding? 
1. Certainly 
2. Somehow 
2. Not really 
4. Not at all. 
5. Don't know 
13. Is CF A funding sufficient for your organisation? 
1. Quite sufficient 
2. More or less sufficient 
3. Not really sufficient 
4. Not sufficient at all 
5. Don't know 
14. Is your organisation affected by the gap (if any) between CFA funding and the actual 
cost of service provision? 
1. Not at all 
2 Not really 
3. To some extent 
4. Significantly 
5. Don't know 
15. Does the uncertainty of CFA funding cause financial insecurity for your organisation? 
1. Not at all 
2. Not really 
3. To some extent 
4. Significantly 
5. Don't know 
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16. What are the undesirable measures that your organisation may have to take as a result 
of lack of financial security? 
1. Retrench staff 
2. Decrease spending on administrative support, maintenance and/or replacement of assets, 
research and development 
3. Incur debts 
4. Increase costs 
5. Compromise on service quality 
6. None of these 
7. One of these (please specify) 
8. Some of these (please specify) 
9. All of these 
10. Don't know 
17. Does the transfer of the fiscal risk to your organisation cause poor service delivery on 
its part? 
1. Not at all 
2. Not really 
3. To some extent 
4. Certainly 
5. Don't know 




4. None of these 
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5. One of these (please specify) 
6. Some of these (please specify) 
7. All of these 
8. Don't know 






5. Don't know 





5. Don't know 





5. Don't know 
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22. Does your organisation have sufficient time between the expiry of the previous contract 





5. Don't know 
23. Is your organisation sometimes forced, because of financial constraints, to: 
1. Lay off workers 
2. Pay workers below market rates 
3. Employ volunteers to work on lower wages 
4. Make volunteers work for longer working hours 
5. None of these 
6. One of these (please specify) 
7. Some of these (please specify) 
8. All of these 
9. Don't know 
24. Does the usual length of the contract (one year) disable your organisation to: 
1. Plan ahead for the continuation of existing services 
2. Focus on long-term objectives 
3. Take risks 
4. None of these 
5. One of these (please specify) 
6. Some of these (please specify) 
7. All of these 
8. Don't know 
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25. Does your organisation have the manpower and expertise required to discharge its 
contractual responsibilities? 
1. Certain! y 
2. Somewhat 
3. Not really 
4. Not at all 
5. Don't know 
26. Are the services provided by your organisation: 
1. Essential 
2. Manifold 
3. Professionally delivered 
4. All of these 
5. Some ofthese (please specify) 
6. One of these (please specify) 
7. None ofthese 
8. Don't know 
27. Is your organisation: 
1. Non-commercial 
2. Non-profit distributing 
3. Altruistic 
4. All of these 
5. Some of these (please specify) 
6. One of these (please specify) 
7. None of these 
8. Don't know 
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28. Since the introduction of purchase of service contracting, has the quantity of your 
services: 
1. Increased 
2. Partially increased/remained the same 
3. Partial! y decreased 
4. Decreased 
5. Don't know 
29. Since the introduction of purchase of service contracting, has the number of your paid 
staff: 
1. Increased 
2. Partially increased/ remained the same 
3. Partially decreased 
4. Decreased 
5. Don't know 
30. Since the introduction of purchase of service contracting, has the funding received by 
you from CFA: 
1. Increased 
2. Partially increased/ remained the same 
3. Partially decreased 
4. Decreased 
5. Don't know 
31. Since the introduction of purchase of service contracting, has the funding received by 
you from other sources: 
1. Increased 
2. Partially increased/remained the same 
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3. Partially decreased 
4. Decreased 
5. Don't know 
32. Since the introduction of purchase of service contracting, has your expenditure on the 
payment of the salaries of your staff: 
1. Increased 
2. Partially increased/remained the same 
3. Partially decreased 
4. Decreased 
5. Don't know 
33. Since the introduction of purchase of service contracting, has your expenditure on the 
reimbursement of the expenses of your volunteers: 
1. Increased 
2. Partially increased/remained the same 
3. Partially decreased 
4. Decreased 
5. Don't know 
34. Since the introduction of purchase of service contracting, has your expenditure on the 
training of your staff and volunteers: 
1. Increased 
2. Partially increased/remained the same 
3. Partially decreased 
4. Decreased 
5. Don't know 
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35. Since the introduction of purchase of service contracting, has your expenditure on 
administrative support: 
. Increased 
2. Partially increased/remained the same 
3. Partially decreased 
4. Decreased 
5. Don't know 
36. Since the introduction of purchase of service contracting, has the time spent by you on 
applying for funding: 
L Decreased 
2. Partially decreased/ remained the same 
3. Partially increased 
4. Increased 
5. Don't know 
37. Since the introduction of purchase of service contracting, has your capacity to replace 
assets: 
L Increased 
2. Partially increased/remained the same 
3. Partially decreased 
4. Decreased 
5. Don't know 
38. Since the introduction of purchase of service contracting, has the rent paid by you for 
the premises: 
L Decreased 
2. Partially decreased/ remained the same 
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3. Partially increased 
4. Increased 
5. Don't know 
39. Since the introduction of purchase of service contracting, has your level of financial 
reserves: 
1. Increased 
2. Partially increased/remained the same 
3. Partially decreased 
4. Decreased 
5. Don't know 
40. Has your organisation stopped providing any services since the introduction of 
purchase of service contracting? 
1. None 
2. A few (please specify) 
2. Some (please specify) 
4. All/many 
5. Don't know 
41. If the current level of CFA funding continues, are there any services presently provided 
that your organisation will be unable to deliver in near future? 
1. None 
2. A few (please specify) 
2. Some (please specify) 
4. All/many 
5. Don't know 
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42. Does your organisation use good employment practices for its staff? 
1. Always 
2. Sometimes 
3. Depending on financial circumstances (please specify) 
4. Can't afford 
5. Don't know 
43. Does your organisation pay its staff at market rates? 
1. Always 
2. Sometimes 
3. Depending on financial circumstances (please specify) 
4. Can't afford 
5. Don't know 
44. Does your organisation place the obligation to serve its clients ahead of everything else? 
1. Always 
2. Sometimes 
3. Depending on financial circumstances (please specify) 
4. Can't afford 
5. Don't know 
45. Does your organisation focus on the specific needs of its clients? 
1. Always 
2. Sometimes 
3. Depending on financial circumstances (please specify) 
4. Can't afford 
5. Don't know 
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46. Do you think that the outreach workers have: 
1. The experience to identify the problems of your organisation 
2. The expertise to assess community needs 
3. The time and resources to communicate with providers and evaluate the progress achieved by 
them 
4. All of these 
5. Some of these (please specify) 
6. One of these (please specify) 
7. None of these 
8. Don't know 
47. Do you think that the contract managers have: 
I. Adequate knowledge of contract procedures 
2. Sufficient understanding of the functioning of your organisation 
3. Capacity to maintain good working relationships with service providers 
4. All of these 
5. Some ofthese (please specify) 
6. One of these (please specify) 
7. None of these 
8. Don't know 
Improving quality 
48. Has the introduction of purchase of service contracting improved the overall standard 
of your organisation? 
I. Certainly 
2. To some extent 
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3. Not really 
4. Not at all 
5. Don't know 
49. Since the introduction of purchase of service contracting, has the quality of your 
services: 
1. Improved 
2. Partially improved/remained the same 
3. Partially declined 
4. Declined 
5. Don't know 
50. Is it difficult for your organisation to measure outputs in terms of quality? 
1. Not difficult at all 
2. Not really difficult 
3. Quite difficult 
4. Very difficult 
5. Don't know 
51. Is it difficult for your organisation to quantify outcomes? 
1. Not difficult at all 
2. Not really difficult 
3. Quite difficult 
4. Very difficult 
5. Don't know 
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52. Does CFA give adequate attention to measuring the quality of the programmes 





5. Don't know 
53. Do you believe that the level of client satisfaction can be measured? 
I. Certainly 
2. To some extent 
3. Not really 
4. Not at all 
5. Don't know 
Reducing cost 
54. Has purchase of service contracting enabled your organisation to reduce its production 
costs? 
1. Certain! y 
2. To some extent 
3. Not really 
4. Not at all 
5. Don't know 
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55. Has the volunteer support received by your organisation been enough to help it deliver 
cost-effective services? 
1. Certainly 
2. More or less 
3. Not really 
4. Not at all 
5. Don't know 
Responding to changes 
56. Does your organisation succeed in: 
1. Changing programme directions 
2. Evading unnecessary administrative regulations and/or rigid political constraints 
3. Attracting volunteer support 
4. Providing specialised services 
5. Developing experimental patterns of service delivery 
6. All ofthese 
7. Some of these (please specify) 
8. One of these (please specify) 
9. None of these 
10. Don't know 
57. Since the introduction of purchase of service contracting, has your expenditure on 
developing new progranunes: 
1. Increased 
2. Partially increased/remained the same 
3. Partially decreased 
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4. Decreased 
5. Don't know 
58. Has your organisation started providing new services since the introduction of 
purchase of service contracting? 
1. Many 
2. Some (please specify) 
3. A few (please specify) 
4. None 
5. Don't know 
59. Is your organisation prepared to provide additional services at the current level of CFA 
funding? 
1. Many 
2. Some (please specify) 
3. A few (please specify) 
4. None 
5. Don't know 
60. Is your organisation ready to provide additional services even without volunteer 
support? 
1. Many 
2. Some (please specify) 
3. A few (please specify) 
4. None 
5. Don't know 
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61. Are there additional services that your organisation would like to provide if CFA 
funding increases? 
1. Many 
2. Some (please specify) 
3. A few (please specify) 
4. None 
5. Don't know 
62. Does your organisation respond to the changing needs of its clients? 
1. Always 
2. Sometimes 
3. Depending on financial circumstances (please specify) 
4. Can't afford 
5. Don't know 
63. Does purchase of service contracting help your clients choose from a large number of 
services? 
1. Certainly 
2. To some extent 
3. Not really 
4. Not at all 
5. Don't know 
64. Does your organisation try to develop new and innovative services for its clients? 
1. Always 
2. Sometimes 
3. Depending on financial circumstances (please specify) 
4. Can't afford 
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5. Don't know 





5. Don't know 





5. Don't know 
67. Does your organisation experience: 
1. Spontaneous volunteer support 
2. Continuous volunteer support 
3. Increasing volunteer support 
4. All of these 
5. Some of these (please specify) 
6. One of these (please specify) 
7. None of these 
8. Don't know 
252 
68. Since the introduction of purchase of service contracting, has volunteer support for 
your organisation: 
1. Increased 
2. Partially increased/remained the same 
3. Partially decreased 
4. Decreased 
5. Don't know 
Reporting and monitoring 
69. Does the accreditation system introduced by CFA emphasise desirable practice 





5. Don't know 
70. Has purchase of service contracting given your organisation an opportunity to evaluate 
its level of performance against agreed standards of quality? 
1. Certainly 
2. To some extent 
3. Not really 
4. Not at all 
5. Don't know 
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71. Has CF A succeeded in measuring the viability of your organisation? 
1. Certain! y 
2. To some extent 
3. Not really 
4. Not at all 
5. Don't know 
72. Does your organisation have sophisticated and modern information and accounting 
systems? 
1. Certain! y 
2. Some 
3. Not really 
4. Not at all 
5. Don't know 
73. Are the application, information and reporting requirements supposed to be adhered 




4. All of these 
5. Some of these (please specify) 
6. One of these (please specify) 
7. None of these 
8. Don't know 
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74. Do the application, information and reporting requirements of purchase of service 
contracting have an adverse impact on your organisation in terms of time and resources? 
1. Not at all 
2. Not really 
3. Somewhat 
4. Certainly 
5. Don't know 





5. Don't know 





5. Don't know 






5. Don't know 





5. Don't know 
79. In case of complaints, does your organisation immediately take the necessary steps to 





5. Don't know 
80. Do you think that the performance evaluation mechanisms for the measurement of 
outputs and outcomes are adequately developed? 
1. Sufficiently developed 
2. More or less developed 
3. Not really developed 
4. Not developed at all 
5. Don't know 
81. Do you believe that the institution of the performance evaluation mechanisms might 
be: 
l.A costly process 
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2. A time-consuming process 
3. An iterative process 
4. None of these 
5. One of these (please specify) 
6. Some of these (please specify) 
7. All of these 
8. Don't know 
Empowering clients and communities 
82. Is your organisation capable of: 
L Establishing close relationships with clients 
2. Networking with other providers 
3. Introducing and enhancing community development programmnes 
4. Facilitating community participation in decision-making 
5. Influencing funding decisions 
6. All of these 
7. Some of these (please specify) 
8. One of these (please specify) 
9. None of these 
10. Don't know 
83. Has purchase of service contracting increased the credibility and reputation of your 
organisation as the harbinger of social change and progress? 
L Certainly 
2. To some extent 
3. Not really 
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4. Not at all 
5. Don't know 





5. Don't know 





5. Don't know 
86. Does the unavailability of additional CFA funding disable your organisation to develop 
and maintain welfare networks for its clients? 
1. Not at all 
2. Not really 
3. To some extent 
4. Certainly 
5. Don't know 
87. Does CFA prevent your organisation from undertaking: 
1. Preventive work 
2. Developmental work 
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3. Advocacy work 
4. None of these 
5. One of these (please specify) 
6. Some of these (please specify) 
7. All ofthese 
8. Don't know 





5. Don't know 
89. Does your organisation encourage its clients to participate in the planning and 





5. Don't know 





5. Don't know 
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5. Don't know 
92. Since the introduction of purchase of service contracting, has the support from the 
community for your organisation: 
I. Increased 
2. Partially increased/remained the same 
3. Partially decreased 
4. Decreased 
5. Don't know 
Promoting clarity 
93. How does CFA set forth contractual terms and conditions for your organisation? 
I. Very clearly 
2. Rather clearly 
3. Not quite clearly 
4. Not clearly at all 
5. Don't know 
94. How does CFA specify outputs for your organisation? 
I. Very clearly 
2. Rather clearly 
3. Not quite clearly 
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4. Not clearly at all 
5. Don't know 
95. How does CFA define outcomes for your organisation? 
1. Very clearly 
2. Rather clearly 
3. Not quite clearly 
4. Not clearly at all 
5. Don't know 
Facilitating transparency 





5. Don't know 






5. Don't know 
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Encouraging fairness and justice 
98. Do you believe that purchase of service contracting contributes to: 
1. Provision of services in conformity with the needs of the ethnic and cultural minorities 
2. Assistance in developing the expertise required for the production and delivery of social 
services 
3. Purchase of services from iwi-based organisation 
4. All of these 
5. Some of these (please specify) 
6. One of these (please specify) 
7. None of these 
8. Don't know 
99. Are the principal purposes of your organisation: 
1. To provide equal and fair treatment to all clients 
2. To facilitate accessibility to outputs 
3. To replicate the services withdrawn from the public sector 
4. To arrange for relief and care 
5. To advocate on behalf of people with unmet needs 
6. To redistribute resources 
7. All of these 
8. Some of these (please specify) 
9. One of these (please specify) 
10. None of these 
11. Don't know 
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100. Do you think that purchase of service contracting has contributed to the display of 
equal concern by CF A for all voluntary organisations with regard to allocation of 
funding? 
1. Certain! y 
2. To some extent 
3. Not really 
4. Not at all 
5. Don't know 





5. Don't know 





5. Don't know 






5. Don't know 
104. Does your organisation replicate for the benefit of its clients the services withdrawn 





5. Don't know 
1 OS. Do you believe that CF A funding is based on specified and restricted client groups 
that relate to departmental responsibilities? 
1. Not at all 
2. Not really 
3. Sometimes 
4. Certain! y 
5. Don't know 
106. Is your organisation concerned only with the client population that typifies only its 
own social mandate for voluntary action? 
1. Not at all 
2. Not really 
3. Sometimes 
4. Certainly 
5. Don't know 
107. Does your organisation intrude into: 
1. The personal preferences of its clients 
2. The moral preferences of its clients 
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3. The religious preferences of its clients 
4. None of these 
5. One of these (please specify) 
6. Some of these (please specify) 
7. All of these 
8. Don't know 









1. How would you describe the relationship between your/a voluntary organisation and 
CFA? 
2. From your experience, could you comment on the important characteristics of a 
successful contract between your/a voluntary organisation and CF A? 
3. Do you believe that your/the voluntary organisation!s was/were adversely affected by the 
contracting process administered by CFA? If so, how? 
4. Could you say a few words on the efforts made by CF A to improve the contract system 
in terms of a) identification and prioritisation of community needs, b) specification of 
contractual terms (including outputs and outcomes), c) extension of the length of the 
contract and d) contract renewal? 
5. How would you rate your/a voluntary organisation as a place to work? 
6. How would you account for the relationship between your/a voluntary organisation and 
its clients? 
7. How about the problems encountered by your/a voluntary organisation in measuring 
outputs and outcomes? 
8. How would you explain the non-Pakeha perspective to the contracting process? 
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9. Do you think that overall, your/a voluntary organisation is more suitable than both 
government and the private sector in respect of tbe provision of social and welfare services 
at the grassroots level? 
10. Do you believe that on the whole your/a voluntary organisation is capable of fulfilling 
the expectations of government as well as the public? 
11. Do you think that it is necessary to consider options other than purchase of service 
contracting for effective and efficient service delivery? 




Name of the voluntary Level Area Age Size 
Funding Client group 
organisation 
DUNEDIN 
Anglican Methodist Family Regional Urban Old (28 years) Large (6 
f/1 and 34 p/1 staff) Above average (70%) Pakeha 
Care Centre 
Aroha KiTe Tamarikl Regional Urban Old (9 years) Large (2 f
ull-land 5 pit staff) Average (25%) Pakeha 
Barnardos Dunedin Affiliated Urban Old (45 years) L
arge (20 f/1 and 15 p/1 staff) Below average (<1%) Pakeha 
Catholic Social Services Affiliated Urban Old (31 years) Large (
2 fit and 8 pit staff) Average (31%) Pakeha 
CORPAC Budgeting Service Regional Urban New (4 years) Sm
all (1 fit and 2 pit staff) Above average (60%) Pakeha 
Trust 
Creative Arts Trust Regional Urban Old (13 years) Small (5 fit s
taff) Below average (1 0% ) Mixed 
Disabled Citizens Society Regional Urban Old (30 years) Large (17
 fit and 3 pit staff) Average (50°/n) Pakeha 
Dunedin Budget Advisory Affiliated Urban Old (27 years) Large (1
 fit and 5 pit staff) Above average (84%) Pakeha 
Service Inc 
Dunedin Community Care Trust Regional Urban New (5 years) Large (42 fit and
 18 pit staff) Below average (<1%) Pakeha 
Dunedin Victim Support Affiliated Urban New (5 years) Small 
(1 pit staff) Average (55%) Pakeha 
Group Inc 
Hawkesbury Community Regional Urban Old (7 years) Large 
(16 fit and 2 pit staff) Average (50%) Pakeha 
Living Trust 
New Zealand Crippled Affiliated Urban Old (63 years) 
Large (30 fit and 15 pit staff) Average (30%) Pakeha 
Children's Society Dunedin Inc "" 
Otago Youth Wellness Trust Regional Urban New (3 years) Large 
(2 fit and 14 pit staff) Below average (16%) Pakeha 
\9
Pregnancy Help Dunedin Affiliated Urban Old (22 years) Small 
(I pit staff) Average (50%) Pakeha 
.4 
Presbyterian Support Regional Urban Old (90 years) Large 
(300 fit and 450 pit staff) Below average (<20%) Pakeha 
Services Otago Inc 
Rape Crisis Dunedin Inc Affiliated Urban Old (20 years) Small (5 pit 
staff) Average (30%) Pakeha 
Refugee Support Group Inc Regional Urban Old (1 o years) Small 
(1 pit staff) Above average (97%) Non-Pakeha 
Schizophrenia Fellowship Affiliated Urban Old (22 years) Large 
(6 fit and 3 pit staff) Above average (70%) Pakeha 
Otago Branch Inc 
STRIVE Charitable Trust Regional Urban New (5 years) Small 
( 1 fit and 1 pit staff) Average (55%) Pakeha 
Te Hou Ora Otepoti Inc Regional Urban Old (22 years) Small 
(1 fit and 2 pit staff) Average (25%) Non-Pakeha 
The Work Opportunities Trust Regional Urban Old (13 years) Small (4 fit a
nd 1 pit stat~ Above average (60%) Pakeha 
Toughlove Lower South Affilia1ed Urban Old (1 0 years) Small 
(2 fit and 1 pit) Average (45%) Pakeha 
Island Inc 
Vouthline Dunedin Inc Affiliated Urban Old (26 years Small 
(1 pit staff) Average (30%) Pakeha 
INVERCARGILL 
Birthright Southland Inc Affiliated Urban Old (40 years) Small (5 p/t staff) Average (45%) Pakeha 
Birthright Southland Inc 
lnvercargill Budget Affiliated Urban Old (40 years) Small (5 p/t staff) Average (45%) Pakeha 
Advisory Service Inc Affiliated Urban Old (25 years) Small (3 p/t staff) N/A Mixed 
lnvercargill Victim 
Support Inc Affiliated Urban Old (10 years) Small (1 f/t staff) N/A Pakeha 
Jubilee Christian Charitable 
Trust Inc Regional Urban Old (1 0 years) Small (4 p/t staff) Above average (66%) Pakeha 
Lifeline lnvercargill Inc 
Murihiku lwi Whanau Services Affiliated Urban Old (32 years) Small (5 p/t staff) Above average (65%) Mixed 
Charitable Trust Regional Urban New (3 years) Small (2 f/t staff) Average (50%) Non-Pakeha 
Pregnancy Help Inc 
lnvercargill Branch Affiliated Urban Old (20 years) Small (1 p/t staff) N/A Pakeha 
Samoan Advisory Council Inc 
Southland Abuse Intervention Affiliated Urban Old (9 years) Large (1 0 p/t staff) N/A Non-Pakeha 
Programme Regional Urban New (5 years) Large (1 f/t and 15 p/t staff) Below average (12%} Pakeha 
South Centre Community 
House Regional Urban Old (7 years) Large (2 fit and 4 p/t staff) Above average (60%) Pakeha 
Southland Enterprises Inc 
Women's Supportline Rape Regional Urban Old (25 years) Large (14 f/t and 6 p/t staff) Below average (23%) Pakeha 
Crisis Southland Inc Affiliated Urban Old (7 years) Small (3 p/t staff) Above average (60%) Mixed 
Youthline Southland Inc ... 




Family Care Centre Regional Rural Old (7 years) Small (2 p/t staff) Above average (1 00%) Pakeha 
New Zealand Riding 
Disabled Association for the Affiliated Rural Old (7 years) Small (2 p/t staff) Below average (16%) Pakeha 
Clutha District Group Inc 
Support Group Inc 
The Clutha Budget 
Advisory Service Affiliated Rural Old (15 years) Small ( 1 f/t staff) N/A Pakeha 
GORE 
Gore and Districts Budget 
Advisory Service Inc Affiliated Rural Old (15 years) Small (2 p/t staff) Above average (1 00%) Pakeha 
Gore and Districts Community 
Counselling Centre Inc Regional Rural Old (11 years) Large (2 fit and 4 pit staff) Below average (20%) Pakeha 
Gore and Districts 
Victim Support Inc 
Te Whanau o Hokonui Affiliated Rural New (5 years) Small ( 1 fit stat~ Average (25%) Pakeha 
Marae Inc Regional Rural Old (7 years) Small (1 fit and 4 pit staff) Above average (65%) Non·Pakeha 
OAMARU 
North Otago Budget 
Advisory Service Affiliated Rural New (5 years) Small (1 pit staff) NiA Pakeha
 
Oamaru Victim 
Support Group Inc Affiliated Rural New (3 years) Small ( 1 pit staff) Average (50%) Pakeha 
ALEXANDRA 
Central Otago Budgeting 
Service Inc Affiliated Rural Old (17 years) Small (2 pit staff) NiA Pakeha
 
Anglican Methodist 
Family Care Centre Affiliated Aural New (6 years) Small (1 fit and 4 pit staff) NiA Pakeha 
QUEENSTOWN 
Wakatipu Victim 
Support Group Inc Affiliated Rural New (5 years) Small (1 fit staff) NiA Mixed 
NIGHTCAPS 
Takitimu Community 






Support Group Inc Affiliated Rural New (4 years) Small (1 pit staff) Above average (75%)
 Mixed 
TAPANUI 
The 26 Centre 
Regional Rural New (6 years) Small (4 pit staff) Above average (80%) Mixed 
TUATAPERE 
Tuatapere Community 
Worker Support Group Inc Regional Rural New (6 years) Small (1 pit staff) Above average (1 00%) Mixed 
RIVERTON 
Riverton Community 
Charitable Trust Regional Rural Old (8 years) Small (1 fit staff) Average (35%) Non-Pakeha 
"' 
~ 
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Values for Voluntary 
the responses organisations 
to the questions 





















































































































0 0 0 
0 -1 0 
0 -1 0 
0 -1 N/A 
-1 0 -1 
-1 -1 















































































-1 N/A -1 
0 -1 -1 
0 -1 -1 0 
0 -1 -1 -1 
0 -1 -1 0 
1 0 0 0 
0 -1 -1 0 
0 -1 0 N/A 
0 -1 -1 0 
0 -1 -1 0 
0 -1 -1 -1 
-1 -1 -1 -1 
-1 0 0 -1 
0 N/A -1 
-1 0 -1 
-1 N/A -1 
1 0 0 -1 
0 0 0 -1 
-1 0 -1 
0 -1 0 -1 
-1 0 -1 
-1 -1 -1 
-1 -1 -1 
















0 1 -1 0 -1 -1 0 0 -1 -1 
0 0 -1 N/A 





























0 -1 -1 
0 -1 -1 
0 -1 N/A 
0 0 0 
0 0 N/A 
0 N/A N/A 
-1 -1 -1 
1 -1 
0 -1 -1 
0 0 0 
0 -1 -1 
0 -1 -1 
0 -1 -1 
-1 -1 -1 
0 -1 0 
0 -1 -1 
0 -1 -1 
0 -1 -1 
0 -1 0 
0 0 0 
0 -1 -1 
0 -1 -1 
0 -1 
-1 -1 -1 
0 0 
-1 -1 -1 
0 -1 -1 
0 0 0 
1 0 -1 
-1 -1 0 
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1 0 0 0 0 
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0 -1 0 -1 

































0 1 -1 











































































1 -1 0 -1 
0 -1 
1 
0 -1 -1 -1 
0 
0 -1 




0 N/A N/A 
0 1 


























0 0 0 0 0 
-1 0 0 0 0 
0 -1 N/A N/A -1 -1 
1 -1 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
-1 
0 1 
0 -1 1 



























0 0 -1 0 N/A 0 
-1 







1 -1 0 









0 0 0 
1 -1 
0 0 1 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 -1 
0 0 -1 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 -1 -1 
0 0 -1 
0 0 0 




































1 0 1 
-1 N/A 
-1 N/A 
1 0 -1 
0 0 
1 0 N/A 















0 N/A 0 
-1 -1 -1 




1 0 -1 



















0 0 1 
0 0 N/A 
0 -1 
0 -1 -1 
0 0 
0 0 
-1 0 0 0 














0 N/A 0 -1 





0 -1 0 
N/A 1 
1 
0 1 1 



































































-1 0 0 
-1 -1 -1 
0 -1 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
-1 0 
0 -1 





0 -1 0 
0 -1 -1 
-1 -1 





0 0 N/A -1 
0 0 0 
1 N/A N/A 




-1 N/A N/A N/A -1 
0 -1 -1 -1 0 
-1 0 0 N/A N/A 
-1 1 1 0 
-1 0 0 1 -1 
-1 0 0 -1 
-1 1 1 0 
0 0 0 -1 
0 1 N/A 1 
1 N/A N/A 1 
-1 N/A N/A 0 0 
0 0 -1 
0 1 0 0 
-1 N/A N/A 
0 
-1 


















N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
0 -1 
1 1 -1 -1 -1 
1 N/ A 1 -1 







-1 -1 -1 N/A N/A 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 N/A 
-1 0 
0 
0 N/A -1 
0 0 N/A 0 
0 -1 
0 0 1 
-1 0 0 
-1 -1 
-1 1 
0 0 0 
0 0 -1 

















































































042 043 044 045 046 047 048 049 050 051 052 053 054 055 
0 0 





















0 0 1 
-1 -1 
N/A N/A 
-1 0 -1 
0 
-1 0 -1 
-1 0 -1 
0 0 0 
-1 -1 -1 
-1 0 -1 
-1 0 0 
-1 0 -1 
-1 0 ON/A 
0 0 -1 
0 N/A -1 
1 N/A -1 
0 -1 N/ A 









0 N/A 0 
-1 -1 N/A 
0 0 -1 
0 -1 -1 
0 N/A -1 
-1 -1 -1 
-1 N/A -1 
N/A -1 
0 N/A N/A 
0 0 -1 























































-1 1 N/ A 1 
0 1 N/A 
0 1 















































































































































































































0 1 0 











































































































N/A -1 N/A N/A -1 
0 -1 0 -1 
Q56 Q57 Q58 Q59 Q60 Q61 Q62 Q63 
Q64 Q65 Q66 Q67 Q68 Q69 Q70 Q71 Q72
 Q73 Q74 Q75 
0 -1 
0 -1 0 0 
0 -1 N/A N/A 
-1 -1 0 
0 -1 -1 
0 0 0 1 
0 -1 1 
0 0 1 1 
-1 -1 N/A N/A 










0 N/A N/A 
-1 0 
-1 N/A N/A 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 -1 
0 -1 1 -1 
0 -1 1 



































-1 0 0 
-1 N/A 
-1 1 0 
-1 1 -1 
-1 -1 0 





0 N/A 0 















-1 -1 -1 
-1 N/A N/A 
-1 
-1 0 
-1 0 0 
-1 WA 
-1 0 -1 
-1 N/ A 0 
-1 
-1 0 -1 
-1 0 


























1 -1 -1 
0 N/A N/A 

































-1 -1 -1 0 
-1 -1 



























0 0 0 0 
-1 -1 -1 
0 -1 -1 
-1 -1 -1 -1 -1 
-1 -1 
-1 N/A -1 
1 0 N/A 
0 0 -1 
0 0 0 
-1 1 
0 N/A N/A 









0 -1 0 












-1 -1 -1 N/A 












-1 -1 -1 
0 
0 -1 -1 -1 
0 -1 -1 N/A 




























-1 0 0 
0 0 
0 -1 0 
0 0 -1 
















































































































































1 -1 0 0 1 
0 -1 1 
0 N/A 0 -1 1 



















































1 1 -1 0 
0 0 -1 -1 0 
0 -1 -1 -1 0 
0 -1 -1 -1 
1 -1 -1 -1 -1 








-1 N/A -1 
0 -1 -1 -1 
0 -1 N/A -1 














































0 0 1 
0 -1 N/A 
0 N/A 
0 -1 N/A 
0 0 












































































































0 0 -1 
0 -1 
0 1 0 -1 
0 0 -1 -1 
1 1 0 -1 
1 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 -1 
0 0 -1 
0 -1 
1 0 -1 
0 0 0 























































































































































































1 N/A -1 
0 N/A 0 
0 N/A 
0 -1 N/A 
0 N/A 0 
1 N/A 0 
0 -1 0 
0 0 -1 
0 0 0 
1 1 -1 



















































1 0 N/A 
-1 N/A 0 







1 0 -1 
-1 -1 
0 -1 N/A 





















-1 N/A N/A 













1 1 0 








































































































































































































































































































































































0 0 N/A 
0 ·1 0 
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1 0 0 
0 1 0 
0 N/A 0 







1 0 "1 
0 0 0 
-1 -1 N/A 
0 0 
N/A -1 
1 N/A 1 



























-1 N/A N/A ·0.05 


















·1 N/A N/A 
0 1 0.10 
·1 0 0.31 
·1 N/A 0.28 
0 ·0.01 

















1 N/A N/A 0 ·0.02 
1 -1 0 0 0.29 





0 -1 0 0.04 
N/A ·1 0 ·0.09 
1 "1 0.32 
N/A N/A 0 ·1 0 0.22 




0 0 0 
N/A N/A 0 0 
N/A N/A ·1 0 
































-1 N/ A 0 
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the responses to 
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01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Average 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 
-1 -1 N/A 
0 -1 




























0 -1 N/A 
-1 0 -1 
-1 -1 
-1 -1 -1 
-1 -1 
0 -1 -1 
-1 -1 -1 
0 -1 0 
-1 N/A 
0 -1 -1 




0 -1 -1 
-1 0 
1 0 0 0 









-1 -1 0 










1 -1 0 
0 -1 N/A 
0 -1 -1 































































0 -1 N/A 
0 0 0 
0 0 N/A 
0 N/AN/A 

































































































































Increasing quantity 08 09 010 011 012 013 014 015 016 017 018 019
 020 021 022 023 
0 -1 0 
0 
0 






0 0 -1 
1 -1 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 














0 -1 -1 -1 -1 
0 0 -1 0 
N/A -1 0 
0 -1 0 N/A 





0 -1 -1 
0 -1 -1 
0 -1 
0 -1 0 -1 
-1 0 -1 
-1 -1 -1 
-1 -1 -1 
0 N/A 0 -1 
-1 0 0 -1 
0 -1 0 -1 














-1 -1 0 N/A 
-1 -1 -1 
0 -1 0 
0 -1 
0 N/A 



























































































































-1 0 0 
-1 -1 0 
0 
0 0 -1 
-1 -1 -1 
-1 -1 0 
-1 -1 -1 
-1 -1 0 
0 -1 -1 
0 0 0 
-1 -1 0 
-1 -1 
-1 0 
0 0 0 





































-1 N/A N/A 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
-1 -1 0 
-1 -1 -1 
-1 -1 0 
0 0 0 
-1 -1 -1 
0 -1 -1 
-1 0 
-1 -1 0 
0 0 -1 
0 0 0 
-1 -1 -1 
-1 -1 -1 
-1 0 0 
-1 -1 0 
-1 -1 0 
-1 -1 -1 
1 0 -1 
-1 -1 -1 
0 0 -1 
1 -1 
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0 1 0 1 













-1 1 0 0 































































1 0 -1 
































1 0 -1 






024 025 026 027 028 029 030 031 032 033 034 035 036 037 038 039 040 041 042 043 044 
0 0 0 1 -1 0 -1 0 0 -1 







0 N/A N/A 
0 1 



















1 0 1 -1 
0 -1 1 -1 
0 0 N/A N/A 
0 0 
-1 1 























-1 -1 1 
-1 -1 -1 
0 0 0 
-1 N/A 
-1 0 -1 0 0 
0 0 -1 -1 





















































0 -1 N/A N/A -1 -1 -1 -1 
0 N/A 
0 1 








-1 0 -1 -1 
-1 0 -1 
-1 -1 -1 
0 0 -1 
-1 0 -1 
0 -1 0 0 
-1 N/A N/A -1 -1 









0 0 -1 0 -1 
0 N/A -1 
0 0 N/A 




































0 1 N/A 
0 0 1 
0 0 -1 
0 0 
0 0 0 
1 N/ A -1 
0 0 
0 0 -1 
















0 0 0 -1 
0 N/A 0 




































































0 0 N/A 
0 0 1 0 0 0 
1 N/A N/A 
0 0 0 
-1 0 -1 
0 0 0 
0 -1 0 0 








0 N/A N/A N/A 
-1 -1 0 
-1 1 
0 1 0 
0 1 N/A N/A 










































0 -1 1 







0 -1 -1 -1 0 









0 0 0 
0 1 N/A 
1 N/A N/A 
-1 N/A N/A 
0 
0 0 






































-1 -1 0 -1 
-1 0 0 0 
-1 -1 -1 -1 -1 























0 -1 N/A 
0 -1 0 
1 1 0 
-1 N/A 0 
0 0 -1 




0 N/A 0 -1 
-1 -1 -1 N/A 
-1 0 0 -1 
0 0 -1 -1 
0 -1 0 N/A -1 
0 0 -1 -1 -1 
0 0 -1 N/A -1 
-1 N/A N/A -1 
0 N/A 0 N/A N/A 
1 -1 0 0 -1 0 
-1 0 N/A 0 1 
-1 -1 0 -1 
0 -1 N/A -1 0 
0 -1 N/A -1 0 
0 
-1 -1 -1 -1 
-1 1 0 0 
-1 -1 0 
-1 -1 
0 0 
0 -1 N/A 
0 0 1 
045 046 047 Average 
1 0 1 0.24 
























































Improving quality 048 049 050 051 052 053 054 Average 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0.29 
0 0 0 0 0 0.29 




1 -1 0 -1 -1 






























-1 -1 ·1 
·1 0 









0 0 -1 ·1 -1 
·1 ·1 -1 ·1 
0 0 0 0 N/A ·1 
0 ·1 0 0 N/A 0 
0 0 
·1 0 
1 ·1 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 
1 0 
0 0 0 



















·1 -1 0 
0 0 -1 
0 0 0 
-1 -1 0 
0 0 -1 
·1 0 -1 
0 0 
-1 0 



















·1 0 ·1 ·1 -1 ·1 
0 ·1 0 0 0 0 
0 ·1 0 0 N/A 
1 1 








0 0 ·1 
0 1 0 

























































































0 ·1 N/A ·1 N/A N/A -0.25 
0.29 0 0 -1 0 
Saving cost 055 056 Average 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
-1 -1 -1 
-1 0 -0.5 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 -
-1 0 
-1 0 -0.5 
-1 -1 -1 
0 0 0 
-1 0 
0 0 0 
-1 -1 -1 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
-1 0 -0.5 
0 0 0 
1 1 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
-1 -1 -1 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
-1 0 -0.5 
-1 -1 -1 
-1 -1 -1 
-1 0 -0.5 
-1 -1 -1 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
-1 0 -0.5 
0 0 0 
-1 0 
0 0 0 
-1 -1 -1 
-1 0 -0.5 
-1 -1 -1 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
-1 -1 -1 
-1 0 -0.5 
-1 -1 -1 
0 0 0 
-1 0 -0.5 
-1 -1 -1 
-1 -1 -1 
N/A N/A N/A 
-1 0 -0.5 
-1 -1 -1 




057 058 059 060 061 062 063 064 065 066 067 068 069
 Average 
-1 
-1 0 0 






·1 N/A N/A 
·1 0 
·1 0 
N/A 0 0 
0 N/A N/A 
-1 0 

















































·1 1 0 
·1 ·1 ·1 
-1 N/A N/A 
·1 1 
·1 0 
·1 0 0 
-1 N/A 1 
·1 0 ·1 
-1 N/A 0 
·1 1 
·1 0 ·1 
·1 1 0 
-1 0 0 
0 1 0 
·1 1 0 
0 
·1 
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 .38 












-1 -1 -1 ·1 
-1 -1 -1 N/A 
-1 0 ·1 0 
-1 -1 ·1 ·1 












N/A ·1 -1 0 0 0 
-1 -1 0 0 
0 N/A -1 -1 ·1 0 0 




-1 ·1 0 
0 ·1 N/A 0 0 
0 0 
0 0 ·1 0 0 
-1 -1 -1 -1 ·1 0 0 1 
0 N/A N/A 
0 0 -1 
1 -1 ·1 0 0 0 
·1 -1 -1 0 0 










0 0 1 




































·1 1 1 
0 N/A N/A 
0 0 
-1 ·1 ·1 
-1 0 
0 0 -1 
·1 -1 
-1 N/A 
0 0 -1 
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PROFILE OF THE RESPONDENTS 
Number and Supportive Indifferent Critical 
Total 
percentage of 42 (73.7%) 2 (3.5%) 13 (22.8%
) 57 (100%) 
supportive, indifferent 




Number and Pakeha Non-Pakeha Total 








Number and Supportive Indifferent Critical 
Total 
percentage Pakeha - 42 (84%) Pakeha - 2 (4%) Pakeha - 6 (12%
) Pakeha - 50 (87%) 
supportive, Non-Pakeha - 0 (0%) Non-Pakeha- 0 (0%) Non-Pakeha
- 7 (100%) Non-Pakeha- 7 {12%) 
indifferent and 





Number and Supportive Indifferent Critical To
tal 
percentage of 20 (71.5%) 0 (0%) 8 (28.6%) 
28 (100%) 
supportive, indifferent 
and critical voluntary 
sector managers 
interviewed 
Number and Pakeha Non-Pakeha Total 






Number and percentage Supportive Indifferent Critical 
Total 
of supportive, indifferent Pakeha - 20 (80%) Pakeha - 0 (0%) Pakeha - 5 
(20%) Pakeha - 25 (89.3%) 
and critical Pakeha Non-Pakeha - 0 (0%) Non-Pakeha - 0 (0%) Non-Pakeh




Number of critical Supportive Critical Total 
and supportive 2 (66.6%) 1 (33.3%) 3 (100%) 
outreach workers 
Number and percentage Supportive Indifferent Critical T
otal 
of supportive, indifferent 6 (75%) 0 (0%) 2 (25%) 8
 (100%) 
and critical agency staff 





level* Achieving Genuine Partnership 
Achieving Gemi ne Partnership 
-1.00 .00 1DO Tctal 
Level Affiliated 21 4 5 30 
70.0% 13.3% 16.7% 100.0% 
Loca I 16 5 6 27 
59.3% 1&5% 22.2% 100.0% 
Tctal 37 9 11 57 
649% 15.8% 19.3% 100.0% 
Table 2 
Area* Achievil g Genuine Partnership 
Acn1evmg uenLJne .-armersn1p 
-1.00 .00 1DO Tctal 
!Aiea Urln1 25 5 7 37 
67.6% 13.5% 1&9°/o 100.0% 
Rural 12 4 4 20 
60.0% 20.0% 20.0% 100.0% 
Tctal 37 9 1 1 57 
64.9% 15.8% 19.3% 100.0% 
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Table 3 
Age* Achielllng Genuile Partnership 
Achieving Gemi ne Partnership 
-1.00 .00 100 Tctal 
Afl' Old 27 7 8 42 
64.3% 16.7% 19.0% 100.0% 
New 10 2 3 15 
66.7% 13.3% 20.0% 100.0% 
Tctal 37 9 11 57 
64.9% 15.8% 19.3% 100.0% 
Table4 
S~e *Achieving Genuine Palf:nership 
Achieving Genu ne Partnership 
-1.00 .00 100 Tctal 
>:i!Ze Large 12 3 3 18 
66.7% 16.7% 16.7% 100.0% 
Small 24 6 8 38 
63.2% 15.8% 21.1% 100.0% 
Total 36 9 11 56 
64.3% 16.1% 19.6% 100.0% 
Table 5 
Funding* Achieving Genuile Partnership 
Achieving Gemine Partne!Ship 
-1.00 .00 100 Total 
Funding 11 3 3 17 
Average 64.7% 17.6% 17.6% 100.0% 
Above ave rage 13 1 4 18 
72.2% 5B% 22. 2°/o 100.0% 
Below ave rage 7 3 1 11 
63.6% 27. 3°/o 9.1% 100.0% 
Total 31 7 8 46 
67.4% 15.2% 17.4% 100.0% 
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Table 6 
Clent Group • Achieving Genuine Partnership 
Achieving GenLine Partne!Ship 
-1.00 .00 1DO Tctal 
Cient 25 5 8 38 
Group Pakeha 65.8% 13.2% 21.1% 100.0% 
Non-Pakeha 5 2 7 
71.4% 2&6% 100.0% 
Mixed 7 2 3 12 
5&3% 1a 7% 25.0% 100.0°/o 
Tctal 37 9 11 57 .. 
64.9% 15.8% 19.3% 100.0% 
Table 7 
Level * Increasing Quantity 
Increasing Quantity 
-1 nn on 1 no Tntel 
Level Att!liated 7 1 22 30 
23.3% 3.3% 73.3% 100.0% 
Local 6 2 19 27 
22.2% 7.4% 70.4% 100.0% 
Total 13 3 41 57 
22.8% 5.3% 71.9% 100.0% 
Table 8 
Area * Increasing Quantity 
Increasing Quantity 
-1.00 .00 1.00. Tntol 
Area Urban 8 1 28 37 
21.6% 2.7% 75.7% 100.0% 
Rural 5 2 13 20 
25.0% 10.0% 65.0% 100.0% 
Total 13 3 41 57 
22.8% 5.3% 71.9% 100.0% 
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Table 9 
Age* Increasing Quantity 
Increasing Quantity 
-1.00 .00 1.00 Total 
Age Old 8 2 32 42 
19.0% 4.8% 76.2% 100.0% 
New 5 1 9 15 
33.3% 6.7% 60.0% 100.0% 
Total 13 3 41 57 
22.8% 5.3% 71.9% 100.0% 
Table 10 
Size *Increasing Quantity 
Increasing Quantity 
-1.00 .00 1.00 Total 
Size Large 3 15 18 
16.7% 83.3% 100.0% 
Small 9 3 26 38 
23.7% 7.9% 68.4% 100.0% 
Total 12 3 41 56 
21.4% 5.4% 73.2% 100.0% 
Table 11 
Funding * Increasing Quantity 
Increasing Quantity 
-1.00 .00 1.00 Total 
Funding 2 15 17 
Average 11.8% 88.2% 100.0% 
Above average 6 1 11' 18 
33.3% 5.6% 61.1% 100.0% 
Below average 2 1 8 11 
18.2% 9.1% 72.7% 100.0% 
Total 10 2 34 46 
21.7% 4.3% 73.9% 100.0% 
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Table 12 
Client Group'* Increasing Quantity 
Increasing Quantity 
-1 nn nn 100 Tntol 
Client 8 1 29 38 
Group Pakeha 21.1% 2.6% 76.3% 100.0% 
Non-Pakeha 1 1 5 7 
14.3% 14.3% 71.4 100.0% 
Mixed 4 1 7 12 
33.3% 8.3% 58.3% 100.0% 
Total 13 3 41 57 .. 
22.8% 5.3% 71.9% 100.0% 
Table 13 
Level* i1creasing Quantly 
Increasing Quanft y 
-1.00 .00 100 Tctal 
Level Affiliated 7 1 22 30 
23.3% 33% 73.3% 100.0% 
Local 6 2 19 27 
22.2% ?A% 70.4% 100.0% 
Tctal 13 3 41 57 
22.8% 53% 21. 1% 100.0% 
Table 14 
Area • Improving Quality 
Improving Quality 
-1 nn .00 1 nn Tntol 
Area Urban 16 7 14 37 
43.2% 18.9% 37.8% 100.0% 
Rural 6 5 9 20 
30.0% 25.0% 45.0% 100.0% 
Total 22 12 23 57 
38.6% 21.1% 40.4% 100.0% 
297 
Table 15 
Age *Improving Quai ty 
I mprovmg Uua• y 
-1.00 .00 100 Tctal 
Age Old 18 9 15 42 
42.9% 21.4% 35.7% 100.0% 
New 4 3 8 15 
26.7% 2QO% 53.3% 100.0% 
Tctal 22 12 23 57 
3&6% 21.1% 40.4% 100.0% 
Table 16 
Size *Improving Quality 
1 mprovmg u uan y 
-1.00 .00 100 Tcial 
Size Large 7 2 9 18 
3&9'% 11.1% 50.0% 100.0% 
Small 15 10 13 38 
39.5% 26.3% 34.2% 100.0% 
Tctal 22 12 22 56 
39.3% 21.4% 39.3% 100.0% 
Table 17 
Funding • Improving Quality 
Improving Quality 
-1.00 .00 1 nn TotaL 
Funding 6 2 9 17 
Average 35.3% 11.8% 52.9% 100.0% 
Above average 10 4 4 18 
55.6% 22.2% 22.2% 100.0% 
Below average 5 4 2 11 
45.5% 36.4% 18.2% 100.0% 
Total 21 10 15 46 
45.7% 21.7% 32.6% 100.0% 
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Table 18 
Cl en! Group *Improving Quality 
Improving Q uait y 
-1.00 .00 100 Tctal 
Cient 8 1 29 38 
Group Pakeba 21.1% 2B% ?a3% 100.0% 
Non-Pakeba 1 1 5 7 
14.3% 14.3% 71.4 100.0% 
Mixed 4 1 7 12 
33.3% 83% 583% 100.0% 
Tctal 13 3 41 57 .. 
22.8% 53% 71.9% 100.0% 
Table 19 
Level* Reducing Cost 
Reduang Cost 
-1.00 .00 100 Tctal 
Leva! Affiliated 8 20 2 30 
2a?% 66.7% 67% 100.0% 
L<x:a I 16 9 1 26 
61.5% 34.6% 38% 100.0% 
Tctal 24 29 3 56 
42.9% 51.8% 5.4% 100.0% 
Table 20 
Area* Reducing Cost 
Heat.clng vast 
-1.00 .00 100 Tctal 
A~ea Urban 13 22 2 42 
35.1% 59.5% 5.4% 100.0% 
Rural 11 7 1 14 
57.9% 36.8% 53% 100.0% 
Tctal 24 29 3 56 
42.9% 51.8% 5.4% 100.0% 
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Table 21 
Age* Reducing Cost 
Redu:1ng vO& 
-1.00 .00 100 Tdal 
Aga Old 15 25 2 42 
35.7% 59.5% 48% 100.0% 
New 9 4 1 14 
64.3% 2as% 7.1% 100.0% 
Tctal 24 29 3 56 
429% 51.8% 5.4% 100.0% 
Table 22 
Size* Reducing Cost 
HeOLCing IJO& 
-1.00 .00 100 Tctal 
Aga Large 5 13 18 
27.8% 722% 100.0% 
Small 19 15 3 37 
51.4% 40.5% 8.1% 100.0% 
Tctal 24 28 3 55 
43.6% 50.9% 55% 100.0% 
Table 23 
Funding *Reducing Cost 
Reducing Cost 
-1.00 .00 100 Tctal 
Funding 5 12 17 
Average 29.4% 70.6% 100.0% 
Above ave rage 7 9 2 18 
3&9% 50.0% 11.1% 100.0% 
Below ave rage 5 6 11 
45.5% 54.5% 100.0% 
Tctal 17 27 2 46 
37.0% 5&7% 43% 100.0% 
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Table 24 
Cl ent Group • Reducing Cost 
Reducing Cost 
-1.00 .00 100 Tctal 
Cient 13 23 2 38 
Group Pakeha 34.2% 60.5% 53% 100.0% 
Non-Pakeha 3 4 7 
429% 57.1% 100.0% 
Mixed 8 2 1 11 
727% 1a2% 9.1% 100.0% 
Tctal 24 29 3 56 
42.9% 51.8% 5.4% 100.0% 
Table 25 
Level • Responding to Changes 
Respond ng to Changes 
-1.00 .00 100 Tctal 
Le;a Affiliated 12 3 15 30 
40.0% 10.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
L<x:a I 9 4 14 27 
63.3% 14.8% 51.9% 100.0% 
Total 21 7 29 57 
36.8% 12.3% 50.9% 100.0% 
Table 26 
Area • Respondng to Changes 
Respond ng to Changes 
-1.00 .00 100 Tctal 
Area Urban 13 4 20 37 
35.1% 10.8% 54.1% 100.0% 
Rural 8 3 9 20 
40.0% 15.0% 45.0% 100.0% 
Total 21 7 29 57 
36.8% 12.3% 50.9% 100.0% 
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Table 27 
Age • Responding to Changes 
Hesponclng to Changes 
-1.00 .00 1DO Tctal 
A<;!' Old 13 4 25 42 
31.0% 95% 59.5% 100.0% 
New 8 3 4 15 
53.3% 20.0% 26.7% 100.0% 
Tctal 21 7 29 57 
36.8% 12.3% 50.9% 100.0% 
Table 28 
S~e *Responding to Changes 
Responcl ng to Changes 
-1.00 .00 1DO Tctal 
1 S~e Large 6 1 11 18 
33.3% 5£% 61.1% 100.0% 
Small 14 6 18 38 
36.8% 15.8% 47.4% 100.0% 
Tctal 20 7 29 56 
35.7% 12.5% 51.8% 100.0% 
Table 29 
Funding •Responding to Changes 
Responding to Changes 
-1.00 .00_ Tnt" I 
Funding 5 1 11 17 
Average 29.4% 5.9% 64.7% 100.0% 
Above average 7 3 8 18 
38.9% 16.7% 44.4% 100.0% 
Below average 4 1 6 11 
36.4% 9.1% 54.5% 100.0% 
Total 16 5 25 46 
34.8% 10.9% 54.3% 100.0% 
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Table 30 
Cl ent Group • Responding to Changes 
Respondng to Charges 
-1.00 .00 100 Tctal 
Cient 13 4 21 38 
Group Pakeha 34.2% 1 0. 5°/o 55.3% 100.0% 
Non-Pakeha 2 1 4 7 
2as% 14.3% <71 100.0% 
Mixed 6 2 4 12 
50.0% 16.7% 33.3% 100.0% 
Tctal 21 7 29 57 
36.8% 12.3% 50.9% 100.0% 
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Table 31 
Level • Ensuring Accountability 
t:rsurn g ACCountat:i 11y 
-1.00 .00 1.00 Tctal 
LENel Affiliattrl 6 2 22 30 
20.0% 6.7% 73.3% 100.0% 
Local 7 4 16 27 
25.9% 14.8% 59.3% 100.0% 
Tctal 13 6 38 57 
22.8% 10.5% 66.7% 100.0% 
Table 32 
Area *Ensuring Accounlabilily 
ErsurngAccountat:iliy 
-1.00 .00 1.00 Tctal 
Area Urban 6 4 27 37 
16.2% 10.8% 73.0% 100.0% 
Rural 7 2 11 20 
35.0% 100% 55.0% 100.0% 
Tctal 13 6 38 57 
22.8% 10.5% 66.7% 100.0% 
Table 33 
Age • Ensuring Accountabilty 
t:rsurng Accountaa1iy 
-1.00 .00 1.00 Tctal 
Ago Old 8 4 30 42 
19.0% 9.5% 71.4% 100.0% 
New 5 2 8 15 
33.3% 13.3% 53.3% 100.0% 
Tctal 13 6 38 57 
22.8% 10.5% 66.7% 100.0% 
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Table 34 
Size • Ensuring Accountability 
t::rsurn g Aocountati lly 
-1.00 .00 1.00 Tctal 
! Size Large 3 15 18 
16.7% 83.3% 100.0% 
Small 10 6 22 38 
263% 15.8% 57.9% 100.0% 
Tctal 13 6 37 56 
23.2% 10.7% 661% 100.0% 
Table 35 
Funding *Ensuring Accountability 
Ensurng Aocountal:i lly 
-1.00 .00 Tctal 
Funding 3 14 17 
Average 17.6% 824% 100.0% 
Above ave rage 3 4 11 18 
16.7% 22.2% 611% 100.0% 
Bebw ave rage 5 6 11 
45.5% 54.5% 100.0% 
Tctal 11 4 31 46 
23.9% 8.7% 67.4% 100.0% 
Table 36 
Client Group • Ensuring Accountability 
Ensurng Aocountal:i lly 
-1.00 .00 1.00 Tctal 
Cient 6 4 28 38 
G10up Pakeha 15.8% 10.5% 73.7% 100.0% 
Non-Pakeha 5 2 7 
71.4% n fi% 100.0% 
Mixed 2 2 8 12 
167% 167% 667% 100.0% 
Tctal 13 6 38 57 
22.8% 10.5% 667% 100.0% 
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Table 37 
Level • Empowering Communities 
empowering <.;ommlllities 
-1.00 .00 1.00 Tctal 
LENa Affiliated 1 2 27 30 
3.3% 6.7% 90.0% 100.0% 
Local 2 3 22 27 
7.4% 11.1% 81.5% 100.0% 
Tctal 3 5 49 57 
5.3% 8.8% 86.0% 100.0% 
Table 38 
Area *Empowering Communities 
empowering <.;ommllliles 
-1.00 .00 1.00 Tctal 
! Area Urban 1 3 33 37 
2.7% 8.1% 89.2% 100.0% 
Rural 2 2 16 20 
10.0% 100% BOO% 100.0% 
Tctal 3 5 49 57 
5.3% 8.8% 86.0% 100.0% 
Table 39 
Age • Elt1lowering Communities 
t:mpoweri ng <.;ommlllities 
-1.00 .00 1.00 Tctal 
Age Old 1 3 38 42 
2.4% 7.1% 90.5% 100.0% 
New 2 2 11 15 
13.3% 13.3% 73.3% 100.0% 
Tctal 3 5 49 57 
5.3% 8.8% 86.0% 100.0% 
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Table 40 
Size * Empowering Communi! es 
Empowering communites 
-1.00 .00 1.00 Tctal 
::;ize Large 1 1 16 18 
5.6% 5.6% 86.9% 100.0% 
Small 2 4 32 38 
5.3% 10.5% 84.2% 100.0% 
Tctal 3 5 48 56 
5.4% 8.9% 85.7% 100.0% 
Table 41 
Funding *Empowering Communities 
Empowering Communites 
-1.00 .00 Tctal 
Funding 1 1 15 17 
Average 5.9% 5.9% 88.2% 100.0% 
Alxlve ave rage 1 17 18 
5.6% 94.4% 100.0% 
Below ave rage 1 2 8 11 
9.1% 18.2% 727% 100.0% 
Tctal 2 4 40 46 
4.3% 8.7% 87.0% 100.0% 
Table 42 
Client Group • Empowering Communities 
Empowering Communites 
-1.00 .00 1.00 Tctal 
Cient 1 3 34 38 
GIOUP Pakeha 2.6% 7.9% 89.5% 100.0% 
Non-Pakeha 1 6 7 
14.3% o< 7<&. 100.0% 
Mixed 1 2 9 12 
8.3% 16.7% 75.0% 100.0% 
Tctal 3 5 49 57 
5.3% 8.8% 86.0% 100.0% 
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Table 43 
Level • Promoting Clarity 
t-'IOmoting c;la rly 
-1.00 .00 1.00 Tctal 
j LEWel Affiliated 7 2 21 30 
233% 6.7% 70.0% 100.0% 
Local 2 3 22 27 
7.4% 11.1% 81.5% 100.0% 
Tctal 9 5 43 57 
15.8% 8.8% 75.4% 100.0% 
Table 44 
Area • Promoting Clarity 
t-'IOmoting c;lariy 
-1.00 .00 1.00 Tctal 
Area Urban 8 2 27 37 
21.6% 5.4% 730% 100.0% 
Rural 1 3 16 20 
5.0% 15.0% 800% 100.0% 
Tctal 9 5 43 57 
1!i8% 8.8% 75.4% 100.0% 
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Table 45 
Age • Promoting Clarity 
Promo! ng Ci:! rly 
-1.00 .00 100 Tctal 
Aga Old 8 2 32 42 
19.0% 48% 76.2% 100.0% 
New 1 3 11 15 
6.7°/o 2QO% 73.3% 100.0% 
Tctal 9 5 43 57 
15.8% 88% 75.4% 100.0% 
Table 46 
Size • Proma ing Clarity 
Promotng ~.;arly 
-1.00 .00 100 Tctal 
Size Large 5 1 12 18 
27.8% 5.6% 66.7% 100.0% 
Small 4 3 31 38 
10.5% 7.9% 81.6% 100.0% 
Total 9 4 43 56 
16.1% 7.1% 76.8% 100.0% 
Table 47 
Funding *Promoting Carty 
Promo! ng Ci:! rly 
-1.00 .00 Tctal 
Funding 4 1 12 17 
Average 23.5% 59% 70.6% 100.0% 
Above average 4 1 13 18 
222% 5£% 72.2% 100.0% 
Below ave rage 1 1 9 11 
9.1% 9l% 81.8% 100.0% 
Tctal 9 3 34 46 
19.6% 65% 73.9% 100.0% 
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Table48 
Clenl Group • Promoti1 g Clarity 
PromolngCarly 
-1.00 .00 100 Tctal 
Cient 8 2 28 38 
Group Pakeha 21.1% 53% 73.7% 100.0% 
Non-Pakeha 1 1 5 7 
14.3% 14.3% 71 d% 100.0% 
Mixed 2 10 12 
16.7% 83.3% 100.0% 
Tctal 9 5 43 57 
15.8% 88% 75.4% 100.0% 
Table 49 
Level* Faciit ating Transparency 
Faci tating Transparency 
.00 100 Tolal 
Lewel Affiliated 24 6 30 
Q() ()07. 20.0% 1000% 
Lrol I 19 7 26 
73.1% 26.9% 1000% 
Tctal 43 13 56 
76.8% 23.2% 1000% 
Table 50 
Area • Facillating Transparency 
Facl tating Transparency 
.00 100 Tom I 
Area Url:m 29 8 37 
70 """' 
21.6% 1000% 
Rural 14 5 19 
73.7% 26.3% 1000% 
Total 43 13 56 
76.8% 23.2% 1000% 
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Table 51 
Age • Faclitating Transpa-ency 
Faci taling Transparency 
()() 1DO Total 
Age Old 34 8 42 
01 f\OL 19.0% 1000% 
New 9 5 14 
64.3% 35.7% 1000% 
Tctal 43 13 56 
76.8% 23.2% 1000% 
Table 52 
Size • Facl Hating Transparency 
Faci taling Transparency 
.00 1D 0 Tolal 
Size Large 16 2 18 
RR Q~ 11.1% 1000% 
Small 26 11 37 
70.3% 29.7% 1000% 
Tctal 42 13 55 
76.4% 23.6% 1000% 
Table 53 
Funding *Facilitating Transparency 
Facilitating Transparency 
-.00 _1.DO 
Funding 15 2 17 
Average 88.2% 11.8% 
Above average 12 6 18 
66.7% 33.3% 100.0° 
Below average 9 2 11 
81.8% 18.2% 100.0 
Total 36 10 46 
78.3% 21.7% 100.0% 
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Table 54 
Cl ent Group* Facl Hating Transparency 
Faci tating Transparency 
-.00 1 D 0 Td:al 
Cient 30 8 38 
Group Pakeha ?as% 21.1% 1 00.0' 
Non-Pakeha 6 1 7 
85.7% 14.3% lnllO'li 
Mixed 7 4 11 
63.6% 36.4% 100.0 
Tci:al 43 13 56 
76.8% 23.2% 1 00.0' 
Table 55 
Level* Encouraging Justice 
Ercourag ng Juslce 
-1.00 .00 100 Tci:al 
Level Affiliated 2 2 26 30 
6.7% 6.7 o/o 86.7% 100.0% 
Local 1 26 27 
3.7% 96.3% 100.0% 
Tci:al 2 3 52 57 
35% 53% 91.2% 100.0% 
Table 56 
Area *Encouraging Justice 
Ercourag ng Jus! ce 
-1.00 .00 100 Tci:al 
Area Urban 2 2 33 37 
5.4% 5.4% 89.2% 100.0% 
Rural 1 19 20 
5D% 95.0% 100.0% 
Tci:al 2 3 52 57 
35% 53% 91.2% 100.0% 
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Table 57 
Age* Encouraging Justice 
Ercouragrg Jusice 
-1.00 .00 1DO Tctal 
AfF' Old 2 2 38 42 
48% 48% 9Q5% 100.0% 
New 1 14 15 
6.7% 93.3% 100.0% 
Tctal 2 3 52 57 
35% 53% 91.2% 100.0% 
Table 58 
Size* Encouraging Justice 
Ercouragrg Jusice 
-1.00 .00 1DO Tctal 
Size Large 1 2 15 18 
5£% 11.1% 83.3% 100.0% 
Small I 1 36 38 
2fi% 2B% 94.7% 100.0% 
Tctal 2 3 51 56 
3.6% 5A% 91.1% 100.0% 
Table 59 
Funding •Encouraging Justice 
a!>iru,Ju sti B 
-1.00 .00 Tctal 
Funding 1 2 14 17 
Average 5.9% 11.8% 824% 100.0% 
Above ave rage 17 18 
94.4% 100.0% 
Below ave rage 11 11 
!OOD% 100.0% 
Tctal 2 2 42 46 
43% 43% 91.3% 100.0% 
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Table 60 
Cl ent Group • Encouraging Justice 
Encouragrg Juslce 
-1.00 .00 1DO Tctal 
Cient 2 2 34 38 
Group Pakeha 53% 53% 89.5% 100.0% 
Non-Pakeha 7 7 
1M()ot 100.0% 
Mixed 1 11 12 
83% 81.7% 100.0% 
Tctal 2 3 52 57 
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